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Articles 1 - 30 of 74
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Birds, Bats And Minds. Tales Of A Revolutionary Scientist: Donald R. Griffin. Volume Three, Carolyn A. Ristau
Birds, Bats And Minds. Tales Of A Revolutionary Scientist: Donald R. Griffin. Volume Three, Carolyn A. Ristau
eBooks
In this three-volume biography, we revisit the life and accomplishments of the revolutionary scientist, Donald R. Griffin. He encountered a lifetime of initial hostile resistance to his ideas and studies; now they are largely accepted. He and a colleague discovered the phenomenon of echolocation used by bats to navigate and capture insects, proposed that birds navigate guided by such cues as the sun and stars, and suggested that animals are likely aware, thinking and feeling beings. Forty interviews with his colleagues and friends help us understand the young emerging scientist and the mature researcher. We learn about his and others’ …
The Divided Self: Internal Conflict In Literature, Philosophy, Psychology, And Neuroscience, Yulia Greyman
The Divided Self: Internal Conflict In Literature, Philosophy, Psychology, And Neuroscience, Yulia Greyman
Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects
This thematic project examines the notion of self-division, particularly in terms of the conflict between cognition and metacognition, across the fields of philosophy, psychology, and, most recently, the cognitive and neurosciences. The project offers a historic overview of models of self-division, as well as analyses of the various problems presented in theoretical models to date. This work explores how self-division has been depicted in the literary works of Edgar Allan Poe, Don DeLillo, and Mary Shelley. It examines the ways in which artistic renderings alternately assimilate, resist, and/or critique dominant philosophical, psychological, and scientific discourses about the self and its …
Plants Lack The Functional Neurotransmitters And Signaling Pathways Required For Sentience In Animals, David G. Robinson, Michael R. Blatt, Andreas Draguhn, Lincoln Taiz, Jon Mallatt
Plants Lack The Functional Neurotransmitters And Signaling Pathways Required For Sentience In Animals, David G. Robinson, Michael R. Blatt, Andreas Draguhn, Lincoln Taiz, Jon Mallatt
Animal Sentience
We cannot agree with Segundo-Ortin and Calvo that plants are sentient organisms. We have critically examined several aspects of their target article, and find their claims are not supported by the published evidence. We address these claims in sections on whether plants have a ‘neurobiology’ analogous to that of animal nervous systems, including neurotransmitters and synaptic receptors that respond to anesthetics; and whether plant signaling resembles neural transmission. For the latter, we especially consider the unique way plants signal their responses to wounding. Although the plant vascular system has been compared to the animal nervous system, animal blood vessels would …
Consciousness, Evolution, And The Self-Organizing Brain, Karen Seymour
Consciousness, Evolution, And The Self-Organizing Brain, Karen Seymour
Journal of Conscious Evolution
While evolution is guided by natural selection, it is internally driven by self-organizing processes. The brain encompasses these complementary forces and dynamics of evolution in both its structure and dynamics by embodying a historical record of the factors that have shaped it throughout its evolutionary past, as well as by being shaped by selective parameters in real time. Self-organization is evident in not only the brain’s structure and form, but also in the processes that support consciousness. From the convergence of complex structure and the novelty-generating dynamics of chaos that both characterize the brain arises the experience of explicit consciousness, …
Sentience In Decapods: Difficulties To Surmount, Michael L. Woodruff
Sentience In Decapods: Difficulties To Surmount, Michael L. Woodruff
Animal Sentience
In the target article Crump et al. present 8 criteria to assess whether decapods experience pain. Four of these -- sensory integration, motivational trade-offs, flexible self-protection, and associative learning -- could be used to assess sentience in general. In this commentary I discuss difficulties with using these criteria to provide evidence of sentience in decapods, particularly if this evidence is to change public opinion and policies. These difficulties are lack of evidence, the potential to eventually explain the neurobiological basis of the behaviors chosen as criteria, thereby eliminating any explanatory work for sentience, and the reluctance to bring animals that …
A Framework For Evaluating Evidence Of Pain In Animals, Matilda Gibbons, Lars Chittka
A Framework For Evaluating Evidence Of Pain In Animals, Matilda Gibbons, Lars Chittka
Animal Sentience
Crump et al. define eight criteria indicating sentience in animals, with a focus on pain. Here, we point out the risk of false negative or false positive diagnoses of pain. Criteria of different levels of inclusivity are useful for using the precautionary principle in animal welfare considerations, and for more formal scientific evidence of pain. We suggest tightening the criteria -- from more general evidence of sentience to pain alone -- because crucial evidence for animal welfare decisions might otherwise be missed for animals subjected to invasive and injurious procedures.
