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- Crime (2)
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Articles 1 - 14 of 14
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Grandparents As Guards: A Game Theoretic Analysis Of Inheritance And Post Marital Residence In A World Of Uncertain Paternity, Brishti Guha
Grandparents As Guards: A Game Theoretic Analysis Of Inheritance And Post Marital Residence In A World Of Uncertain Paternity, Brishti Guha
Research Collection School Of Economics
I unify the following (1) men face paternal uncertainty while women do not face maternal uncertainty, (2) putative fathers and paternal kin care about true paternity, (3) paternity confidence is systematically lower in matrilocal cultures than in patrilocal ones, (4) inheritance tends to be patrilineal in high paternity confidence cultures and matrilineal in low confidence ones, and (5) most societies with patrilineal inheritance were patrilocal while most societies with matrilineal inheritance were matrilocal. I model the co-evolution of inheritance patterns and post-marital residence patterns - and their relationship with paternity uncertainty. Using a game theoretic model, I examine how a …
Schooling, Political Participation, And The Economy, Filipe R. Campante, Davin Chor
Schooling, Political Participation, And The Economy, Filipe R. Campante, Davin Chor
Research Collection School Of Economics
We investigate how the link between individual schooling and political participation is a ected by country characteristics. Using individual survey data, we nd that political participation is more responsive to schooling in land-abundant countries, and less responsive in human capital-abundant countries, even while controlling for country political institutions and cultural attitudes. We propose an explanation that centers on how individuals allocate the use of their human capital. A relative abundance of land (used primarily in the least skill-intensive sector) or a scarcity of aggregate hu- man capital increases both the level of political participation and its responsiveness to schooling, by …
An Evolutionary Analysis Of Turnout With Conformist Citizens, Massimiliano Landi, Mauro Sodini
An Evolutionary Analysis Of Turnout With Conformist Citizens, Massimiliano Landi, Mauro Sodini
Research Collection School Of Economics
We propose an evolutionary analysis of a voting game where citizens have a preference for conformism that adds to the instrumental preference for the electoral outcome. Multiple equilibria arise, and some generate high turnout. Simulations of best response dynamics show that high turnout is asymptotically stable if conformism matters but its likelihood depends on the reference group for conformism: high turnout is more likely when voters care about their own group's choice, as this better overrides the free rider problem of voting games. Comparative statics on the voting cost distribution, the population's size or the groups' composition are also done.
Gambling On Genes: Ambiguity Aversion Explains Investment In Sisters' Children, Brishti Guha
Gambling On Genes: Ambiguity Aversion Explains Investment In Sisters' Children, Brishti Guha
Research Collection School Of Economics
Many men invest in their sisters’ children instead of their wives’. Existing theories addressing such behavior depend on the level of paternity probability in such men’s societies being implausibly low. I link this anthropologically observed investment behavior with the experimentally observed phenomenon that some individuals are ambiguity averse. Arguing that men’s decisions are made under ambiguity, I show that an increase in ambiguity aversion results in investment in sisters’, rather than wives’, children. I show that this can happen even under risk neutrality. I also consider the special cases of a SEU maximizer and of extreme ambiguity aversion in the …
Central Place Theory And City Size Distribution, Wen-Tai Hsu
Central Place Theory And City Size Distribution, Wen-Tai Hsu
Research Collection School Of Economics
This paper proposes a theory of city size distribution via a hierarchy approach rather than the popular random growth process. It does so by formalizing central place theory using an equilibrium entry model and specifying the conditions under which city size distribution follows a power law. Central place theory describes the way in which a hierarchical city system with different layers of cities serving differently sized market areas is formed from a uniformly populated space. The force driving the city size differences in this model is the heterogeneity in economies of scale across goods. The city size distribution under a …
Crime And Moral Hazard: Does More Policing Necessarily Induce Private Negligence?, Brishti Guha, Ashok S. Guha
Crime And Moral Hazard: Does More Policing Necessarily Induce Private Negligence?, Brishti Guha, Ashok S. Guha
Research Collection School Of Economics
Even risk-neutral individuals can insure themselves against crimes by combining direct expenditure on security with costly diversification. In such cases — and even when one of these options is infeasible — greater policing often actually encourages private precautions.
Crime And Moral Hazard: Does More Policing Necessarily Induce Private Negligence?, Brishti Guha, Ashok S. Guha
Crime And Moral Hazard: Does More Policing Necessarily Induce Private Negligence?, Brishti Guha, Ashok S. Guha
Research Collection School Of Economics
Even risk-neutral individuals can insure themselves against crimes by combining direct expenditure on security with costly diversification. In such cases — and even when one of these options is infeasible — greater policing often actually encourages private precautions.
