Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Physical Sciences and Mathematics Commons™
Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 2 of 2
Full-Text Articles in Physical Sciences and Mathematics
Sustainability Of Rewards-Based Crowdfunding: A Quasi-Experimental Analysis Of Funding Targets And Backer Satisfaction, Michael Wessel, Rob Gleasure, Robert John Kauffman
Sustainability Of Rewards-Based Crowdfunding: A Quasi-Experimental Analysis Of Funding Targets And Backer Satisfaction, Michael Wessel, Rob Gleasure, Robert John Kauffman
Research Collection School Of Computing and Information Systems
Rewards-based crowdfunding presents an information asymmetry for participants due to the funding mechanism used. Campaign-backers trust creators to complete projects and deliver rewards as outlined prior to the fundraising process, but creators may discover better opportunities as they progress with a project. Despite this, the all-or-nothing (AON) mechanism on crowdfunding platforms incentivizes creators to set meager funding-targets that are easier to achieve but may offer limited slack when creators wish to simultaneously pursue emerging opportunities later in the project. We explore the related issues of how funding targets seem to be selected by the creators, and how dissatisfaction with the …
Creators And Backers In Rewards-Based Crowdfunding: Will Incentive Misalignment Affect Kickstarter's Sustainability?, Michael Wessel, Rob Gleasure, Robert John Kauffman
Creators And Backers In Rewards-Based Crowdfunding: Will Incentive Misalignment Affect Kickstarter's Sustainability?, Michael Wessel, Rob Gleasure, Robert John Kauffman
Research Collection School Of Computing and Information Systems
Incentive misalignment in rewards-based crowd-funding occurs because creators may benefit disproportionately from fundraising, while backers may benefit disproportionately from the quality of project deliverables. The resulting principal-agent relationship means backers rely on campaign information to identify signs of moral hazard, adverse selection, and risk attitude asymmetry. We analyze campaign information related to fundraising, and compare how different information affects eventual backer satisfaction, based on an extensive dataset from Kickstarter. The data analysis uses a multi-model comparison to reveal similarities and contrasts in the estimated drivers of dependent variables that capture different outcomes in Kickstarter’s funding campaigns, using a linear probability …