“But My Lease Isn’T Up Yet!”: Finding Fault With “No-Fault” Evictions, Eloisa Rodriguez-Dod
Nov 2016
“But My Lease Isn’T Up Yet!”: Finding Fault With “No-Fault” Evictions, Eloisa Rodriguez-Dod
Eloisa C Rodríguez-Dod
Historically, tenants could be evicted when their actions put them “at-fault.” Grounds for “at-fault” eviction (i.e., evictions for cause) include a tenant’s failure to pay rent, a tenant’s holding over after termination of the lease, a tenant’s material noncompliance with the lease agreement, and a tenant’s failure to maintain the premises materially affecting health and safety. Recently, some landlords have been evicting tenants for no fault of their own.
This article focuses on three reasons for attempted “no-fault” evictions: foreclosure of the premises, proposed sale of the premises, or intended re-occupancy by the landlord. Part II of this article provides …
Special Economic Zones In The United States: From Colonial Charters, To Foreign-Trade Zones, Toward Ussezs, Tom W. Bell
Mar 2016
Special Economic Zones In The United States: From Colonial Charters, To Foreign-Trade Zones, Toward Ussezs, Tom W. Bell
Tom W. Bell
Special economic zones (SEZs) and the United States have a long and complicated relationship. The lineage of the United States runs back to proto-SEZs, created when Old World governments sold entrepreneurs charters to build for-profit colonies in the New World, such as Jamestown and New Amsterdam. In more recent times, though, the United States has lagged behind the rest of the world in tapping the potential of SEZs, which have exploded in number, types, territory, and population. True, the US hosts a large and growing number of Foreign-Trade Zones (FTZs), but these do little more than exempt select companies from …
The Corporate Shell Game, J.S. Nelson
Dec 2015
The Corporate Shell Game, J.S. Nelson
J.S. Nelson
This Article identifies for the first time the hardening of the corporate shell. It provides compelling evidence that shell-hardening pushes and disguises the way that corporations and agents commit large-scale wrongdoing, and it traces the contributing legal streams that protect the agents who engage in this behavior. The only way to combat widespread frauds that inflict damage on the public is for the corporate shell to be-come less opaque.
Using Social Norms As A Substitute For Law, Bryan H. Druzin
Dec 2015
Using Social Norms As A Substitute For Law, Bryan H. Druzin
Bryan H. Druzin
This paper follows the law and norms literature in arguing that policymakers can use social norms to support or even replace regulation. Key to the approach offered here is the idea — borrowed from the folk theorem in game theory — that cooperative order can arise in circumstances where parties repeatedly interact. This paper proposes that repeated interaction between the same agents, specifically the intensity of it, may be used as a yardstick with which to gauge the potential to scale back regulation and use social norms as a substitute for law. Where there are very high levels of repeated …
Comparison Excluding Commitments: Incommensurability, Adjudication, And The Unnoticed Example Of Trade Disputes, Sungjoon Cho, Richard Warner
Dec 2015
Comparison Excluding Commitments: Incommensurability, Adjudication, And The Unnoticed Example Of Trade Disputes, Sungjoon Cho, Richard Warner
Sungjoon Cho
We claim that there are important cases of “incommensurability” in public policymaking, in which all relevant reasons are not always comparable on a common scale as better, worse, or equally good. Courts often fail to confront this. We are by no means the first to contend that incommensurability exists. Yet incommensurability’s proponents have failed to sway the courts mainly because they overlook the fact that there are two types of incommensurability. The first (“incompleteness incommensurability”) consists of the lack of any appropriate metric for making the comparison. We argue that this type of incommensurability is relatively unproblematic in that courts …
