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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons™
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- Keyword
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- Strategy-proofness (3)
- Unanimity (3)
- Exterior Property (2)
- Interior Property (2)
- Random Social Choice Functions (2)
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- Tops-only Property (2)
- Agricultural productivity (1)
- Anonymity (1)
- Autoregression (1)
- Auxiliary information (1)
- Bubble (1)
- Budget balance (1)
- Bundles (1)
- Calibration estimation (1)
- College education (1)
- Decision efficiency (1)
- Decomposability (1)
- Dominant-strategy mechanisms (1)
- Duality approach (1)
- Economic fluctuations (1)
- Education subsidies (1)
- Entrepreneurship (1)
- Equal treatment of equals (1)
- Financing constraints (1)
- Followup (1)
- Incentive compatibility (1)
- Individual rationality; mechanisms; public goods (1)
- Instrumental variable analysis (1)
- Intercept (1)
- Limit theory (1)
Articles 1 - 16 of 16
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Semiparametric Maximum Likelihood Inference For Nonignorable Nonresponse With Callbacks, Zhong Guan, Denis H. Y. Leung, Jing Qin
Semiparametric Maximum Likelihood Inference For Nonignorable Nonresponse With Callbacks, Zhong Guan, Denis H. Y. Leung, Jing Qin
Research Collection School Of Economics
We model the nonresponse probabilities as logistic functions ofthe outcome variable and other covariates in the survey sampling study withcallback. The identification aspect of this callback model is investigated. Semiparametricmaximum likelihood estimators of the parameters in the responseprobabilities are proposed and studied. As a result, an efficient estimator ofthe mean of the outcome variable is constructed using the estimated responseprobabilities. Moreover, if a regression model for conditional mean of the outcomevariable given some covariate is available, then we can obtain an evenmore efficient estimate of the mean of the outcome variable by fitting the regressionmodel using an adjusted least squares …
Coarse Revealed Preference, Gaoji Hu, Jiangtao Li, John K. Quah, Rui Tang
Coarse Revealed Preference, Gaoji Hu, Jiangtao Li, John K. Quah, Rui Tang
Research Collection School Of Economics
We identify necessary and sufficient conditions under which a coarse data set canbe coarsely rationalized by a linear order (or weak order). The conditions are easy tocheck, and efficient algorithms are provided. We apply our theory to investigate theobservable restrictions of several economic models including (1) rational choice withimperfect observation; (2) multiple preferences; (3) monotone multiple preferences; and(4) minimax regret.
Entrepreneurship, College, And Credit: The Golden Triangle, Roberto M. Samaniego, Juliana Yu Sun
Entrepreneurship, College, And Credit: The Golden Triangle, Roberto M. Samaniego, Juliana Yu Sun
Research Collection School Of Economics
We develop a model to evaluate the aggregate impact of college finance in an environment with entrepreneurship. The calibrated model captures the stylized fact that entrepreneurs with college are more common and more profitable in the United States. The calibration indicates this is mainly because higher labor earnings allow college‐educated agents to ameliorate credit constraints if and when they eventually become entrepreneurs. Changes in financing constraints on entrepreneurs can thus affect college attendance, and changes in financing constraints on college can affect entrepreneurship rates as well.
