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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Allocating Vehicle Registration Permits, Massimiliano Landi, Domenico Menicucci
Allocating Vehicle Registration Permits, Massimiliano Landi, Domenico Menicucci
Research Collection School Of Economics
We compare social welfare, consumer surplus and profits in two different institutional settings in which an item whose quantity is fixed and controlled (vehicle registration permit) is allocated to the buyers of a complementary good (car). In the first setting, which resembles the way in which vehicle registration permits are allocated in Singapore, the central planner runs a uniform price auction for permits in which the consumers who bid the highest receive the permits and pay the highest losing bid. Then each winning consumer purchases a car from a seller. In the alternative setting, the central planner first allocates the …
Auctions For Transferable Objects: Theory And Evidence From The Vehicle Quota System In Singapore, David K. C. Lee, Winston T. H. Koh
Auctions For Transferable Objects: Theory And Evidence From The Vehicle Quota System In Singapore, David K. C. Lee, Winston T. H. Koh
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
This paper studies the hypothesis that auctions with resale markets result in higher prices. The vehicle quota system introduced in Singapore in May 1990 provides the setting. The Certificates of Entitlement (COEs) necessary to purchase new cars were initially transferable for all quota categories. After October 1991, COEs for four major categories became non-transferable. Our results indicate that while the conversion to non-transferability eliminated speculation, it has also intensified competition among car distributors. Auctions for non-transferable COEs in fact led to higher COE prices in three of the four categories.