Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons^™

Ceo Compensation And Risk-Taking At Financial Firms: Evidence From U.S. Federal Loan Assistance, Amar Gande, Swami Kalpathy

Amar Gande

We examine whether risk-taking among the largest financial firms in the U.S. is related to CEO equity incentives before the 2008 financial crisis. Using data on U.S. Federal Reserve emergency loans provided to these firms, we find that the amount of emergency loans and total days the loans are outstanding are increasing in pre-crisis CEO risk-taking incentives – “vega”. Our results are robust to accounting for endogeneity in CEO equity incentives and selection of financial firms into emergency loan programs. We also rule out the possibility that our results are driven by a bank’s funding base, bank complexity, CEO overconfidence, …

Datos Para Replicar Los Cálculos Del Artículo "La Consar: Balanceando Los Intereses De Los Ahorradores Y Las Afores", Rodrigo Garcia-Verdu

Rodrigo Garcia-Verdu

Merger & Acquisition And Capital Expenditure In Health Care: Information Gleaned From Stock Price Variation, Wenjing Ouyang, Peter E. Hilsenrath

Peter E. Hilsenrath

Investment, especially through merger and acquisition (M&A), is a leading topic of concern among health care managers. In addition, the implications of this activity for organization and market concentration are of great interest to policy makers. Using a sample of 2256 firm-year observations in the health care industry during the period from 1985 to 2011, this article provides novel evidence that managers learn from financial markets in making capital expenditure (CAPEX) and M&A investment decisions. Within the industry, managers in the Drugs subsector are most likely to do so, whereas managers in the Medical Equipment and Supplies are least likely …

The Effects Of Short-Selling Threats On Incentive Contracts: Evidence From An Experiment, David De Angelis, Gustavo Grullon, Sebastien Michenaud

Sébastien Michenaud