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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

Competition And Demographics In Large Indian Cities, Mohammad Amin Aug 2010

Competition And Demographics In Large Indian Cities, Mohammad Amin

Mohammad Amin

Recent studies suggest that consumer-household attributes may be as important in determining the level of competition in certain markets as firm characteristics and the number of firms. However, evidence on which consumer-household attributes matter for competition is limited, especially for developing countries. Focusing on India’s retail sector, the present paper contributes to this literature by showing that the number of adult non-workers per household in the city, a proxy for shopping time opportunity cost, has a strong effect on competition between retailers. Policy implications of our findings in light of the ongoing dramatic reductions in non-workers in India are discussed.


An Economic Overview Of The Implications For Online Video Of The Proposed Comcast-Nbcu Transaction, Scott J. Wallsten Jul 2010

An Economic Overview Of The Implications For Online Video Of The Proposed Comcast-Nbcu Transaction, Scott J. Wallsten

Scott J. Wallsten

No abstract provided.


Residential Broadband Competition In The United States, Scott J. Wallsten, Colleen Mallahan Mar 2010

Residential Broadband Competition In The United States, Scott J. Wallsten, Colleen Mallahan

Scott J. Wallsten

This paper uses a new FCC dataset on residential broadband subscribership and speeds at the census tract level combined with data from a number of additional sources to explore the state of broadband competition in the U.S. and test the effects of competition on speeds, penetration, and prices.

We find that the number of wireline providers in a census tract is positively correlated with the highest available broadband speeds, even when controlling for housing density, household income, state fixed effects, and endogenizing the number of providers. That is, we find that DSL, cable, and fiber speeds are each significantly higher …


The Location Decisions Of Foreign Investors In China: Untangling The Effect Of Wages Using A Control Function Approach, Xuepeng Liu, Mary E. Lovely, Jan Ondrich Feb 2010

The Location Decisions Of Foreign Investors In China: Untangling The Effect Of Wages Using A Control Function Approach, Xuepeng Liu, Mary E. Lovely, Jan Ondrich

Faculty and Research Publications

There is almost no support for the proposition that capital is attracted to low wages from firm-level studies. We examine the location choices of 2,884 firms investing in China between 1993 and 1996 to offer two main contributions. First, we find that the location of labor-intensive activities is highly elastic to provincial wage differences. Generally, investors' wage sensitivity declines as the skill intensity of the industry increases. Second, we find that unobserved location-specific attributes exert a downward bias on estimated wage sensitivity. Using a control function approach, we estimate a downward bias of 50% to 90% in wage coefficients estimated …


Is Competition Good For Innovation? A Simple Approach To An Unresolved Question, Armin Schmutzler Jan 2010

Is Competition Good For Innovation? A Simple Approach To An Unresolved Question, Armin Schmutzler

Armin Schmutzler

The relation between the intensity of competition and R&D investmenthas received a lot of attention, both in the theoretical and in the empirical literature. Nevertheless, no consensus on the sign of the effect of competition on innovation has emerged. This survey of the literature identifies sources of confusion in the theoretical debate. My discussion is mainly based on a unified model that simplifies the comparison of different results. This model is also applied to show which factors work in favor of a positive relation between competition and innovation.


Visibility Of Contributions And Cost Of Information: An Experiment On Public Goods, Anya Savikhin, Roman M. Sheremeta Jan 2010

Visibility Of Contributions And Cost Of Information: An Experiment On Public Goods, Anya Savikhin, Roman M. Sheremeta

ESI Working Papers

We experimentally investigate the impact of visibility of information about contributors on contributions in the public goods game. We systematically consider several treatments that are similar to a wide range of situations in practice. First, we vary the cost of viewing identifiable information about contributors. Second, we vary recognizing all, top or bottom contributors. We find that recognizing all contributors significantly increases contributions relative to the baseline. Recognizing only the top contributors is not significantly different from not recognizing contributors, but recognizing only the bottom contributors is as effective as recognizing all contributors. When viewing information about contributors is costly, …


Multi-Player Bargaining With Endogenous Capacity, Gabriele Camera, Cemil Selcuk Jan 2010

Multi-Player Bargaining With Endogenous Capacity, Gabriele Camera, Cemil Selcuk

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

We study equilibrium prices and trade volume in a market with several identical buyers and a seller who commits to an inventory and then offers goods sequentially. Prices are determined by a strategic costly bargaining process with a random sequence of proponents. A unique subgame perfect equilibrium exists, characterized by no costly delays and heterogeneous sale prices. In equilibrium constraining capacity is a bargaining tactic the seller uses to improve a weak bargaining position. With capacity constraints, sale prices approach the outcome of an auction as bargaining costs vanish. The framework provides a building block for price formation in models …


Standardization As A Solution To The Reading Costs Of Form Contracts, Abraham L. Wickelgren Dec 2009

Standardization As A Solution To The Reading Costs Of Form Contracts, Abraham L. Wickelgren

Abraham L. Wickelgren

It is well-known that a monopolist cannot commit to offer a high quality contract to a consumer reading costs are postive. This paper shows that this also holds in a competitive environment with consumer heterogeneity if the contract space is unrestricted. If firms can offer standardized contracts from a finite set, however, each with a standardized name, this paper shows that, when reading costs are not too large, there exists an equilibrium in which firms offer the most efficient contracts from the set of named contracts and consumers purchase the most efficient contracts offered without incurring any reading costs.