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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons™
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- Endogenous institutions (2)
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- Bias Aggregation (1)
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Articles 1 - 30 of 31
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
The Doors Of Perception, Gary Charness, Alessandro Sontuoso
The Doors Of Perception, Gary Charness, Alessandro Sontuoso
ESI Working Papers
We investigate how a player’s strategic behavior is affected by the set of notions she uses in thinking about the game, i.e., the “frame”. To do so, we consider matching games where two players are presented with a set of objects, from which each player must privately choose one (with the goal of matching the counterpart’s choice). We propose a novel theory positing that different player types are aware of different attributes of the strategy options, hence different frames; we then rationalize why differences in players’ frames may lead to differences in choice behavior. Unlike previous theories of framing, our …
Harnessing The Power Of Social Incentives To Curb Shirking In Teams, Brice Corgnet, Brian C. Gunia, Roberto Hernán González
Harnessing The Power Of Social Incentives To Curb Shirking In Teams, Brice Corgnet, Brian C. Gunia, Roberto Hernán González
ESI Working Papers
We study several solutions to shirking in teams that trigger social incentives by reshaping the workplace social context. Using an experimental design, we manipulate social pressure at work by varying the type of workplace monitoring and the extent to which employees engage in social interaction. This design allows us to assess the effectiveness as well as the popularity of each solution. Despite similar effectiveness in boosting productivity across solutions, only organizational systems involving social interaction (via chat) were at least as popular as a baseline treatment. This suggests that any solution based on promoting social interaction is more likely to …
News-Driven Expectations And Volatility Clustering, Sabiou M. Inoua
News-Driven Expectations And Volatility Clustering, Sabiou M. Inoua
ESI Working Papers
Financial volatility obeys two well-established empirical properties: it is fat-tailed (power-law distributed) and it tends to be clustered in time. Many interesting models have been proposed to account for these regularities, notably agent-based computational models, which typically invoke complicated mechanisms, however. It can be shown that trend-following speculation generates the power law in an intrinsic way. But this model cannot exaplain clustered volatility. This paper extends the model and offers a simple explanation for clustered volatility: the impact of exogenous news on traders’ expectations. Owing to the famous no-trade results, rational expectations, the dominant model of news-driven expectations, is hard …
Price Signaling And Bargain Hunting In Markets With Partially Informed Populations, Mark Schneider, Daniel Graydon Stephenson
Price Signaling And Bargain Hunting In Markets With Partially Informed Populations, Mark Schneider, Daniel Graydon Stephenson
ESI Working Papers
Classical studies of asymmetric information focus on situations where only one side of a market is informed. This study experimentally investigates a more general case where some sellers are informed and some buyers are informed. We establish the existence of semiseparating perfect Bayesian equilibria where prices serve as informative signals of quality to uninformed buyers, while informed buyers can often leverage their informational advantage by purchasing high quality items from uninformed sellers at bargain prices. These models provide a rational foundation for the co-existence of bargains, price signaling, and Pareto efficiency in markets with asymmetric information. We test these theoretical …
Do Appeals To Donor Benefits Raise More Money Than Appeals To Recipient Benefits? Evidence From A Natural Field Experiment With Pick.Click.Give., John A. List, James J. Murphy, Michael K. Price, Alexander G. James
Do Appeals To Donor Benefits Raise More Money Than Appeals To Recipient Benefits? Evidence From A Natural Field Experiment With Pick.Click.Give., John A. List, James J. Murphy, Michael K. Price, Alexander G. James
ESI Working Papers
We partnered with Alaska’s Pick.Click.Give. Charitable Contributions Program to implement a statewide natural field experiment with 540,000 Alaskans designed to explore whether targeted appeals emphasizing donor benefits through warm glow impact donations. Results highlight the relative import of appeals to self. Individuals who received such an appeal were 4.5 percent more likely to give and gave 20 percent more than counterparts in the control group. Yet, a message that instead appealed to recipient benefits had no effect on average donations relative to the control group. We also find evidence of long-run effects of warm glow appeals in the subsequent year.
A Class Of N-Player Colonel Blotto Games With Multidimensional Private Information, Christian Ewerhart, Dan Kovenock
A Class Of N-Player Colonel Blotto Games With Multidimensional Private Information, Christian Ewerhart, Dan Kovenock
ESI Working Papers
We consider a class of incomplete-information Colonel Blotto games in which N ≥ 2 agents are engaged in (N + 1) battlefields. An agent’s vector of battlefield valuations is drawn from a generalized sphere in Lp-space. We identify a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which any agent’s resource allocation to a given battlefield is strictly monotone in the agent’s valuation of that battlefield. In contrast to the single-unit case, however, agents never enjoy any information rent. We also outline an extension to networks of Blotto games.
