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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons™
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Articles 1 - 2 of 2
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Information Aggregation In Polls, John Morgan, Phillip C. Stocken
Information Aggregation In Polls, John Morgan, Phillip C. Stocken
Dartmouth Scholarship
We study information transmission via polling. A policymaker polls constituents, who differ in their information and ideology, to determine policy. Full revelation is an equilibrium in a poll with a small sample, but not with a large one. In large polls, full information aggregation can arise in an equilibrium where constituents endogenously sort themselves into centrists, who respond truthfully, and extremists, who do not. We find polling statistics that ignore strategic behavior yield biased estimators and mischaracterize the poll's margin of error. We construct estimators that account for strategic behavior. Finally, we compare polls and elections.
Gerrymanders And Theories Of Law Making: A Study Of Legislative Redistricting In Illinois, Michael C. Herron, Alan E. Wiseman
Gerrymanders And Theories Of Law Making: A Study Of Legislative Redistricting In Illinois, Michael C. Herron, Alan E. Wiseman
Dartmouth Scholarship
Redistricting politics in Illinois provide a novel opportunity for testing competing theories of law making. With this in mind, we demonstrate that the post-2000 Census redistricters in Illinois, dominated by Democrats, strategically reshuffled district demographic profiles in an attempt to convert relatively liberal Republican districts to conservative Democratic districts in the state Senate while decreasing and increasing the ideological diversity of the Democrats and Republicans, respectively, in the House. Such reshufflings suggest that legislative politics in Illinois are conducted in a manner consistent with vote-buying theories of coalition formation.