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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
The Evolution Of Innovation And The Evolution Of Regulation: Emerging Tensions And Emerging Opportunities In Communications, John W. Mayo
The Evolution Of Innovation And The Evolution Of Regulation: Emerging Tensions And Emerging Opportunities In Communications, John W. Mayo
John W Mayo
Changes to an industry’s core technologies inevitably create tension for regulatory institutions. This is true for any sector experiencing persistent disruptive innovation, and that has been the defining feature of the communications industry for the last two decades or longer. In very short order, a century of switched voice communication networks have been supplanted by new, packet-based voice, video and data networks, rendering both the legal and regulatory framework hammered out for the switched-voice era increasingly strained. This incongruity has created tangible regulatory asymmetries. Wireline telephony provided by a “telco” is regulated by the Federal Communications Commission under Title II …
New Powers- New Vulnerabilities? A Critical Analysis Of Market Inquiries Performed By Competition Authorities, Tamar Indig, Michal Gal
New Powers- New Vulnerabilities? A Critical Analysis Of Market Inquiries Performed By Competition Authorities, Tamar Indig, Michal Gal
Michal Gal
In the past two decades the number of jurisdictions which have empowered their Competition Authorities to engage in market inquiries (MIs) has grown substantially. Although jurisdictions differ in the scope and procedure adopted for such studies, they all share an important common trait: attempting to allocate the roots of limited competition in the studied market. Market studies differ from traditional competition law tools in their triggers, range, object, and the level of pro-activity of the Competition Authority. They are not triggered by a suspicion of anti-competitive conduct of specific firm(s), but rather allow the Authority to use a broad prism …
Voice Without Say: Why Capital-Managed Firms Aren’T (Genuinely) Participatory, Justin Schwartz
Voice Without Say: Why Capital-Managed Firms Aren’T (Genuinely) Participatory, Justin Schwartz
Justin Schwartz
Why are most capitalist enterprises of any size organized as authoritarian bureaucracies rather than incorporating genuine employee participation that would give the workers real authority? Even firms with employee participation programs leave virtually all decision-making power in the hands of management. The standard answer is that hierarchy is more economically efficient than any sort of genuine participation, so that participatory firms would be less productive and lose out to more traditional competitors. This answer is indefensible. After surveying the history, legal status, and varieties of employee participation, I examine and reject as question-begging the argument that the rarity of genuine …
A Comparison Of Anti-Manipulation Rules In U.S. And Eu Electricity And Natural Gas Markets: A Proposal For A Common Standard, Shaun D. Ledgerwood, Dan Harris
A Comparison Of Anti-Manipulation Rules In U.S. And Eu Electricity And Natural Gas Markets: A Proposal For A Common Standard, Shaun D. Ledgerwood, Dan Harris
Shaun D. Ledgerwood
In this paper, we describe the development and current status of anti-manipulation rules as they apply to wholesale electricity and natural gas markets in the United States and the European Union, including the institutions that are responsible for overseeing these rules. We then compare and contrast these jurisdictions to discuss similarities, differences, and potential gaps in coverage within and across their internal markets. We note that while the behavior prohibited by the U.S. and EU statutes is remarkably similar, there is in fact no common standard for defining market manipulation. The absence of a common EU/U.S. framework for examining manipulative …
Ecj Ruling On The Prohibition Of On-Line Sales In Selective Distribution Networks, Valerio Cosimo Romano
Ecj Ruling On The Prohibition Of On-Line Sales In Selective Distribution Networks, Valerio Cosimo Romano
Valerio Cosimo Romano
No abstract provided.
Rummaging Through The Bottom Of Pandora’S Box: Funding Predatory Pricing Through Contemporaneous Recoupment, Shaun D. Ledgerwood, Wesley J. Heath
Rummaging Through The Bottom Of Pandora’S Box: Funding Predatory Pricing Through Contemporaneous Recoupment, Shaun D. Ledgerwood, Wesley J. Heath
Shaun D. Ledgerwood
Predatory pricing doctrine is currently a dead area of the law. To proceed beyond summary judgment, a plaintiff must prove the predation created a "dangerous probability" of supracompetitive pricing as the mechanism for recouping the losses “invested” in the predation. This requires proof that the predator sold products below its average variable cost and raised an entry barrier that ultimately enabled the recoupment of profits at some later time. We offer an alternative to this two-phased recoupment model. In this paper we show that a multiproduct retailer can target loss leading behavior in a market segment to punish or eliminate …
Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz
Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz
Justin Schwartz
This short nontechnical article reviews the Arrow Impossibility Theorem and its implications for rational democratic decisionmaking. In the 1950s, economist Kenneth J. Arrow proved that no method for producing a unique social choice involving at least three choices and three actors could satisfy four seemingly obvious constraints that are practically constitutive of democratic decisionmaking. Any such method must violate such a constraint and risks leading to disturbingly irrational results such and Condorcet cycling. I explain the theorem in plain, nonmathematical language, and discuss the history, range, and prospects of avoiding what seems like a fundamental theoretical challenge to the possibility …
Wobbling Back To The Fire: Economic Efficiency And The Creation Of A Retail Market For Set-Top Boxes, T. Randolph Beard, George S. Ford, Lawrence J. Spiwak, Michael Stern
Wobbling Back To The Fire: Economic Efficiency And The Creation Of A Retail Market For Set-Top Boxes, T. Randolph Beard, George S. Ford, Lawrence J. Spiwak, Michael Stern
GEORGE S FORD
Under Section 629 of the Communications Act, Congress directed the FCC to adopt regulations to promote a retail market for set-top boxes. The Commission’s first attempt was the ill-fated CableCard experiment, which—by the Commission’s own admission—was a dismal failure. In response, the Commission is now contemplating an aggressive new “AllVid” regime, whereby the agency would mandate multichannel video program distributors (“MVPDs”) to provide an adapter to serve as a “common interface for connection to televisions, DVRs, and other smart video devices.” Because the FCC is again proceeding without any formal economic analysis of the nature of the service-equipment relationship in …
The Need For Better Analysis Of High Capacity Services, George S. Ford, Lawrence J. Spiwak
The Need For Better Analysis Of High Capacity Services, George S. Ford, Lawrence J. Spiwak
GEORGE S FORD
In 1999, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) began to grant incumbent local exchange carriers (“LECs”) pricing flexibility on special access services in some Metropolitan Statistical Areas (“MSAs”) when specific evidence of competitive alternatives is present. The propriety of that deregulatory move by the FCC has been criticized by the purchasers of such services ever since. Proponents of special access price regulation rely on three central arguments to support a retreat to strict price regulation: (1) the market(s) for special access and similar services is unduly concentrated; (2) rates of return on special access services, computed using FCC ARMIS data, are …
From Libertarianism To Egalitarianism, Justin Schwartz
From Libertarianism To Egalitarianism, Justin Schwartz
Justin Schwartz
A standard natural rights argument for libertarianism is based on the labor theory of property: the idea that I own my self and my labor, and so if I "mix" my own labor with something previously unowned or to which I have a have a right, I come to own the thing with which I have mixed by labor. This initially intuitively attractive idea is at the basis of the theories of property and the role of government of John Locke and Robert Nozick. Locke saw and Nozick agreed that fairness to others requires a proviso: that I leave "enough …