Cooperation In Indefinitely Repeated Helping Games: Existence And Characterization, Gabriele Camera, Alessandro Gioffré
Cooperation In Indefinitely Repeated Helping Games: Existence And Characterization, Gabriele Camera, Alessandro Gioffré
ESI Working Papers
Experiments that investigate the spontaneous emergence of money in laboratory societies rely on indefinitely repeated helping games with random matching (Camera et al., 2013; Camera and Casari, 2014). An important open issue is the lack of a general proof of existence of an equilibrium capable of supporting the efficient allocation under private monitoring, without money. Here, we fill this gap by offering a general proof, as well as by characterizing the efficient non-monetary equilibrium. This technique can be extended to study games with simultaneous actions.
Breaking Up: Experimental Insights Into Economic (Dis)Integration, Gabriele Camera, Lukas Hohl, Rolf Weder
Breaking Up: Experimental Insights Into Economic (Dis)Integration, Gabriele Camera, Lukas Hohl, Rolf Weder
ESI Working Papers
Standard international economic theory suggests that people should embrace economic integration because it promises large gains. But recent events such as Brexit indicate a desire for economic disintegration. Here we report results of an experiment, based on a strategic analytical framework, of how size and distribution of potential gains from integration influence outcomes and individuals’ inclination to embrace integration. We find that cross-country inequality in potential gains acts as a friction to realize those gains. This suggests that to better understand recent phenomena, international economic theory should account for distributional considerations and behavioral aspects it currently ignores.
Make It Too Difficult And I’Ll Give-Up; Let Me Succeed And I’Ll Excel: The Interaction Between Assigned And Personal Goals, James Fan, Joaquin Gomez-Minambres, Samuel Smithers
Make It Too Difficult And I’Ll Give-Up; Let Me Succeed And I’Ll Excel: The Interaction Between Assigned And Personal Goals, James Fan, Joaquin Gomez-Minambres, Samuel Smithers
ESI Working Papers
We examine the motivational effects of setting both assigned and personal non-binding goals on a real effort laboratory experiment. In order to derive conjectures for our experiment, we develop a model with goal-dependent preferences. In line with previous studies, we find that goal setting leads to a higher performance. We also find that goal-setting is most effective if subjects were able to achieve previous goals. Therefore, in goal setting, “success breeds success”. In particular, we observe that when subjects are initially allowed to attain assigned goals, they are better at self-motivating in the future when performing under personal goals.
Investment Choice Architecture In Trust Games: When “All-In” Is Not Enough, Joaquin Gómez-Miñambres, Eric Schniter, Timothy W. Shields
Investment Choice Architecture In Trust Games: When “All-In” Is Not Enough, Joaquin Gómez-Miñambres, Eric Schniter, Timothy W. Shields
ESI Working Papers
While many economic interactions feature “All-or-Nothing” options nudging investors towards going “all-in”, such designs may unintentionally affect reciprocity. We manipulate the investor’s action space in two versions of the “trust game”. In one version investors can invest either “all” their endowment or “nothing”. In the other version, they can invest any amount of the endowment. Consistent with our intentions-based model, we show that "all-or-nothing” designs coax more investment but limit investors’ demonstrability of intended trust. As a result, “all-in” investors are less generously reciprocated than when they can invest any amount, where full investments are a clearer signal of trustworthiness.
