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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Economics

Singapore Management University

2014

Strategy-proofness

Articles 1 - 2 of 2

Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

A Characterization Of Single-Peaked Preferences Via Random Social Choice Functions, Shurojit Chatterji, Arunava Sen, Huaxia Zeng Sep 2014

A Characterization Of Single-Peaked Preferences Via Random Social Choice Functions, Shurojit Chatterji, Arunava Sen, Huaxia Zeng

Research Collection School Of Economics

The paper proves the following result: every path-connected domain of preferences that admits a strategy-proof, unanimous, tops-only random social choice function satisfying a compromise property, is single-peaked. Conversely, every single-peaked domain admits a random social choice function satisfying these properties. Single-peakedness is defined with respect to arbitrary trees. We also show that a maximal domain that admits a strategy-proof, unanimous, tops-only random social choice function satisfying a stronger version of the compromise property, is single-peaked on a line. A converse to this result also holds. The paper provides justification of the salience of single-peaked preferences and evidence in favour of …


Random Dictatorship Domains, Shurojit Chatterji, Arunava Sen, Huaxia Zeng Jul 2014

Random Dictatorship Domains, Shurojit Chatterji, Arunava Sen, Huaxia Zeng

Research Collection School Of Economics

A domain of preference orderings is a random dictatorship domain if every strategy-proof random social choice function satisfying unanimity defined on the domain is a random dictatorship. Gibbard (1977) showed that the universal domain is a random dictatorship domain. We ask whether an arbitrary dictatorial domain is a random dictatorship domain and show that the answer is negative by constructing dictatorial domains that admit anonymous, unanimous, strategy-proof random social choice functions which are not random dictatorships. Our result applies to the constrained voting model. Lastly, we show that substantial strengthenings of linked domains (a class of dictatorial domains introduced in …