On Strategy-Proofness And The Salience Of Single-Peakedness, Shurojit Chatterji, Jordi Masso
On Strategy-Proofness And The Salience Of Single-Peakedness, Shurojit Chatterji, Jordi Masso
Research Collection School Of Economics
We consider strategy-proof social choice functions operating on a rich domain of preference profiles. We show that if the social choice function satisfies in addition tops-onlyness, anonymity and unanimity then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to as semilattice single-peakedness). We do so by deriving from the social choice function an endogenous partial order (a semilattice) from which the notion of a semilattice single-peaked preference can be defined. We also provide a converse of this main finding. Finally, we show how well-known restricted domains under which nontrivial strategy-proof social choice functions are admissible …
Revisiting The Foundations Of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms, Yi-Chun Chen, Jiangtao Li
Revisiting The Foundations Of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms, Yi-Chun Chen, Jiangtao Li
Research Collection School Of Economics
An important question in mechanism design is whether there is any theoretical foundation for the use of dominant-strategy mechanisms. This paper studies the maxmin and Bayesian foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms in general social choice environments with quasi-linear preferences and private values. We propose a condition called the uniform shortest-path tree that, under regularity, ensures the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms. This exposes the underlying logic of the existence of such foundations in the single-unit auction setting, and extends the argument to cases where it was hitherto unknown. To prove this result, we adopt the linear programming approach to mechanism design. In …
On Incentive Compatible, Individually Rational Public Good Provision Mechanisms, Takashi Kunimoto, Cuiling Zhang
On Incentive Compatible, Individually Rational Public Good Provision Mechanisms, Takashi Kunimoto, Cuiling Zhang
Research Collection School Of Economics
This paper characterizes mechanisms satisfying Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC) and interim individual rationality (IIR) in the classical public good provision problem. Many papers in the literature obtain the results in the so-called standard model of ex ante identical agents with a continuous, closed interval of types. Although the standard model and more generally a continuum type space are widely used in the literature, it is nonetheless an abstraction of reality. Given that the public good provision problem has occupied a central application in the theory of mechanism design, we propose a "stress test" for the results in the standard model …
Sharing Sequential Values In A Network, Ruben Juarez, Yu Ko Chiu, Jingyi Xue
Sharing Sequential Values In A Network, Ruben Juarez, Yu Ko Chiu, Jingyi Xue
Research Collection School Of Economics
Consider a sequential process where agents have individual values at every possible step. A planner is in charge of selecting steps and distributing the accumulated aggregate values among a number of agents. We model this process by a directed network, whereby each edge is associated with a vector of individual values. This model applies to several new and existing problems, e.g. developing a connected public facility and distributing total values received by surrounding districts, selecting a long-term production project and sharing final profits among partners of a firm, or choosing a machine schedule to serve different tasks and distributing total …
Random Assignment Of Bundles, Shurojit Chatterji, Peng Liu
Random Assignment Of Bundles, Shurojit Chatterji, Peng Liu
Research Collection School Of Economics
We study the random assignments of bundles with no free disposal. The key difference between the setting with bundles and the setting with objects (see Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001)) is one of feasibility. The implications of this difference are significant. First, the characterization of sd-efficient random assignments is fundamentally different. Second, a possibility result in the setting with objects fails in the setting with bundles. However, in the setting with bundles, we are able to identify a preference restriction, called essential monotonicity, under which the random serial dictatorship rule (extended to the setting with bundles) is equivalent to the probabilistic …
Fair Division With Uncertain Needs, Jingyi Xue
Fair Division With Uncertain Needs, Jingyi Xue
Research Collection School Of Economics
Imagine agents having uncertain needs for a resource when the resource has to be divided before uncertainty resolves. In this situation, waste occurs when an agent's assignment turns out to exceed his realized need. How should the resource be divided in the face of possible waste? This is a question out of the scope of the existing rationing literature. Our main axiom to address the issue is no domination. It requires that no agent receive more of the resource than another while producing a larger expected waste, unless the other agent has been fully compensated. Together with conditional strict endowment …
Maskin Meets Abreu And Matsushima, Yi-Chun Chen, Takashi Kunimoto, Yifei Sun, Siyang Xiong
Maskin Meets Abreu And Matsushima, Yi-Chun Chen, Takashi Kunimoto, Yifei Sun, Siyang Xiong
Research Collection School Of Economics