Defending Human Difference By Raising The Bar, Joe Gough
Defending Human Difference By Raising The Bar, Joe Gough
Animal Sentience
Chapman & Huffman (C&H) offer a theory of why we humans want to believe that we are different: to justify our cruelty to animals. This commentary offers further supporting evidence of this and examines more closely what the claim that humans are ‘different’ amounts to. It also considers some methodological issues in animal psychology closely related to C&H ‘s theory. These problems result from a common strategy for defending hypotheses about human difference.
The Reality And Prevalence Of Animal Sentience, Antonio Damasio
The Reality And Prevalence Of Animal Sentience, Antonio Damasio
Animal Sentience
Rowan et al use findings from neurobiology, clinical neurology, and general biology to argue for the extensive presence of sentience in animals, but they are wisely cautious concerning when in the phylogenetic scale that emergence occurred.
Do Beetles Have Experiences? How Can We Tell?, Matt Cartmill
Do Beetles Have Experiences? How Can We Tell?, Matt Cartmill
Animal Sentience
We attribute consciousness to other humans because their anatomy and behavior resembles our own and their verbal descriptions of subjective experiences correspond to ours. Nonhuman mammals have somewhat humanlike behavior and anatomy, but without the verbal descriptions. Their sentience is therefore open to Cartesian doubt. Robot "minds" lack humanlike behavior and anatomy, and so their sentience is generally discounted no matter what sentences they generate. Invertebrates lack both neurological similarity and language. Although it may be safest in making moral judgments to assume that some invertebrates are sentient, cogent reasons for thinking so must await an objective causal explanation for …
Inhibition Of Pain Or Response To Injury In Invertebrates And Vertebrates, Matilda Gibbons, Sajedeh Sarlak
Inhibition Of Pain Or Response To Injury In Invertebrates And Vertebrates, Matilda Gibbons, Sajedeh Sarlak
Animal Sentience
In certain situations, insects appear to lack a response to noxious stimuli that would cause pain in humans. For example, from the fact that male mantids continue to mate while being eaten by their partner it does not follow that insects do not feel pain; it could be the result of modulation of nociceptive inputs or behavioural outputs. When we try to infer the underlying mental state of an insect from its behaviour, it is important to consider the behavioural effects of the associated physiological and neurobiological mechanisms.
