Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons^™

Institutions Matter: Why The Herder Problem Is Not A Prisoner's Dilemma, Peter Grossman, Daniel Cole

Peter Z. Grossman

In the game theory literature, Garrett Hardin’s famous allegory of the “tragedy of the commons” has been modeled as a variant of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, labeled the Herder Problem (or, sometimes, the Commons Dilemma). This brief paper argues that important differences in the institutional structures of the standard Prisoner’s Dilemma and Herder Problem render the two games different in kind. Specifically, institutional impediments to communication and cooperation that ensure a dominant strategy of defection in the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma are absent in the Herder Problem. Their absence does not ensure that players will achieve a welfare-enhancing, cooperative solution to the …

U.S. Energy Policy And The Presumption Of Market Failure, Peter Grossman

Peter Z. Grossman

The article presents an analysis of U.S. energy policy, focusing on the question of whether it is able to correct market failures in terms of alternative energy sources. The question of whether any such market failures exist is said to be a separate question, and an argument is presented that governments generally are not competent to fix such problems even when they do exist. A discussion of U.S. energy policy from the early 1970s to the 21st century is presented. Programs designed to encourage technological innovations such as biofeuls, nuclear fusion, and electric vehicles are analyzed.

The Apollo Fallacy And Its Effect On U.S. Energy Policy, Peter Grossman

Peter Z. Grossman

US Policy makers have made continual references to the Apollo Program as a model for development of alternative energy technologies. This model, however, is inappropriate for energy policy, and its use is termed the Apollo fallacy. The goal of the Apollo Program was the demonstration of engineering prowess while any alternative energy technology must succeed in the marketplace. Several Apollo-like energy programs have been tried and all have failed at high cost. It is argued that the use of Apollo has political benefits but that it is detrimental to the adoption of potentially effective energy policies. Note: Link is to …

Uncertainty, Insurance, And The Learned Hand Formula, Peter Grossman, Reed Cearley, Daniel Cole

Peter Z. Grossman

Note: Final definitive version is available at Oxford Journals. http://www.oxfordjournals.org Law and economics scholars have written extensively about how insurance markets affect the tort system. They have noted the beneficial cost-spreading function of insurance, as well as the detrimental incentive-distorting affects of insurance, stemming from problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. Surprisingly, however, scholars have over-looked one of the most important salutary functions that insurance serves for the tort system: it provides much of the information courts need to apply the Marginal Learned Hand Formula. This paper explains precisely how insurance markets collect and disseminate information about the expected …

How Cartels Endure And How They Fail : Studies Of Industrial Collusion, Peter Grossman

Peter Z. Grossman

Note: full-text not available due to publisher restrictions. Link takes you to an external site where you can purchase the book or borrow it from a local library.

Toward A Total-Cost Approach To Environmental Instrument Choice, Peter Grossman, Daniel Cole

Peter Z. Grossman

Note: full-text not available due to publisher restrictions. Link takes you to an external site where you can locate the article at your local library.

The Meaning Of Property Rights: Law Versus Economics?, D. Cole, Peter Grossman

Peter Z. Grossman