Love And Money By Parental Match-Making: Evidence From Urban Couples In China, Fali Huang, Ginger Jin, Lixin Collin Xu
Love And Money By Parental Match-Making: Evidence From Urban Couples In China, Fali Huang, Ginger Jin, Lixin Collin Xu
Research Collection School Of Economics
Parental involvement in marriage matchmaking may distort the optimal spouse choice because parents are willing to substitute love for money. The rationale is that the joint income of married children can be shared among extended family members more easily than mutual attraction felt by the couple themselves, and as a result, the best spouse candidate in the parents' eyes can differ from what is optimal to the individual, even though parents are altruistic and care dearly about their children's welfare. We find supporting evidence for this prediction using a unique sample of urban couples in China in the early 1990s.
Finding Dynamic Treatment Effects Under Anticipation: Spanking Effects On Behavior, Myoung-Jae Lee, Fali Huang
Finding Dynamic Treatment Effects Under Anticipation: Spanking Effects On Behavior, Myoung-Jae Lee, Fali Huang
Research Collection School Of Economics
The dynamic treatment effect literature considers multiple treatments administered over time, with some treatments affected by interim outcomes. But the literature overlooks the possibility of individuals acting in anticipation of future treatments. This lack of anticipation aspect may not matter in the drug–response relationships which motivated the literature. But human beings (or animals with some intelligence) do not just respond to current and past treatments, but also ‘reflect and anticipate’ future treatments. For example, a punishment or reward is likely to prompt forward looking. Even if no personal punishment or reward is involved, people may take action in anticipation of …
A Note On Separability And Intra-Household Resource Allocation In A Collective Household Model, Tomoki Fujii, Ryuichiro Ishikawa
A Note On Separability And Intra-Household Resource Allocation In A Collective Household Model, Tomoki Fujii, Ryuichiro Ishikawa
Research Collection School Of Economics
We consider a collective model of a household in which each member has a utility function satisfying the weak separability condition. We show that the separability at the individual level carries over to the household level and that the allocation of private goods in any Pareto-efficient allocation can be supported as a Pareto-efficient allocation of private sub-problem. We also provide the necessary and sufficient condition for the Pareto weight for the private sub-problem to move in the same direction as the household Pareto weight.
Is Specialization Desirable In Committee Decision Making?, Ruth Ben-Yashar, Winston T. H. Koh, Shmuel Nitzan
Is Specialization Desirable In Committee Decision Making?, Ruth Ben-Yashar, Winston T. H. Koh, Shmuel Nitzan
Research Collection School Of Economics
Committee decision making is examined in this study focusing on the role assigned to the committee members. In particular, we are concerned about the comparison between committee performance under specialization and non-specialization of the decision makers. Specialization (in the context of project or public policy selection) means that the decision of each committee member is based on a narrow area, which typically results in the acquirement and use of relatively high expertise in that area. When the committee members’ expertise is already determined, specialization only means that the decision of each committee member is based solely on his/her relatively high …
Peer Transparency In Teams: Does It Help Or Hinder Incentives?, Parimal Bag, Nona Pepito
Peer Transparency In Teams: Does It Help Or Hinder Incentives?, Parimal Bag, Nona Pepito
Research Collection School Of Economics
In a joint project involving two players of a two-round effort investment game with complementary efforts, transparency, by allowing players to observe each other's efforts, achieves at least as much, and sometimes more, collective and individual efforts relative to a nontransparent environment. Without transparency, multiple equilibria can arise, and transparency elimites the inferior equilibria. When full cooperation arises only under transparency, it occurs gradually: No worker sinks in the maximum amount of effort in the first round, preferring instead to smooth out contributions over time. If the players' efforts are substitutes, transparency makes no difference to equilibrium efforts.
Pirates And Fishermen: Is Less Patrolling Always Bad?, Brishti Guha
Pirates And Fishermen: Is Less Patrolling Always Bad?, Brishti Guha
Research Collection School Of Economics
Motivated by the Somali fishermen–pirates, I explore the time allocation decision of potential pirates between piracy and an alternative non-violent occupation, fishing, when the returns of both piracy and fishing are sensitive to patrolling intensity. For a range of parameters, the static model yields multiple equilibria, an “efficient” one with no patrolling and low piracy, a less efficient equilibrium with intermediate levels of both piracy and patrolling and a highly inefficient high-patrolling high-piracy equilibrium. Analyzing the dynamic analogue, I obtain the surprising result that sufficiently low patrolling can be a good strategy.
Quasi-Option Value Under Strategic Interactions, Tomoki Fujii, Ryuichiro Ishikawa
Quasi-Option Value Under Strategic Interactions, Tomoki Fujii, Ryuichiro Ishikawa
Research Collection School Of Economics
We consider a simple two-period model of irreversible investment under strategic interactions between two players. In this setup, we show that the quasi-option value may cause some conceptual difficulties. In case of asymmetric information, decentralized investment decisions fail to induce first-best allocations. Therefore a regulator may not be able to exercise the option to delay the decision to develop. We also show that information-induced inefficiency may arise in a game situation and that under certain assumptions inefficiency can be eliminated by sending asymmetric information to the players, even when the regulator faces informational constraints. Our model is potentially applicable to …