Labor Contracts, Gift-Exchange And Reference Wages: Your Gift Need Not Be Mine!, Hernán Bejerano, Brice Corgnet, Joaquín Gómez-Miñambres
Labor Contracts, Gift-Exchange And Reference Wages: Your Gift Need Not Be Mine!, Hernán Bejerano, Brice Corgnet, Joaquín Gómez-Miñambres
ESI Working Papers
We extend Akerlof’s (1982) gift-exchange model to the case in which reference wages respond to changes in the work environment such as those related to unemployment benefits or workers’ productivity levels. Our model shows that these changes spur disagreements between workers and employers regarding the value of the reference wage. These disagreements tend to weaken the gift-exchange relationship thus reducing production levels and wages. We find support for these predictions in a controlled, yet realistic, workplace environment. Our work also sheds light on several stylized facts regarding employment relationships such as the increased intensity of labor conflicts when economic conditions …
Give Me A Challenge Or Give Me A Raise, Aleksandr Alekseev
Give Me A Challenge Or Give Me A Raise, Aleksandr Alekseev
ESI Working Papers
I study the effect of task difficulty on workers' effort and compare it to the effect of monetary rewards in an incentivized lab experiment. I find that task difficulty has an inverse-U effect on effort, and that this effect is quantitatively large when compared to the effect of conditional monetary rewards. Difficulty acts as a mediator of monetary rewards: conditional rewards are most effective at the intermediate or high levels of difficulty. I show that the inverse-U pattern of effort response to difficulty is not consistent with the Expected Utility model but is consistent with the Rank-Dependent Utility model that …
Self-Selecting Into Being A Dictator: Distributional Consequences, Lara Ezquerra, Praveen Kujal
Self-Selecting Into Being A Dictator: Distributional Consequences, Lara Ezquerra, Praveen Kujal
ESI Working Papers
We allow for principals to self-select into delegating, or not, the allocation decision to an agent in a modified dictator game. The standard dictator game arises when principal´s choose to make the allocation decision themselves. Dictators thus obtained transfer lower amounts to receivers, relative to when the decision making is passed to an agent under delegation (or in the standard dictator game). Principals choose to be a dictator nearly half of the time. The average amount transferred by individuals who delegate in more than half of the rounds is significantly higher than the quantity transferred by those who choose to …
Lying And Shirking Under Oath, Nicolas Jacquemet, Alexander James, Stéphane Luchini, James J. Murphy, Jason F. Shogren
Lying And Shirking Under Oath, Nicolas Jacquemet, Alexander James, Stéphane Luchini, James J. Murphy, Jason F. Shogren
ESI Working Papers
This study explores whether an oath to honesty can reduce both shirking and lying among crowd-sourced internet workers. Using a classic coin-flip experiment, we first show that a substantial majority of Mechanical Turk workers both shirk and lie when reporting the number of heads flipped. We then demonstrate lying can be reduced by first asking each worker to swear voluntarily on his or her honor to tell the truth in subsequent economic decisions. The oath, however, did not reduce shirking as measured by time- at-coin-flip-task, although it did increase the time they spent answering a demographic survey. Conditional on response, …
Adding Tournament To Tournament: Combining Between-Team And Within-Team Incentives, Michael Majerczyk, Roman Sheremeta, Yu Tian
Adding Tournament To Tournament: Combining Between-Team And Within-Team Incentives, Michael Majerczyk, Roman Sheremeta, Yu Tian
ESI Working Papers
We examine theoretically and experimentally how combining between-team and within-team incentives affects behavior in team tournaments. Theory predicts that free-riding will occur when there are only between-team incentives, and offering within-team incentives may solve this problem. However, if individuals collude, then within-team incentives may not be as effective at reducing free-riding. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, the results of our experiment indicate that although between-team incentives are effective at increasing individual effort, there is substantial free-riding and declining effort over time. Importantly, a combination of between-team and within-team incentives is effective not only at generating effort but also at sustaining …
Co-Enforcement Of Common Pool Resources: Experimental Evidence From Turfs In Chile, Carlos A. Chávez, James J. Murphy, John K. Stranlund
Co-Enforcement Of Common Pool Resources: Experimental Evidence From Turfs In Chile, Carlos A. Chávez, James J. Murphy, John K. Stranlund
ESI Working Papers
This work presents the results of framed field experiments designed to study the co-enforcement of access to common pool resources. The experiments were conducted in the field with participants in the territorial use rights in fisheries (TURFs) management scheme that regulates access to nearshore fisheries along the coast of Chile. In the experiments, TURF members not only decided on harvest but also invested in monitoring to deter poaching by outsiders. Treatments varied whether the monitoring investment was an individual decision or determined by a group vote. Per-unit sanctions for poaching were exogenous as if provided by a government authority, and …
The Effect Of Social Information In The Dictator Game With A Taking Option, Tanya O'Garra, Valerio Capraro, Praveen Kujal
The Effect Of Social Information In The Dictator Game With A Taking Option, Tanya O'Garra, Valerio Capraro, Praveen Kujal
ESI Working Papers
We experimentally study how redistribution choices are affected by positive and negative information regarding the behaviour of a previous participant in a dictator game with a taking option. We use the strategy method to identify behavioural ‘types’, and thus distinguish ‘conformists’ from ‘counter-conformists’, and unconditional choosers. Unconditional choosers make up the greatest proportion of types (about 80%) while only about 20% of subjects condition their responses to social information. We find that both conformity and counter-conformity are driven by a desire to be seen as moral (the ‘symbolization’ dimension of moral identity). The main difference is that, conformity is also …
Classical Economics: Lost And Found, Sabiou M. Inoua, Vernon Smith
Classical Economics: Lost And Found, Sabiou M. Inoua, Vernon Smith
ESI Working Papers
"We argue that neoclassical value theory suffers from a more basic and serious logical indeterminacy, which is inherent in the axiom of price-taking behavior, and which renders price dynamics indeterminate before inquiring as to its stability. If everyone in the economy takes price as given, whence come these prices? Who is giving these prices? Jevons avoided the indeterminacy by assuming that people must have complete information on supply and demand, and the consequent equilibrium prices—‘perfect competition.’ Walras in effect imported an external agent who found the prices by trial-and-error-correction (the Walrasian Auctioneer). Paradoxically, both approaches had the potential better to …
Cournot Marked The Turn From Classical To Neoclassical Thinking, Vernon L. Smith, Sabiou M. Inoua
Cournot Marked The Turn From Classical To Neoclassical Thinking, Vernon L. Smith, Sabiou M. Inoua
ESI Working Papers
For classical economists, markets served the highest value buyers without anyone in the market needing to know that it was possible to write aggregate buyer reservation prices in the form, D = F (p). Cournot, thereby launched neoclassical economics as modelling and thinking of economic action in terms of their outcome effects, rather than their roots in human experience.
