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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons™
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Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Pay Suppression In Social Impact Contexts: How Framing Work Around The Greater Good Inhibits Job Candidate Compensation Demands, Insiya Hussain, Marko Pitesa, Stefan Thau, Michael Schaerer
Pay Suppression In Social Impact Contexts: How Framing Work Around The Greater Good Inhibits Job Candidate Compensation Demands, Insiya Hussain, Marko Pitesa, Stefan Thau, Michael Schaerer
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Past research suggests that when organizations communicate the benefits of their work for human welfare—that is, use a social impact framing for work—job candidates are willing to accept lower wages because they expect the work to be personally meaningful. We argue that this explanation overlooks a less socially desirable mechanism by which social impact framing leads to lower compensation demands: the perception among job candidates that requesting higher pay will breach organizational expectations to value work for its intrinsic (rather than extrinsic) rewards, or constitute a motivational norm violation. We find evidence for our theory across five studies: a qualitative …
Building Negotiation Capital, Michael Benoliel
Building Negotiation Capital, Michael Benoliel
Asian Management Insights
Today, unlike the marketing or supply chain tasks, the negotiation task remains unstructured, sporadic, often improvised, and rarely analysed critically in the post-deal stage.
The Too-Much Precision Effect: When And Why Precise Anchors Backfire With Experts, David D. Loschelder, Malte Friese, Michael Schaerer, Adam D. Galinsky
The Too-Much Precision Effect: When And Why Precise Anchors Backfire With Experts, David D. Loschelder, Malte Friese, Michael Schaerer, Adam D. Galinsky
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Past research has suggested a fundamental principle of price precision: The more precise an opening price, the more it anchors counteroffers. The present research challenges this principle by demonstrating a too-much-precision effect. Five experiments (involving 1,320 experts and amateurs in real-estate, jewelry, car, and human-resources negotiations) showed that increasing the precision of an opening offer had positive linear effects for amateurs but inverted-U-shaped effects for experts. Anchor precision backfired because experts saw too much precision as reflecting a lack of competence. This negative effect held unless first movers gave rationales that boosted experts’ perception of their competence. Statistical mediation and …