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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

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Articles 1 - 5 of 5

Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

Cheating On Their Taxes: When Are Tax Limitations Effective At Limiting State Taxes, Expenditures, And Budgets?, Colin H. Mccubbins, Mathew D. Mccubbins Jan 2014

Cheating On Their Taxes: When Are Tax Limitations Effective At Limiting State Taxes, Expenditures, And Budgets?, Colin H. Mccubbins, Mathew D. Mccubbins

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


For Whom The Tel Tolls: Can State Tax And Expenditure Limits Effectively Reduce Spending?, Thad Kousser, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Ellen Moule Jan 2008

For Whom The Tel Tolls: Can State Tax And Expenditure Limits Effectively Reduce Spending?, Thad Kousser, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Ellen Moule

Faculty Scholarship

Can voters stop state governments from spending at high rates through the enactment of tax and expenditure limits (TELs), or do these laws become dead letters? We draw upon the principal-agent literature to theorize that TELs – one of the most frequent uses of the initiative process across the country – may be circumvented by the sorts of elected officials who would inspire their passage.

In order to investigate our claim, we conduct an event study. First, we test for the effectiveness of TELs across states using a differences-in-differences model. Second, we dissect our treatment variable using different legal provisions …


Abdication Or Delegation? Congress, The Bureaucracy, And The Delegation Dilemma, Mathew D. Mccubbins Jan 1999

Abdication Or Delegation? Congress, The Bureaucracy, And The Delegation Dilemma, Mathew D. Mccubbins

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Structure And Process, Politics And Policy: Administrative Arrangements And The Political Control Of Agencies, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Roger D. Noll, Barry R. Weingast Jan 1989

Structure And Process, Politics And Policy: Administrative Arrangements And The Political Control Of Agencies, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Roger D. Noll, Barry R. Weingast

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


A Theory Of Political Control And Agency Discretion, Randall L. Calvert, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Barry R. Weingast Jan 1989

A Theory Of Political Control And Agency Discretion, Randall L. Calvert, Mathew D. Mccubbins, Barry R. Weingast

Faculty Scholarship

A major issue in the study of American politics is the extent to which electoral discipline also constrains bureaucrats. In practice, executive agencies operate with considerable independence from elected officials. However,the entire process of policy execution is a game among legislators.the chief executive. and bureaucratic agents. It includes the initial delegation of authority, the choice of policy alternatives,and opportunities for oversight and control. A simple model of this process demonstrates an important distinction between bureaucratic authority and bureaucratic discretion. Indeed.in its simplest form, the model predicts a world in which bureaucrats are the sole active participants in policymaking, but in …