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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Individually Rational Buyback Contracts With Inventory Level Dependent Demand, Lokendra Devagan, R K Amit, Peeyush Mehta, Sanjeev Swami, Kripa Shanker
Individually Rational Buyback Contracts With Inventory Level Dependent Demand, Lokendra Devagan, R K Amit, Peeyush Mehta, Sanjeev Swami, Kripa Shanker
R K Amit
In this paper, we consider a supply chain coordination problem when demand faced by a retailer is influenced by the amount of inventory displayed on the retail shelf. We assume that shelf space inventory is used as one of the levers to stimulate demand. Our objective in this research is to design individually rational contracts that coordinate the supply chain when the retailer faces inventory-level-dependent demand. We consider a buyback contract where any leftover inventory at the retailer can be returned to the supplier at a pre-specified terms of the buyback contract. The existing buyback contracts in the supply chain …
A Relational Contract For Water Demand Management, R K Amit, Parthasarathy Ramachandran
A Relational Contract For Water Demand Management, R K Amit, Parthasarathy Ramachandran
R K Amit
For necessary goods like water, under supply constraints, fairness considerations lead to negative externalities. The objective of this paper is to design an infinite horizon contract or relational contract (a type of long-term contract) that ensures self-enforcing (instead of court-enforced) behaviour by the agents to mitigate the externality due to fairness issues. In this contract, the consumer is induced to consume at firm-supply level using the threat of higher fair price for future time periods. The pricing mechanism, computed in this paper, internalizes the externality and is shown to be economically efficient and provides revenue sufficiency.