Experimental Investigation Examining The Effects Of Acute Exercise On Implicit Memory Function, Paul D. Loprinzi, Morgan Gilbert, Gina Robinson, Briahna Dickerson
Experimental Investigation Examining The Effects Of Acute Exercise On Implicit Memory Function, Paul D. Loprinzi, Morgan Gilbert, Gina Robinson, Briahna Dickerson
Faculty and Student Publications
© 2019, PsychOpen. All rights reserved. Emerging work suggests that acute exercise can enhance explicit memory function. Minimal research, however, has examined whether acute exercise is associated with implicit memory, which was the purpose of this study. Three separate experimental studies were computed (N = 120; Mean age = 21). In Experiment 1, participants were randomly assigned to either a moderate-intensity bout of acute exercise (15-minute) or engaged in a seated control task (15-minute), followed by the completion of a word-fragmentation implicit memory task. Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1, but instead employed a higher-intensity exercise protocol. For Experiment 3, participants …
The Question Of Animal Awareness, Francoise Wemelsfelder
The Question Of Animal Awareness, Francoise Wemelsfelder
Françoise Wemelsfelder, PhD
The problem of animal awareness lies at the interface of science and philosophy. As a starting point for the study of phenomena such as awareness, mind, consciousness, etc., we hardly have any reference other than our own human experience and in the context of a nondualistic ontology this can be justified. In philosophy and psychology it appears to be very difficult to give direct operational definitions of terms such as consciousness, etc. So we might expect this to be even more difficult in the study of animals. A detailed knowledge of animals and their behaviour is necessary in order to …
Coupled Correlates Of Attention And Consciousness, Ravi Varkki Chacko
Coupled Correlates Of Attention And Consciousness, Ravi Varkki Chacko
McKelvey School of Engineering Theses & Dissertations
Introduction: Brain Computer Interfaces (BCIs) have been shown to restore lost motor function that occurs in stroke using electrophysiological signals. However, little evidence exists for the use of BCIs to restore non-motor stroke deficits, such as the attention deficits seen in hemineglect. Attention is a cognitive function that selects objects or ideas for further neural processing, presumably to facilitate optimal behavior. Developing BCIs for attention is different from developing motor BCIs because attention networks in the brain are more distributed and associative than motor networks. For example, hemineglect patients have reduced levels of arousal, which exacerbates their attentional deficits. More …
The Perfecting Of The Octopus, Ila France Porcher
The Perfecting Of The Octopus, Ila France Porcher
Animal Sentience
Cephalopods split away from the phylogenetic tree about half a billion years ago, and octopus evolution has been accelerated by an extremely low survival rate. This helps explain why this unusual animal presents qualities found in no other. It has a radially organized nervous system with a processing centre for each of its eight tentacles. Yet, although this might suggest that each tentacle has its own centre of consciousness, it remains just one animal, with one mouth to feed, and one life to lose, and it behaves as if it is centrally controlled. Its capacity for a range of intelligent …
Complexities And Challenges Of Nonduality, Elizabeth Stephens
Complexities And Challenges Of Nonduality, Elizabeth Stephens
CONSCIOUSNESS: Ideas and Research for the Twenty-First Century
States of consciousness referred to as nonduality, awakening, enlightenment, moksha, peak experience, unitive states, or void states, among other terms, have garnered increasing secular attention and have become a topic of psychological and neuroscientific research. A review of the literature revealed many challenges to studying this set of states, such as inconsistent conceptualizations, a variety of models and theories, and conflicting descriptions indicating that the actual experience may not live up to the superlative descriptions found in historical texts or the expectations put forth by nondual teachers. A great deal more empirical research on this topic is needed, and researchers …
Cephalopods Are Best Candidates For Invertebrate Consciousness, Jennifer A. Mather, Claudio Carere
Cephalopods Are Best Candidates For Invertebrate Consciousness, Jennifer A. Mather, Claudio Carere
Jennifer Mather, PhD
Insects might have been the first invertebrates to evolve sentience, but cephalopods were the first invertebrates to gain scientific recognition for it.
If It Looks Like A Duck: Fish Fit The Criteria For Pain Perception, Julia E. Meyers-Manor
If It Looks Like A Duck: Fish Fit The Criteria For Pain Perception, Julia E. Meyers-Manor
Animal Sentience
Whereas we have denied the experience of pain to animals, including human babies, the evidence is becoming clearer that animals across a variety of species have the capacity to feel pain (Bellieni, 2012). As converging findings are collected from pain studies and the study of cognition, it is becoming harder to deny that fish are among the species that do feel pain.
