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Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Protection For Sale Under Monopolistic Competition, Pao Li Chang
Protection For Sale Under Monopolistic Competition, Pao Li Chang
Research Collection School Of Economics
This paper broadens the protection for sale model of Grossman and Helpman (1994) by incorporating the Krugman–Dixit–Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition, given its importance in explaining the prevalence of intraindustry trade. Several new results arise in this paper. First, the endogenous import tariff will never fall below zero, even in unorganized sectors. Second, the endogenous export policy for organized sectors is not necessarily an export subsidy, and can be an export tax as in unorganized sectors. Third, the level of import protection varies inversely with the degree of import penetration, regardless of whether the sector is organized or not.
The Politics Of Wto Enforcement Mechanism, Pao Li Chang
The Politics Of Wto Enforcement Mechanism, Pao Li Chang
Research Collection School Of Economics
This paper attempts to develop a formal economic framework to analyze the influences of domestic political considerations by democratic governments in shaping the WTO enforcement outcomes following a violation ruling against the defendant. Since a different mix of import and export sectors in the defendant and complainant country will benefit from the various potential enforcement outcomes, they become competing forces which steer the strategic interactions between the disputing governments. The results of the paper illustrate the complainant's strategy in selecting the retaliation list, and the likelihood of the defendant's compliance or compensation in response to the proposed or foreseeable retaliation, …
The Politics Of Wto Enforcement Mechanism, Pao-Li Chang
The Politics Of Wto Enforcement Mechanism, Pao-Li Chang
Research Collection School Of Economics
This paper attempts to develop a formal economic framework to analyze the influences of domestic political considerations by democratic governments in shaping the WTO enforcement outcomes in the wake of a violation ruling against the defendant. Since a different mix of import and export sectors in the defendant and complainant country will benefit from the various potential enforcement outcomes, they become competing forces which steer the strategic interactions between the disputing governments. The results of the paper illustrate the complainant’s strategy in selecting the retaliation list, and the likelihood of the defendant’s compliance or compensation in response to the proposed …