We study the classical Nash implementation problem due to Maskin (1999), but allow for the use of lottery and monetary transfer as in Abreu and Matsushima (1992, 1994). We therefore unify two well-established but somewhat orthogonal approaches of implementation theory. We first show that Maskin monotonicity is a necessary and sufficient condition for pure-strategy Nash implementation by a direct mechanism. Second, taking mixed strategies into consideration, we show that Maskin monotonicity is a necessary and sufficient condition for mixed-strategy Nash implementation by a finite (albeit indirect) mechanism. Third, we extend our analysis to implementation in rationalizable strategies. In contrast to …
Industrial Output Fluctuations In Developing Countries: General Equilibrium Consequences Of Agricultural Productivity Shocks, Iona Hyojung Lee
Industrial Output Fluctuations In Developing Countries: General Equilibrium Consequences Of Agricultural Productivity Shocks, Iona Hyojung Lee
Research Collection School Of Economics
This paper shows that a negative shock to agricultural productivity may increase food prices, and labor and capital can move away from manufacturing into agriculture to meet the subsistence requirement for food. This effect depends on income levels and openness to trade. Using annual manufacturing data and rainfall shocks as the instrument for crop yields (proxy for agricultural productivity), I find that an exogenous decline in yield decreases manufacturing output as well as employment and capital investment in manufacturing. Overall, crop yield variation can explain up to 44% of industrial output fluctuations in developing countries (rainfall shocks cause 31% of …
On Random Social Choice Functions With The Tops-Only Property, Shurojit Chatterji, Huaxia Zeng
On Random Social Choice Functions With The Tops-Only Property, Shurojit Chatterji, Huaxia Zeng
Research Collection School Of Economics
We study the standard voting model with randomization. A Random Social Choice Function (or RSCF) satisfies the tops-only property if the social lottery under each preference profile depends only on the peaks of voters' preferences. We identify a general condition on domains of preferences (the Interior Property and the Exterior Property) which ensures that every strategy-proof RSCF satisfying unanimity has the tops-only property. We show that our condition applies to important classes of voting domains which include restricted connected domains (Sato, 2013) and the multi-dimensional single-peaked domain (Barberà et al., 1993). As an application of our result, we show that …
Limit Theory For Mildly Integrated Process With Intercept, Yijie Fei
Limit Theory For Mildly Integrated Process With Intercept, Yijie Fei
Research Collection School Of Economics
Some asymptotic results are given for first-order autoregressive (AR(1)) time series with two features: (i). a nonzero constant intercept (ii). a root moderately deviating from unity. Both stationary and explosive sides are studied. It is shown that the inclusion of intercept will change drastically the large sample properties of the least-squares (LS) estimator obtained in Phillips and Magdalinos (2007, PM hereafter). For near-stationary case, only an unusual convergence of a linear combination of intercept and AR coefficient can be derived. For near-explosive case, on the other hand, the limiting distributions of two estimators will be independent and Gaussian, with conventional …
A Large Class Of Strategy-Proof Exchange Rules With Single-Peaked Preferences, Peng Liu
A Large Class Of Strategy-Proof Exchange Rules With Single-Peaked Preferences, Peng Liu
Research Collection School Of Economics
We study the classical house exchange problem (Shapley and Scarf (1974)) and identified a large class of rules, each of which is strategy-proof, efficient, and individually rational with single-peaked preferences. These rules are generalisations of Gale’s top trading cycles rule: In each step a subset of houses are allowed to be traded along top trading cycles and in particular, the next step subset of trading houses may depend on the exchanges happened already. We believe that the flexibility introduced by this class of rules is desirable when the designer faces some context-specific requirements.
On Random Social Choice Functions With The Tops-Only Property, Shurojit Chatterji, Huaxia Zeng
On Random Social Choice Functions With The Tops-Only Property, Shurojit Chatterji, Huaxia Zeng
Research Collection School Of Economics
We study the standard voting model with randomization. A Random Social Choice Function (or RSCF) satisfies the tops-only property if the social lottery under each preference profile depends only on the peaks of voters' preferences. We identify a general condition on domains of preferences (the Interior Property and the Exterior Property) which ensures that every strategy-proof RSCF satisfying unanimity has the tops-only property. We show that our condition applies to important classes of voting domains which include restricted connected domains (Sato, 2013) and the multi-dimensional single-peaked domain (Barberà et al., 1993). As an application of our result, we show that …
Sequential Auctions With Decreasing Reserve Prices., Massimiliano Landi, Domenico Menicucci
Sequential Auctions With Decreasing Reserve Prices., Massimiliano Landi, Domenico Menicucci
Research Collection School Of Economics
We study sequential sealed bid auctions with decreasing reserve prices when there are two identical objects for sale and unit-demand bidders (existing literature has dealt with the case of weakly increasing reserve prices). Under decreasing reserve prices bidders may have an incentive not to bid in the first auction, and no equilibrium exists with a strictly increasing stage one bidding function. However, we find that an equilibrium always exists, and its shape depends on the distance between the two reserve prices. The equilibrium exhibits some pooling at the stage one auction, which disappears in the limit as the number of …