Pain In Fish: Evidence From Peripheral Nociceptors To Pallial Processing, Michael L. Woodruff
Pain In Fish: Evidence From Peripheral Nociceptors To Pallial Processing, Michael L. Woodruff
Animal Sentience
The target article by Sneddon et al. (2018) presents convincing behavioral and pharmacological evidence that ray-finned fish consciously perceive noxious stimuli as painful. One objection to this interpretation of the evidence is that the fish nervous system is not complex enough to support the conscious experience of pain. Data that contradict this objection are presented in this commentary. The neuroanatomy and neurophysiology of the fish nervous system from the peripheral nerves to the pallium is able to support the sentient appreciation of pain.
Fish Sentience, Consciousness, And Ai, Ila France Porcher
Fish Sentience, Consciousness, And Ai, Ila France Porcher
Animal Sentience
The systematic criticism of articles providing evidence that fish and invertebrates can feel pain is discussed. Beliefs are known to be stronger than evidence in the human mind, and could generate this outcry, while from another perspective, the criticisms appear as a territorial move by fishermen against a perceived threat to their domain. The scientific inconsistency in which consciousness is granted to machines but not to fish and invertebrates, purely due to political bias, is pointed out. No basis exists for denying sentience to any life form as long as science is ignorant of the nature and source of consciousness.
Preserved Consciousness In The Absence Of A Cerebral Cortex, The Legal And Ethical Implications Of Redefining Consciousness And Its Neural Correlates: A Case For A Subcortical System Generating Affective Consciousness, Shadia Kawkabani
Williams Honors College, Honors Research Projects
Historically, the scientific and medical communities have taken a corticocentric view on consciousness, emphasizing the need for a cortex in producing the conscious experience. The preserved consciousness observed in hydranencephalic children and decorticated rats suggests that some form of consciousness may be produced by a subcortical network. The brainstem, a phylogenetically ancient and conserved brain structure, could serve as the major integrative machinery to produce this form of consciousness, which is called affective consciousness—the evolutionary antecedent to the reflective consciousness that allows humans to reflect on their experiences. The functional convergence of the brainstem with the amygdala, motor system, and …
A Realization Of Modernity: Case Studies In Connectivity And Time, Mari Gorman
A Realization Of Modernity: Case Studies In Connectivity And Time, Mari Gorman
Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects
My stated goal in applying to The Graduate Center was to explore my previous research in diverse fields of study. This research, the result of a formal investigation of acting, was and still is centrally focused on the subject of relationship itself, relationships being what actors create. In pursuit of a greater understanding of the essential nature of relationship in practical terms, a self-organizing complex system that constitutes universal relationship was unexpectedly discovered. As such, this system has been shown to offer solutions to many outstanding problems in diverse areas of study. The Liberal Studies program track, Approaches to Modernity …
Studying Dog Emotion Beyond Expression And Without Concern For Feeling, Peter F. Cook
Studying Dog Emotion Beyond Expression And Without Concern For Feeling, Peter F. Cook
Animal Sentience
Studies of dog emotion have focused on the expression of social emotion, either because this is taken to suggest human-like feeling states in dogs or because it has been the most accessible signal of dog emotional processing. I argue for an approach grounded in affective neuroscience, relying on direct measures of physiology across different contexts. This work may be particularly fertile in exploring social emotion in the dog, not because dogs necessarily share human emotional states, but because they are unique in having likely evolved to fit a human social niche.
Animal Models, Agendas And Sentience, Thomas Creson
Animal Models, Agendas And Sentience, Thomas Creson
Animal Sentience
Woodruff’s target article on teleost consciousness is a well-organized logical argument for considering the fish as a sentient being. This becomes more important for animal ethical discussion as the fish becomes a more important and legitimate animal model for investigating animal states and traits associated with higher levels of behavior such as learning and memory.
