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Articles 1 - 16 of 16

Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo Sep 2009

The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo

Paolo Santella

No abstract provided.


The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo Sep 2009

The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo

Carlo Drago

No abstract provided.


The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo Jul 2009

The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo

Paolo Santella

No abstract provided.


The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo Jul 2009

The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo

Carlo Drago

No abstract provided.


Consumer Behavior And Competition In Retailing (A Short Note), Mohammad Amin Apr 2009

Consumer Behavior And Competition In Retailing (A Short Note), Mohammad Amin

Mohammad Amin

Drawing on a small but growing literature, this note argues that consumer behavior may be as important as firm behavior for the level of competition in consumer industries such as retailing. We use data on 1.948 retail stores in India and contribute to the literature in three ways. First, we find that the number of non-workers in the household, a proxy for time cost of shopping, has a large effect on competition. Moving from the city with the least to the most number of non-workers increases competition by 84% of its mean level. Second, as suggested in the literature, we …


A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi Feb 2009

A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi

Paolo Santella

No abstract provided.


A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi Feb 2009

A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi

Carlo Drago

No abstract provided.


A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi Feb 2009

A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi

Paolo Santella

No abstract provided.


A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi Feb 2009

A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi

Carlo Drago

No abstract provided.


Markets, Competition And Generation Of Wealth In Society, Shyam Sunder Feb 2009

Markets, Competition And Generation Of Wealth In Society, Shyam Sunder

Shyam Sunder

No abstract provided.


The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo Jan 2009

The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo

Carlo Drago

No abstract provided.


A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom, Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi Jan 2009

A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom, Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi

Paolo Santella

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the literature on director interlocks by illustrating and analysing the interlocking directorships among the Italian, French, German, UK and US listed Blue Chips. The comparison of the five countries considered shows that two national models stand out. On the one hand a model made of a high number of companies linked to each other through a small number of shared directors who serve on several company boards at the time (France, Germany, and Italy). On the other hand, in the UK much fewer companies are connected to each other essentially through …


A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom, Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi Jan 2009

A Comparison Among The Director Networks In The Main Listed Companies In France, Germany, Italy, And The United Kingdom, Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo, Enrico Gagliardi

Carlo Drago

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the literature on director interlocks by illustrating and analysing the interlocking directorships among the Italian, French, German, UK and US listed Blue Chips. The comparison of the five countries considered shows that two national models stand out. On the one hand a model made of a high number of companies linked to each other through a small number of shared directors who serve on several company boards at the time (France, Germany, and Italy). On the other hand, in the UK much fewer companies are connected to each other essentially through …


Markets, Competition And Efficiency, Shyam Sunder Jan 2009

Markets, Competition And Efficiency, Shyam Sunder

Shyam Sunder

No abstract provided.


Markets, Competition And Efficiency, Shyam Sunder Jan 2009

Markets, Competition And Efficiency, Shyam Sunder

Shyam Sunder

No abstract provided.


Competition, Market Selection And Growth, Vincenzo Denicolo, Piercarlo Zanchettin Jan 2009

Competition, Market Selection And Growth, Vincenzo Denicolo, Piercarlo Zanchettin

Vincenzo Denicolo

We study the effect of the competitive selection process on the economy's rate of growth. In an extension of standard quality-ladder models of endogenous growth, we allow for the possibility that in each period several asymmetric firms (representing an endogenously determined number of past innovators) may be simultaneously active in an industry. Stronger competitive pressure then has conflicting effects on the incentive to innovate, lowering prices but also selecting the more efficient firms. We show that the market selection effect of competition always increases the incentive to innovate and find circumstances in which it can outweigh the traditional negative effect …