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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

Optimal City Hierarchy: A Dynamic Programming Approach To Central Place Theory, Wen-Tai Hsu, Thomas J. Holmes, Frank Morgan Nov 2014

Optimal City Hierarchy: A Dynamic Programming Approach To Central Place Theory, Wen-Tai Hsu, Thomas J. Holmes, Frank Morgan

Research Collection School Of Economics

Central place theory is a key building block of economic geography and an empirically plausible description of city systems. This paper provides a rationale for central place theory via a dynamic programming formulation of the social planner's problem of city hierarchy. We show that there must be one and only one immediate smaller city between two neighboring larger-sized cities in any optimal solution. If the fixed cost of setting up a city is a power function, then the immediate smaller city will be located in the middle, confirming the locational pattern suggested by Christaller. We also show that the solution …


Is Urban Food Demand In The Philippines Different From China?, Tomoki Fujii Oct 2014

Is Urban Food Demand In The Philippines Different From China?, Tomoki Fujii

Research Collection School Of Economics

It is essential to understand the consumption pattern of food and how it changes over time to formulate sound economic policies as well as marketing and pricing strategies. In this study, we estimate the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System with six rounds of the Family Income Expenditure Survey exploiting the conditional linearity of the demand system. We find that the Filipino diet has become westernized and that the changes in urban food demand elasticities are qualitatively similar to those in urban China, especially for meat, fruits, and vegetables.We also offer some policy and business implications.


Does Market Competition Lead To Customization?, Wen-Tai Hsu, Yi Lu, Travis Ng Oct 2014

Does Market Competition Lead To Customization?, Wen-Tai Hsu, Yi Lu, Travis Ng

Research Collection School Of Economics

This paper proposes a theory of competition and customization. When firms allocate their production to both custom-made and standardized products, the fraction of sales from the former will increase in the face of increased competition. Recent surveys conducted by the World Bank on Chinese firms provide a rare direct measure of customization that allows us to test the above-mentioned prediction. We find empirical results consistent with the prediction.


How Effective Can Ex Post Destruction Alleviate The Hold-Up Problem?, Huan Wang, Juyuan Zhang, Yi Zhang Jul 2014

How Effective Can Ex Post Destruction Alleviate The Hold-Up Problem?, Huan Wang, Juyuan Zhang, Yi Zhang

Research Collection School Of Economics

We first investigate whether or not ex post destruction can possibly alleviate the hold-up problem in a one-shot game between a supplier and a buyer. The answer is yes but only when the buyer believes that the supplier might be a Homo reciprocans agent with sufficiently strong propensity for reciprocity. Under incomplete information with informed supplier, investment is made feasible by the “mismatch” between the buyer’s belief of stronger supplier reciprocal propensity and a de facto weaker one. Under incomplete information with uninformed supplier, the “mismatch” between the buyer’s belief of weaker supplier reciprocal propensity and a stronger ex post …


Reinterpreting King Solomon's Problem: Malice And Mechanism Design, Brishti Guha Feb 2014

Reinterpreting King Solomon's Problem: Malice And Mechanism Design, Brishti Guha

Research Collection School Of Economics

I argue for an alternative interpretation of King Solomon's problem in terms of one of the two claimants being “malicious”. A “malicious” claimant places no intrinsic value on the object but derives utility from depriving the rival claimant. This new interpretation permits a simpler solution than those considered in the literature; I derive a mechanism that induces truthful revelation where the equilibrium involves a single round of elimination of weakly dominated strategies, and no monetary transfers. I consider extensions which allow for the malicious claimant to also place some low but positive intrinsic valuation on the object; I also discuss …