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Articles 1 - 8 of 8
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Review Of Coasean Economics: Law And Economics And The New Institutional Economics Edited By Steven Medema, Eric Bennett Rasmusen
Review Of Coasean Economics: Law And Economics And The New Institutional Economics Edited By Steven Medema, Eric Bennett Rasmusen
Eric Bennett Rasmusen
A book review which talks about what kinds of papers I'd like to see written.
Observed Choice, Estimation, And Optimism About Policy Changes, Eric Bennett Rasmusen
Observed Choice, Estimation, And Optimism About Policy Changes, Eric Bennett Rasmusen
Eric Bennett Rasmusen
A policy will be used more heavily in a particular time and place where its marginal cost is lower. The analyst who treats times and places as identical will overestimate the policy's net benefit, especially for policy intensities greater than exist in his sample. In regression analysis, the problem can be solved by instrumental variables and a correction for heteroskedasticity. In an example using state- level data, the technique substantially increases the estimated responsiveness of the illegitimacy rate to transfer payments.
The Economics Of Desecration: Flag Burning And Related Activities., Eric Bennett Rasmusen
The Economics Of Desecration: Flag Burning And Related Activities., Eric Bennett Rasmusen
Eric Bennett Rasmusen
When a symbol is desecrated, the desecrator obtains benefits while those who venerate the symbol incur costs. The approach to policy used in this paper is to ask whether the benefits are likely to exceed the costs. I conclude that they usually do not. Desecration is often motivated by a desire to reduce the utility of others, which generally is inefficient. Also, if desecration occurs, people have less incentive to create and maintain symbols. Symbols, like other produced goods, need property- rights protection if the outcome is to be efficient. Laws against desecration are a good way to provide this …
From Miranda To Mezzanatto: The Economics Of Self Incrimination, Eric Bennett Rasmusen
From Miranda To Mezzanatto: The Economics Of Self Incrimination, Eric Bennett Rasmusen
Eric Bennett Rasmusen
A 1995 Supreme Court decision allowed defendants in criminal trials to waive their rights to block use of information disclosed by them during the plea bargaining process. Does this really encourage plea bargaining?
Nuisance Suits, Eric Bennett Rasmusen
Nuisance Suits, Eric Bennett Rasmusen
Eric Bennett Rasmusen
Nuisance suits can be defined a number of ways, explained a number of ways, and prevented in a number of ways. I survey them.
Lifting The Veil Of Ignorance: Personalizing The Marriage Contract, Eric Bennett Rasmusen, Jeffrey Stake
Lifting The Veil Of Ignorance: Personalizing The Marriage Contract, Eric Bennett Rasmusen, Jeffrey Stake
Eric Bennett Rasmusen
Modern state laws only allow marriages in which each party can unilaterally divorce the other. We argue that the law should clearly permit parties to contract for more restrictive forms of marriage.
The Observed Choice Problem In Estimating The Cost Of Policies, Eric Bennett Rasmusen
The Observed Choice Problem In Estimating The Cost Of Policies, Eric Bennett Rasmusen
Eric Bennett Rasmusen
A very short version of my Public Choice paper which makes the basic point that OLS estimation of the costs of deliberately chosen policies will be biased downwards.
Review Of Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences Of Preference Falsification, Eric Bennett Rasmusen
Review Of Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences Of Preference Falsification, Eric Bennett Rasmusen
Eric Bennett Rasmusen
A review of a book on what happens when people's statement of their information depends on what other people are saying.