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Selected Works

Gary Tian

China

Articles 1 - 2 of 2

Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

Interactions Among China-Related Stocks: Evidence From A Causality Test With A New Procedure, Gary Gang Tian, Guang Hua Wan Jun 2013

Interactions Among China-Related Stocks: Evidence From A Causality Test With A New Procedure, Gary Gang Tian, Guang Hua Wan

Gary Tian

The purpose of this study is to investigate a causal relationship among five different indices of shares issued by Chinese firms, A-, B- and H-shares listed in China and Hong Kong. This paper re-examines the interactions among these China-related stocks using daily time series data by constructing a vector autoregresion (VAR) model. A new Granger no-causality testing procedure developed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995) was applied to test the causality link among these five stock indices. The results emerging from our research indicate that there are "closed" relations within A-share (as well as within B-share) between Shanghai and Shenzhen markets …


Venture Capital And Executive Incentives In China, Jerry Cao, Qigui Liu, Gary G. Tian May 2013

Venture Capital And Executive Incentives In China, Jerry Cao, Qigui Liu, Gary G. Tian

Gary Tian

This paper examines the effect that venture capital (VC) has on the pay-performancerelationship in listed Chinese firms. We find that VC has a significantly positive effect onCEO compensation and the pay-performance relationship, such effect particularly stronger infirms needing more managerial efforts and discretions (higher growth opportunity or higherlevels of capital expenditure). In addition, we show that VC-backed firms with moremanagerial discretions are more likely to use stock options. The evidence suggests thatventure capital investors use more sensitive compensation contract for top executives inChinese when the need for managerial discretion is greater. Such compensation schemes byVCs enhance firm performance subsequently.