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- Animal welfare (2)
- Emotion (2)
- Evolution of pain (2)
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- Animal awareness (1)
- Animal rights (1)
- Animal sentience (1)
- Animal well-being (1)
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Articles 1 - 12 of 12
Full-Text Articles in Medicine and Health Sciences
Birds, Bats And Minds. Tales Of A Revolutionary Scientist: Donald R. Griffin. Volume Three, Carolyn A. Ristau
Birds, Bats And Minds. Tales Of A Revolutionary Scientist: Donald R. Griffin. Volume Three, Carolyn A. Ristau
eBooks
In this three-volume biography, we revisit the life and accomplishments of the revolutionary scientist, Donald R. Griffin. He encountered a lifetime of initial hostile resistance to his ideas and studies; now they are largely accepted. He and a colleague discovered the phenomenon of echolocation used by bats to navigate and capture insects, proposed that birds navigate guided by such cues as the sun and stars, and suggested that animals are likely aware, thinking and feeling beings. Forty interviews with his colleagues and friends help us understand the young emerging scientist and the mature researcher. We learn about his and others’ …
Limits To Sentience, Donald M. Broom
Limits To Sentience, Donald M. Broom
Animal Sentience
There are many parallels between cellular function in animals and plants. Plants can have complex interactions with their environments. But they lack a central nervous system, which is a prerequisite for sentience (the capacity to feel). In my view the suggestion that plants are sentient is not only empirically incorrect but potentially harmful to the efforts to protect the welfare of sentient beings.
Defining And Exploring Animal Sentience, Andrew N. Rowan, Joyce M. D'Silva Mrs, Ian J.H. Duncan, Nicholas Palmer
Defining And Exploring Animal Sentience, Andrew N. Rowan, Joyce M. D'Silva Mrs, Ian J.H. Duncan, Nicholas Palmer
Animal Sentience
One of the commentaries on the target article notes that "animal sentience" is difficult to define operationally. This response to the commentaries develops a working, usable definition of animal sentience and examines the relationships between animal emotions and sentience.
Independence, Weight And Priority Of Evidence For Sentience, Elizabeth Irvine
Independence, Weight And Priority Of Evidence For Sentience, Elizabeth Irvine
Animal Sentience
This commentary maps out relationships of dependency between the criteria proposed in the target article (Crump et al. 2022), identifying the criteria that carry most of the weight of the evidence, and suggesting which criteria should have priority in research on sentience.
Strong Inferences About Pain In Invertebrates Require Stronger Evidence, Edgar T. Walters
Strong Inferences About Pain In Invertebrates Require Stronger Evidence, Edgar T. Walters
Animal Sentience
Evidence for sentience in animals distantly related to humans is often sought in observations of behavioral and neural responses to noxious stimuli that would be painful in humans. Most proposed criteria for painful sentience in “lower” animals such as decapod crustaceans have no necessary links to the affective (“suffering”) component of pain. The best evidence for painful affect in animals is learned aversion to stimuli associated with noxious experience, and conditioned preference for contexts associated with relief from aversive consequences of noxious experience, as expressed in voluntary behavior. Such evidence is currently lacking for any invertebrate except octopus.
Emotional Component Of Pain Perception In The Medicinal Leech?, Brian D. Burrell
Emotional Component Of Pain Perception In The Medicinal Leech?, Brian D. Burrell
Animal Sentience
Crump et al. have provided a series of criteria to assess animal sentience that is focused on the perception of pain, which is known to have both sensory and emotional components. They also provide a qualitative scoring system to assess data that address the eight criteria and apply this paradigm to decapod crustaceans. The criteria laid out have the potential to be applied to other invertebrates typically thought to have sensory response to tissue damage, but no emotional component to pain perception.
Animal Sentience: History, Science, And Politics, Andrew N. Rowan, Joyce M. D'Silva, Ian J.H. Duncan, Nicholas Palmer
Animal Sentience: History, Science, And Politics, Andrew N. Rowan, Joyce M. D'Silva, Ian J.H. Duncan, Nicholas Palmer
Animal Sentience
This target article has three parts. The first briefly reviews the thinking about nonhuman animals’ sentience in the Western canon: what we might know about their capacity for feeling, leading up to Bentham’s famous question “can they suffer?” The second part sketches the modern development of animal welfare science and the role that animal-sentience considerations have played therein. The third part describes the launching, by Compassion in World Farming, of efforts to incorporate animal sentience language into public policy and regulations concerning human treatment of animals.
Brain Complexity, Sentience And Welfare, Donald M. Broom
Brain Complexity, Sentience And Welfare, Donald M. Broom
Animal Sentience
Neither sentience nor moral standing is confined to animals with large or human-like brains. Invertebrates deserve moral consideration. Definition of terms clarifies the relationship between sentience and welfare. All animals have welfare but humans give more protection to sentient animals. Humans should be less human-centred.
Can Human Neurological Tests Of Consciousness Be Applied To Octopus?, Benedetta Cecconi, Jitka Annen, Steven Laureys
Can Human Neurological Tests Of Consciousness Be Applied To Octopus?, Benedetta Cecconi, Jitka Annen, Steven Laureys
Animal Sentience
If the anatomy, physiology and behaviour of a species differ substantially from our own, can we infer that the species is unconscious? In the daily clinical care of patients with disorders of consciousness we face many similar challenges: our current approach with these patients - a combination of behavioural and brain imaging-based assessments - might also be a viable route to investigating octopus consciousness.
Non-Human Animals Providing Rescue In Medical Emergencies, Rainer Spiegel
Non-Human Animals Providing Rescue In Medical Emergencies, Rainer Spiegel
Animal Sentience
In their target article, Chapman & Huffman challenge the quotation of Sir William Osler that the desire to take medication distinguishes humans from non-human animals. They provide examples of self-medication in non-human animals. Based on these examples, it can be inferred that non-human animals practice at least some form of medicine for symptom control. I would like to extend this view by showing that non-human animals not only provide self-medication, but also rescue others facing emergencies.
Canine Emotions As Seen Through Human Social Cognition, Miiamaaria V. Kujala
Canine Emotions As Seen Through Human Social Cognition, Miiamaaria V. Kujala
Animal Sentience
It is not possible to demonstrate that dogs (Canis familiaris) feel emotions, but the same is true for all other species, including our own. The issue must therefore be approached indirectly, using premises similar to those used with humans. Recent methodological advances in canine research reveal what dogs experience and what they derive from the emotions perceptible in others. Dogs attend to social cues, they respond appropriately to the valence of human and dog facial expressions and vocalizations of emotion, and their limbic reward regions respond to the odor of their caretakers. They behave differently according to the …
Where Is Pain In The Brain?, Marshall Devor
Where Is Pain In The Brain?, Marshall Devor
Animal Sentience
Key argues that fish cannot experience pain based on (1) brain imaging in humans, (2) consequences of lesions and (3) direct brain stimulation. Imaging indeed shows that pain-relevant signals reach the cortex, but not that they underlie the subjective experience of pain. Lesions and stimulation data are more to the point, but Key paints an idiosyncratic and misleading picture of their effects. S1 and S2 ablation does not eliminate evoked or spontaneous pain, although there may be up- or down-modulation. Likewise, stimulation of pain-associated cortical areas rarely induces pain, and pain almost never occurs at the onset of epileptic seizures. …