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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons™
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Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
A Cost-Benefit Interpretation Of The "Substantially Similar" Hurdle In The Congressional Review Act: Can Osha Ever Utter The E-Word (Ergonomics) Again?, Adam M. Finkel, Jason W. Sullivan
A Cost-Benefit Interpretation Of The "Substantially Similar" Hurdle In The Congressional Review Act: Can Osha Ever Utter The E-Word (Ergonomics) Again?, Adam M. Finkel, Jason W. Sullivan
All Faculty Scholarship
The Congressional Review Act permits Congress to veto proposed regulations via a joint resolution, and prohibits an agency from reissuing a rule “in substantially the same form” as the vetoed rule. Some scholars—and officials within the agencies themselves—have understood the “substantially the same” standard to bar an agency from regulating in the same substantive area covered by a vetoed rule. Courts have not yet provided an authoritative interpretation of the standard.
This Article examines a spectrum of possible understandings of the standard, and relates them to the legislative history (of both the Congressional Review Act itself and the congressional veto …
Allocating Power Within Agencies, Elizabeth Magill, Adrian Vermeule
Allocating Power Within Agencies, Elizabeth Magill, Adrian Vermeule
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Standard questions in the theory of administrative law involve the allocation of power among legislatures, courts, the President, and various types of agencies. These questions are often heavily informed by normative commitments to particular allocations of governmental authority among the three branches of the national government. These discussions, however, are incomplete because agencies are typically treated as unitary entities. In this essay, we examine a different question: How does administrative law allocate power within agencies? Although scholars have sometimes cracked open the black box of agencies to peer inside, their insights are localized and confined to particular contexts. We will …
Deregulation Vs. Reregulation Of Telecommunications: A Clash Of Regulatory Paradigms, Christopher S. Yoo
Deregulation Vs. Reregulation Of Telecommunications: A Clash Of Regulatory Paradigms, Christopher S. Yoo
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For the past several decades, U.S. policymakers and the courts have charged a largely deregulatory course with respect to telecommunications. During the initial stages, these decisionmakers responded to technological improvements by narrowing regulation to cover only those portions of industry that remained natural monopolies and deregulating those portions that became open to competition. Eventually, Congress began regulating individual network components rather than services, mandating that incumbent local telephone companies provide unbundled access to any network element. As these elements became open to competition, the courts prompted the Federal Communications Commission to release almost the entire network from unbundling obligations. The …