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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Grandparents As Guards: A Game Theoretic Analysis Of Inheritance And Post Marital Residence In A World Of Uncertain Paternity, Brishti Guha
Grandparents As Guards: A Game Theoretic Analysis Of Inheritance And Post Marital Residence In A World Of Uncertain Paternity, Brishti Guha
Research Collection School Of Economics
I unify the following (1) men face paternal uncertainty while women do not face maternal uncertainty, (2) putative fathers and paternal kin care about true paternity, (3) paternity confidence is systematically lower in matrilocal cultures than in patrilocal ones, (4) inheritance tends to be patrilineal in high paternity confidence cultures and matrilineal in low confidence ones, and (5) most societies with patrilineal inheritance were patrilocal while most societies with matrilineal inheritance were matrilocal. I model the co-evolution of inheritance patterns and post-marital residence patterns - and their relationship with paternity uncertainty. Using a game theoretic model, I examine how a …
Applicant Screening And Performance-Related Outcomes, Fali Huang, Peter Cappelli
Applicant Screening And Performance-Related Outcomes, Fali Huang, Peter Cappelli
Research Collection School Of Economics
A fundamental problem faced by employers is how to elicit effort from employees. Most economic models suggest that employers meet this challenge by monitoring employees carefully to prevent shirking. But there is another option that relies on heterogeneity across employees, and that is to screen job candidates to find workers with a stronger work ethic who require less monitoring. We might therefore expect employers who screen candidates more intensively to monitor them less. Using data from a national sample of US employers, we find that employers who screen applicants more intensively for factors that should predict work ethic also monitor …
To Trust Or To Monitor: A Dynamic Analysis, Fali Huang
To Trust Or To Monitor: A Dynamic Analysis, Fali Huang
Research Collection School Of Economics
In a principal-agent framework, principals can mitigate moral hazard problems not only through extrinsic incentives such as monitoring, but also through agents’ intrinsic trustworthiness. Their relative usage, however, changes over time and varies across societies. This paper attempts to explain this phenomenon by endogenizing agent trustworthiness as a response to potential returns. When monitoring becomes relatively cheaper over time, agents acquire lower trustworthiness, which may actually drive up the overall governance cost in society. Across societies, those giving employees lower weights in choosing governance methods tend to have higher monitoring intensities and lower trust. These results are consistent with the …