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Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
When Poverty Is The Worst Crime Of All: A Film Review Of Gideon’S Army (2013), Jessica S Henry
When Poverty Is The Worst Crime Of All: A Film Review Of Gideon’S Army (2013), Jessica S Henry
Department of Justice Studies Faculty Scholarship and Creative Works
This review of the Sundance Award-winning documentary film, Gideon’s Army, examines the disparate impact of the criminal justice system on the poor and, particularly, poor people of color.
Medical Paternalism And The Rule Of Law: A Reply To Dr. Relman, Charles Baron
Medical Paternalism And The Rule Of Law: A Reply To Dr. Relman, Charles Baron
Charles H. Baron
In this Article, Professor Baron challenges the position taken recently by Dr. Arnold Relman in this journal that the 1977 Saikewicz decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was incorrect in calling for routine judicial resolution of decisions whether to provide life-prolonging treatment to terminally ill incompetent patients. First, Professor Baron argues that Dr. Relman's position that doctors should make such decisions is based upon an outmoded, paternalistic view of the doctor-patient relationship. Second, he points out the importance of guaranteeing to such decisions the special qualities of process which characterize decision making by courts and which are not …
The Lawyer Rent-Seeker Myth And Public Policy, Teresa J. Schmid
The Lawyer Rent-Seeker Myth And Public Policy, Teresa J. Schmid
Teresa J Schmid
ABSTRACT Two enduring fallacies in public policy are that lawyers are rent seekers who impair rather than stimulate the economy, and that there are too many of them. While lawyers may disagree with the first premise, they tacitly accept the second. These two fallacies have led leaders in both the political and professional arenas to adopt policies that impair access to justice. This study documents the negative effects of those policies and recommends courses of action to reverse those effects.
Costs Of Codification, Dru Stevenson
Costs Of Codification, Dru Stevenson
Dru Stevenson
Between the Civil War and World War II, every state and the federal government shifted toward codified versions of their statutes. Academia has so far ignored the systemic effects of this dramatic change. For example, the consensus view in the academic literature about rules and standards has been that precise rules present higher enactment costs for legislatures than would general standards, while vague standards present higher information costs for courts and citizens than do rules. Systematic codification – featuring hierarchical format and numbering, topical arrangement, and cross-references – inverts this relationship, lowering transaction costs for legislatures and increasing information costs …
Judicial Attention As A Scarce Resource: A Preliminary Defense Of How Judges Allocate Time Across Cases In The Federal Courts Of Appeals, Marin K. Levy
Faculty Scholarship
Federal appellate judges no longer have the time to hear argument and draft opinions in all of their cases. The average annual filing per active judgeship now stands at 330 filed cases per year — more than four times what it was sixty years ago. In response, judges have adopted case management strategies that effectively involve spending significantly less time on certain classes of cases than on others. Various scholars have decried this state of affairs, suggesting that the courts have created a “bifurcated” system of justice with “separate and unequal tracks.” These reformers propose altering the relevant constraints of …
Rethinking The Principal-Agent Theory Of Judging, Rafael I. Pardo, Jonathan Remy Nash
Rethinking The Principal-Agent Theory Of Judging, Rafael I. Pardo, Jonathan Remy Nash
Scholarship@WashULaw
This Essay offers new insights into understanding the relationship between higher and lower courts and responds to the extant literature that has characterized the relationship as one involving a principal and an agent. We challenge the underpinnings of the principal-agent understanding of judicial hierarchies and identify problems with the theory’s applicability in this context. While principals ordinarily select their agents, higher court judges usually do not select lower court judges. Moreover, while lower court judges may cast votes with an eye to the possibility of elevation to a higher court, the higher court judges who review the lower court’s decisions …
Shleifer's Failure, Jonathan Klick