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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

Could Tariffs Be Pro-Cyclical?, James Lake, Maia K. Linask Jan 2016

Could Tariffs Be Pro-Cyclical?, James Lake, Maia K. Linask

Economics Faculty Publications

Conventional wisdom says that tariffs are counter-cyclical. We analyze the relationship between business cycles and applied MFN tariffs using a disaggregated product-level panel dataset covering 72 countries between 2000 and 2011. Strikingly, and counter to conventional wisdom, we find that tariffs are pro-cyclical. Further investigation reveals that this pro-cyclicality is driven by the tariff setting behavior of developing countries; tariffs are acyclical in developed countries. We present evidence that pro-cyclical market power drives the pro-cyclicality of tariffs in developing countries, providing further evidence of the importance of terms of trade motivations in explaining trade policy.


Domestic Political Competition And Pro-Cyclical Import Protection, James Lake, Maia K. Linask Jan 2016

Domestic Political Competition And Pro-Cyclical Import Protection, James Lake, Maia K. Linask

Economics Faculty Publications

Governments, especially in developing countries, routinely practice binding overhang (i.e. setting applied tariffs below binding WTO commitments) and frequently move applied tariffs for given products up and down over the business cycle. Moreover, applied tariffs are pro-cyclical in developing countries. We explain this phenomenon using a dynamic theory of lobbying between domestic interest groups. Applied tariffs are pro-cyclical when high-tariff interests (e.g. import-competing industries) capture the government: these groups concede lower tariffs to low-tariff interest groups (e.g. exporting firms or firms using imported intermediate inputs) during recessions because recessions lower the opportunity cost of lobbying and thereby generate a stronger …