Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons^™

Why Have There Been No Rich Women Artists? Examining The Gender Price Discount In The Contemporary Auction Market For Early Twentieth Century Mexican Avant-Garde Art, Lucy P. Bloomstran

Scripps Senior Theses

This paper examines the gender price discount for early twentieth-century Mexican avant-garde art in the contemporary auction market. A premium for art by men is established through the econometric analysis of a dataset of auction transactions taking place at major American and Mexican auction houses between 2000 and 2022. After this price discount for women’s art is established, a deep delve into gender discrimination in the creation and exhibition of Mexican Muralism and Surrealism is presented to provide possible art historical explanations for the results of the regression analysis.

Dynamic Double Auctions: An Analysis Of Secondary Sneaker Market And Its Future As An Nft Marketplace, Chris Zhu

Honors Theses

A theoretical analysis of a dynamic double auction over time shows that greater market density can result in more aggressive trading strategies from buyers and sellers. In addition, my model suggests a fast price discovery period initially, with impatient investors having a more aggressive approach. I confirm these results using resale sneaker data from the StockX website for five deadstock sneakers. I find that market density is positively correlated with bid prices, and the bid-ask spread decreases over time during the price discovery period. However, the results also indicate that sellers price in additional transaction costs and lags in their …

A Computational And Experimental Examination Of The Fcc Incentive Auction, Logan Gantner

Computational and Data Sciences (PhD) Dissertations

In 2016, the Federal Communications Commission debuted a new auction mechanism, the Incentive Auction, with the intention of obtaining high frequency television broadcasting spectrum, repurposing it for cellular use, and reselling these licenses at profitable prices. In designing this process, the traditional mechanism used for spectrum auctions, the Simulta- neous Multiple Round Auction (SMR), was modified in order to speed the process. This new mechanism, the Incentive Forward Auction (IFA), intended to reduce the number of rounds per auction by lumping similar spectrum licenses together. However, the IFA discourages straightforward bidding strategies and can result in bidders committing more in …

An Empirical Analysis Of Consumer Behavior In The Online Auction Marketplace, Calvin Salter

All Theses

The purpose of this paper is to analyze a unique data set pertaining to eBay auctions, in particular auctions of the first generation iPad. This analysis will give some interpretations about consumer behavior in the consumer electronics market on eBay, especially how the reputation of sellers and the shipping price that sellers charge affects the final selling price of an item. Other economics variables are analyzed to provide a broader picture of pricing determinants. Reputation is an important mechanism to consider in any market. However, reputation in the eBay market is particularly important because buyers do not interact with the …

Essays On Mechanism Design And The Informed Principal Problem, Nicholas C. Bedard

Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository

Three models of a privately informed contract designer (a principal) are examined. In the first, I study how much private information the principal wants to acquire before offering a contract to an agent. Despite allowing her to acquire all information for free, I prove in a general environment that there is a nontrivial set of parameters for which it is strictly suboptimal for the principal to be completely informed, regardless of the continuation equilibrium following any information acquisition choice. This result holds even when the principal is able to employ the most general mechanisms available and, in particular, when she …

How To Maximize The Profit For Bidder And Seller In A Sealed-Bid Second-Price Auction, Wei Yu

Honors Theses

With a history of more than 2500 years, auctions have long been used to negotiate the exchange of goods and commodities. In an auction, bidders compete with rivals by submitting bids depending on their personal evaluations of the goods. The good is allocated to the bidder who offers the highest bid. There are many different types of auctions, but four major ones are primarily concerned by economists and researchers--the English auction, the Dutch auction, the sealed-bid first-price auction and the sealed-bid second-price auction. My thesis mainly focuses on the characteristics of the sealed-bid second-price auction, with both continuous and discrete …

Horizontal Subcontracting In Procurement Auctions, Nancy Huff

All Dissertations

A firm submitting a bid in a procurement auction is sometimes also listed as a subcontractor in one or more competing bids. This paper theoretically and empirically examines how such horizontal subcontracting affects welfare and price competition. I first specify a model of horizontal subcontracting which endogenizes the roles of the subcontracting firms as well as a negotiated payment for subcontracted work. The model shows that horizontal subcontracting always weakly increases welfare by enabling more efficient allocation of production but has two opposite effects on price competition: an efficiency effect and a strategic effect. The efficiency effect arises when firms …

Exploring Environmental Service Auctions, William B. Holmes

Economics Dissertations

The chapters of this dissertation explore related aspects of the procurement of conservation services from private landowners. In the first chapter, heuristic laboratory experiments reveal the impact of potential government regulation on strategic forces and efficiency properties in conservation procurement auctions. In the second chapter, data from past procurement auctions are analyzed to discover the existence and magnitude of premiums received by auction participants.

The first Chapter, “Procurement Auctions Under Regulatory Threat,” examines how strategic forces and efficiency properties are impacted in auctions for the procurement of environmental services when a threat of regulation is levied. Laboratory experiments examining different …