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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Withdrawal: Reassessing America's Final Years In Vietnam, Gregory A. Daddis
Withdrawal: Reassessing America's Final Years In Vietnam, Gregory A. Daddis
History Faculty Books and Book Chapters
Withdrawal is a groundbreaking reassessment that tells a far different story of the Vietnam War. Daddis convincingly argues that the entire US effort in South Vietnam was incapable of reversing the downward trends of a complicated Vietnamese conflict that by 1968 had turned into a political-military stalemate. Despite a new articulation of strategy, Abrams's approach could not materially alter a war no longer vital to US national security or global dominance. Once the Nixon White House made the political decision to withdraw from Southeast Asia, Abrams's military strategy was unable to change either the course or outcome of a decades' …
Choosing Progress: Evaluating The "Salesmanship" Of The Vietnam War In 1967, Gregory A. Daddis
Choosing Progress: Evaluating The "Salesmanship" Of The Vietnam War In 1967, Gregory A. Daddis
History Faculty Books and Book Chapters
"As the president and his war managers increasingly saw Vietnam as a 'race between accomplishment and patience,' publicizing progress became an integral part of the war. Yet far from a unique case of bureaucratic dishonesty, the 1967 salesmanship campaign demonstrates the reality, even necessity, of conversation gaps when one is assessing progress in wars where the military struggle abroad matters less than the political one at home."
American Military Strategy In The Vietnam War, 1965– 1973, Gregory A. Daddis
American Military Strategy In The Vietnam War, 1965– 1973, Gregory A. Daddis
History Faculty Books and Book Chapters
For nearly a decade, American combat soldiers fought in South Vietnam to help sustain an independent, noncommunist nation in Southeast Asia. After U.S. troops departed in 1973, the collapse of South Vietnam in 1975 prompted a lasting search to explain the United States’ first lost war. Historians of the conflict and participants alike have since critiqued the ways in which civilian policymakers and uniformed leaders applied—some argued misapplied—military power that led to such an undesirable political outcome. While some claimed U.S. politicians failed to commit their nation’s full military might to a limited war, others contended that most officers fundamentally …