Monetary Equilibrium And The Cost Of Banking Activity, Paola Boel, Gabriele Camera
Monetary Equilibrium And The Cost Of Banking Activity, Paola Boel, Gabriele Camera
ESI Working Papers
We investigate the effects of banks’ operating costs on allocations and welfare in a low interest rate environment. We introduce an explicit production function for banks in a microfounded model where banks employ labor resources, hired on a competitive market, to run their operations. In equilibrium, this generates a spread between interest rates on loans and deposits, which naturally reflects the underlying monetary policy and the efficiency of financial intermediation. In a deflation or low inflation environment, equilibrium deposits yield zero returns. Hence, banks end up soaking up labor resources to offer deposits that do not outperform idle balances, thus …
Do Economic Inequalities Affect Long-Run Cooperation & Prosperity?, Gabriele Camera, Cary Deck, David Porter
Do Economic Inequalities Affect Long-Run Cooperation & Prosperity?, Gabriele Camera, Cary Deck, David Porter
ESI Working Papers
We explore if fairness and inequality motivations affect cooperation in indefinitely repeated games. Each round, we randomly divided experimental participants into donor-recipient pairs. Donors could make a gift to recipients, and ex-ante earnings are highest when all donors give. Roles were randomly reassigned every period, which induced inequality in ex-post earnings. Theoretically, income-maximizing players do not have to condition on this inequality because it is payoff-irrelevant. Empirically, payoff-irrelevant inequality affected participants’ ability to coordinate on efficient play: donors conditioned gifts on their own past roles and, with inequalities made visible, discriminated against those who were better off.
Reconsidering Rational Expectations And The Aggregation Of Diverse Information In Laboratory Security Markets, Brice Corgnet, Cary Deck, Mark Desantis, Kyle Hampton, Erik O. Kimbrough
Reconsidering Rational Expectations And The Aggregation Of Diverse Information In Laboratory Security Markets, Brice Corgnet, Cary Deck, Mark Desantis, Kyle Hampton, Erik O. Kimbrough
ESI Working Papers
The ability of markets to aggregate diverse information is a cornerstone of economics and finance, and empirical evidence for such aggregation has been demonstrated in previous laboratory experiments. Most notably Plott and Sunder (1988) find clear support for the rational expectations hypothesis in their Series B and C markets. However, recent studies have called into question the robustness of these findings. In this paper, we report the result of a direct replication of the key information aggregation results presented in Plott and Sunder. We do not find the same strong evidence in support of rational expectations that Plott and Sunder …
The Political Economy Of Foreign Aid And Growth: Theory And Evidence, Sultan Mehmood, Avner Seror
The Political Economy Of Foreign Aid And Growth: Theory And Evidence, Sultan Mehmood, Avner Seror
ESI Working Papers
In this paper, we demonstrate that even when foreign aid is used to fund patronage, it may still have a positive - and significant - effect on economic growth in developing countries. First, we present a theory that formalizes the effect of aid on economic growth and patronage. Next, we provide evidence from Pakistan consistent with the predictions of the model that foreign aid increases economic growth, despite being used for patronage. The identification strategy we propose allows us to provide causal evidence for the predictions of the model.