The Emotional Brain Of Fish, Sonia Rey Planellas
The Emotional Brain Of Fish, Sonia Rey Planellas
Animal Sentience
Woodruff (2017) analyzes structural homologies and functional equivalences between the brains of mammals and fish to understand where sentience and social cognition might reside in teleosts. He compares neuroanatomical, neurophysiological and behavioural correlates. I discuss current advances in the study of fish cognitive abilities and emotions, and advocate an evolutionary approach to the underlying basis of sentience in teleosts.
Similar Anatomy Does Not Imply Comparable Function, Jay R. Stauffer Jr.
Similar Anatomy Does Not Imply Comparable Function, Jay R. Stauffer Jr.
Animal Sentience
Woodruff concludes that ray-finned fishes (Actinopterygii) are sentient and that the pallium contributes to sentience in these fishes. He gives a detailed description of the pallium; however, he assumes that similar structures in fishes and tetrapods support similar behaviors, capabilities, and functions. I reject the premise that similarities in structure imply similarities in function. The fact that a selected species of fish may exhibit behaviors, reactions, and/or anatomy suggestive of sentience does not necessarily generalize to all teleosts.
Still Wondering How Flesh Can Feel, Gwen J. Broude
Still Wondering How Flesh Can Feel, Gwen J. Broude
Animal Sentience
Reber believes he has simplified Chalmers’s “hard problem” of consciousness by arguing that subjectivity is an inherent feature of biological forms. His argument rests on the related notions of continuity of mind and gradual accretion of capacities across evolutionary time. These notions need to be defended, not just asserted. Because Reber minimizes the differences in mental faculties among species across evolutionary time, it becomes easier to assert, and perhaps believe, that sentience is already present in early biological forms. The more explicit we are about the differences among these mental faculties and the differences across species, the less persuasive is …
Reber’S Caterpillar Offers No Help, Carl Safina
Reber’S Caterpillar Offers No Help, Carl Safina
Animal Sentience
Reber’s target article “Caterpillars, consciousness and the origins of mind” seems only to shift but not to address the question of where the mind is and how minds occur.
Resolving The Hard Problem And Calling For A Small Miracle, Arthur S. Reber
Resolving The Hard Problem And Calling For A Small Miracle, Arthur S. Reber
Animal Sentience
With the exception of the commentary by Key, the commentaries on Reber have a common feature: the commenters feel, with varying levels of enthusiasm, that there is at least some virtue in the core assumption of the Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC) theory that consciousness (or subjectivity or sentience) accompanies the earliest forms of life. The model has two important entailments: (a) it resolves the (in)famous Hard Problem by redirecting the search for the biochemical foundations of sentience away from human consciousness; and (b) it reduces the need for an emergentist miracle to a far simpler scale than is currently …
No Help On The Hard Problem, Derek Ball
No Help On The Hard Problem, Derek Ball
Animal Sentience
The hard problem of consciousness is to explain why certain physical states are conscious: why do they feel the way they do, rather than some other way or no way at all? Arthur Reber (2016) claims to solve the hard problem. But he does not: even if we grant that amoebae are conscious, we can ask why such organisms feel the way they do, and Reber’s theory provides no answer. Still, Reber’s theory may be methodologically useful: we do not yet have a satisfactory theory of consciousness, but perhaps the study of simple minds is a way to go about …
Unconscious Higher-Order Thoughts (Hots) As Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness?, Rocco J. Gennaro
Unconscious Higher-Order Thoughts (Hots) As Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness?, Rocco J. Gennaro
Animal Sentience
Rowlands argues that many nonhuman animals are “persons,” contrary to the prevailing orthodoxy which rests on a mistaken conception of the kind of self-awareness relevant to personhood. He argues that self-awareness bifurcates into two importantly different forms — reflective self-awareness and pre-reflective self-awareness — and that many animals can have the latter, which is sufficient for personhood. I agree that there is good reason to think that many animals can have pre-reflective self-awareness, but I think Rowlands is mistaken about its nature. His account runs the risk of leading to an infinite regress objection, and his notion of pre-reflective self-awareness …