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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Persuasive Communication When The Sender's Incentives Are Uncertain, Paan Jindapon, Carlos Oyarzun
Persuasive Communication When The Sender's Incentives Are Uncertain, Paan Jindapon, Carlos Oyarzun
Carlos Oyarzun
We study persuasion in a modified Crawford-Sobel sender-receiver game in which the receiver makes a binary decision to accept or reject a good recommended by the sender. The good's quality and the sender's type (neutral or biased) are not observable to the receiver. These slight alterations yield a simple model with a unique equilibrium in which neutral senders fully separate. The neutral sender can only communicate low quality levels with precision and the biased sender adopts a mixed strategy that on average can successfully persuade the receiver to accept the good. This strategy is robust under competition between multiple senders. …
Learning And Risk Aversion, Carlos Oyarzun, Rajiv Sarin
Learning And Risk Aversion, Carlos Oyarzun, Rajiv Sarin
Carlos Oyarzun
Abstract We study the manner in which learning shapes behavior towards risk when individuals are not assumed to know, or to have beliefs about, probability distributions. In any period, the behavior change induced by learning is assumed to depend on the action chosen and the payoff obtained. We characterize learning processes that, in expected value, increase the probability of choosing the safest (or riskiest) actions and provide sufficient conditions for them to converge, in the long run, to the choices of risk averse (or risk seeking) expected utility maximizers. We provide a learning theoretic motivation for long run risk choices, …