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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

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Economics

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

Series

2023

Behavioral IO

Articles 1 - 2 of 2

Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

Organizational Structure And Pricing: Evidence From A Large U.S. Airline, Ali Hortaçsu, Olivia R. Natan, Hayden Parsley, Timothy Schwieg, Kevin R. Williams Jun 2023

Organizational Structure And Pricing: Evidence From A Large U.S. Airline, Ali Hortaçsu, Olivia R. Natan, Hayden Parsley, Timothy Schwieg, Kevin R. Williams

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

Firms facing complex objectives often decompose the problems they face, delegating different parts of the decision to distinct sub-units. Using comprehen-sive data and internal models from a large U.S. airline, we establish that airline pricing is not well approximated by a model of the firm as a unitary decision-maker. We show that observed prices, however, can be rationalized by account-ing for organizational structure and the decisions by departments that are tasked with supplying inputs to the observed pricing heuristic. Simulating the prices the firm would charge if it were a rational unitary decision-maker results in lower welfare than we estimate …


Organizational Structure And Pricing: Evidence From A Large U.S. Airline, Ali Hortaçsu, Olivia R. Natan, Hayden Parsley, Timothy Schwieg, Kevin R. Williams Jan 2023

Organizational Structure And Pricing: Evidence From A Large U.S. Airline, Ali Hortaçsu, Olivia R. Natan, Hayden Parsley, Timothy Schwieg, Kevin R. Williams

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

Firms facing complex objectives often decompose the problems they face, delegating different parts of the decision to distinct subordinates. Using comprehensive data and internal models from a large U.S. airline, we establish that airline pricing is inconsistent with canonical dynamic pricing models. However, we show that observed prices can be rationalized as an equilibrium of a game played by departments who each have decision rights for different inputs that are supplied to the observed pricing heuristic. Incorrectly assuming that the firm solves a standard profit maximization problem as a single entity understates overall welfare actually achieved but affects business and …