Designing Call Auction Institutions To Eliminate Price Bubbles: Is English Dutch The Best?, Cary Deck, Maroš Servátka, Steven Tucker
Designing Call Auction Institutions To Eliminate Price Bubbles: Is English Dutch The Best?, Cary Deck, Maroš Servátka, Steven Tucker
ESI Working Papers
The bubble and burst pattern in asset market experiments is among the most replicable results in experimental economics. Numerous studies have searched for means to reduce this mispricing. Using controlled laboratory experiments, we compare mispricing in standard double auction markets to prices in two clock auctions. The double Dutch auction, shown to be more efficient than the double auction in commodity market experiments, does not eliminate bubbles. However, the English Dutch auction does yield prices reflective of underlying fundamentals and succeeds in taming bubbles even with inexperienced traders in the common declining fundamental value environment.
Salience And Social Choice, Mark Schneider, Jonathan W. Leland
Salience And Social Choice, Mark Schneider, Jonathan W. Leland
ESI Working Papers
The axioms of expected utility and discounted utility theory have been tested extensively. In contrast, the axioms of social welfare functions have only been tested in a few questionnaire studies involving choices between hypothetical income distributions. In this note, we conduct a controlled experiment with 100 subjects in the role of social planners that tests five fundamental properties of social welfare functions to provide a basic test of cardinal social choice theory. We find that four properties of the standard social welfare functions tested are systematically violated, producing an Allais paradox, a common ratio effect, a framing effect, and a …
A Time To Print, A Time To Reform, Lars Boerner, Jared Rubin, Battista Severgnini
A Time To Print, A Time To Reform, Lars Boerner, Jared Rubin, Battista Severgnini
ESI Working Papers
The public mechanical clock and movable type printing press were arguably the most important and complex technologies of the late medieval period. We posit that towns with clocks became upper-tail human capital hubs--clocks required extensive technical know-how and fine mechanical skill. This meant that clock towns were in position to adopt the printing press soon after its invention in 1450, as presses required a similar set of mechanical and technical skills to operate and repair. A two-stage analysis confirms this conjecture: we find that clock towns were 34-40 percentage points more likely to also have a press by 1500. The …
Endogenous Market Formation And Monetary Trade: An Experiment, Gabriele Camera, Dror Goldberg, Avi Weiss
Endogenous Market Formation And Monetary Trade: An Experiment, Gabriele Camera, Dror Goldberg, Avi Weiss
ESI Working Papers
The theory of money assumes decentralized bilateral exchange and excludes centralized multilateral exchange. However, endogenizing the exchange process is critical for understanding the conditions that support the use of money. We develop a “travelling game” to study the emergence of decentralized and centralized exchange, theoretically and experimentally. Players located on separate islands can either trade locally, or pay a cost to trade elsewhere, so decentralized and centralized markets can both emerge in equilibrium. The former minimize trade costs through monetary exchange; the latter maximizes overall surplus through non-monetary exchange. Monetary trade emerges when coordination is problematic, while centralized trade emerges …
The Attack And Defense Games, Roman Sheremeta
The Attack And Defense Games, Roman Sheremeta
ESI Working Papers
The attack and defense game is a game in which an attacker (a group of attackers) has an incentive to revise the status quo and a defender (a group of defenders) wants to protect it. The asymmetry in objectives creates incompatible interests and results in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. However, this equilibrium could be heavily impacted by behavioral considerations.
A Bias Aggregation Theorem, Mark Schneider
A Bias Aggregation Theorem, Mark Schneider
ESI Working Papers
In a market where some traders are rational (maximize expected utility) and others are systematically biased (deviate from expected utility due to some bias parameter, q), do equilibrium prices necessarily depend on q? In this note, focusing on the case where there is an aggregate and systematic bias in the population, we show that market prices can still be unbiased. Hence, we establish that systematically biased agents do not necessarily imply biased market prices. We show that the parametric model we use also predicts observed deviations from expected utility in laboratory and market environments.
Cooperation Among Strangers With And Without A Monetary System, Maria Bigoni, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari
Cooperation Among Strangers With And Without A Monetary System, Maria Bigoni, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari
ESI Working Papers
Human societies prosper when their members move beyond local exchange and cooperate with outsiders in the creation of wealth. Collaboration of this type presents formidable challenges because interaction is impersonal, reciprocity is unfeasible and trust cannot be easily established. Here we study this cooperation problem by modeling strategic interaction among strangers through an Intertemporal Exchange Game. The setup can be easily implemented in the laboratory to study a variety of cooperation-enhancing institutions. In particular, we study the role of a fiat monetary system by introducing intrinsically worthless tokens that can be offered in exchange for cooperation. The experiments show that …