Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Keyword
-
- Animal welfare (3)
- Comparative cognition (2)
- Sentience (2)
- Animal protection (1)
- Bayesian brain (1)
-
- Book review (1)
- Brain size (1)
- Canis familiaris (1)
- Domestic dog (1)
- Emotion (1)
- Expected Net-Welfare Maximization (1)
- Fish consciousness (1)
- Invertebrate cognition (1)
- Invertebrates (1)
- Morality (1)
- Neocortex (1)
- Neuroscience (1)
- Non-mammalian consciousness (1)
- Precautionary Principle (1)
- Psychology (1)
- Social cognition (1)
- Vertebrate cognition (1)
- Welfare biology (1)
Articles 1 - 8 of 8
Full-Text Articles in Life Sciences
Extending The Null Hypothesis To Invertebrate Pain Sentience, Eva Kakrada, Michael Colombo
Extending The Null Hypothesis To Invertebrate Pain Sentience, Eva Kakrada, Michael Colombo
Animal Sentience
In 1985 Macphail proposed his Null Hypothesis that there were no qualitative differences in intelligence across vertebrate species. A recent review of the literature has found overwhelming support for his view. Studies also suggest that, with respect to cognition and the neural mechanisms that support it, the Null Hypothesis should be extended to invertebrates. We suggest, on the same premise, that the Null Hypothesis should be extended to pain sentience in invertebrates. Although few studies have been conducted, behavioural and neural evidence for pain sentience has been found in various representative invertebrate species.
Brain Complexity, Sentience And Welfare, Donald M. Broom
Brain Complexity, Sentience And Welfare, Donald M. Broom
Animal Sentience
Neither sentience nor moral standing is confined to animals with large or human-like brains. Invertebrates deserve moral consideration. Definition of terms clarifies the relationship between sentience and welfare. All animals have welfare but humans give more protection to sentient animals. Humans should be less human-centred.
Sheep Are Sentient, But Not Identical, Alison Hanlon
Sheep Are Sentient, But Not Identical, Alison Hanlon
Animal Sentience
Marino & Merskin (M&M) provide a timely reminder that sheep have advanced cognitive abilities, but do we still have to provide evidence to justify animal sentience? In the EU, regulations are designed to support farm animal welfare. Whilst the regulations are imperfect, they do emphasize behavioural needs and other concepts relevant to sentience. The persistence of sheep welfare issues such as lamb mortality indicates that regulations may not be achieving their desired goal. We can quibble about the science described by M&M yet reach the same conclusion: sheep (lambs, ewes and rams) are not all identical, but they are all …
Canine Emotions As Seen Through Human Social Cognition, Miiamaaria V. Kujala
Canine Emotions As Seen Through Human Social Cognition, Miiamaaria V. Kujala
Animal Sentience
It is not possible to demonstrate that dogs (Canis familiaris) feel emotions, but the same is true for all other species, including our own. The issue must therefore be approached indirectly, using premises similar to those used with humans. Recent methodological advances in canine research reveal what dogs experience and what they derive from the emotions perceptible in others. Dogs attend to social cues, they respond appropriately to the valence of human and dog facial expressions and vocalizations of emotion, and their limbic reward regions respond to the odor of their caretakers. They behave differently according to the …
Justifying The Precautionary Principle With Expected Net-Welfare Maximization, Yew-Kwang Ng
Justifying The Precautionary Principle With Expected Net-Welfare Maximization, Yew-Kwang Ng
Animal Sentience
The precautionary principle may be best justified on the principle of expected net-welfare/benefit maximization; there is no conflict between the two principles. We should want to be more cautious for cases with high benefit-to-cost ratios; there should thus be different degrees of precaution. For measures to reduce extinction-threatening environmental disruption or to reduce animal suffering that cost us little or nothing, we should adopt them even for species having only a small likelihood of being sentient, i.e., we should be more cautious. This argument is based on welfarism, which I strongly defend elsewhere (Ng 1990 & forthcoming).
Why Fish Pain Cannot And Should Not Be Ruled Out, Anil K. Seth
Why Fish Pain Cannot And Should Not Be Ruled Out, Anil K. Seth
Animal Sentience
Do fish consciously feel pain? Addressing this question, Key (2016) asks whether the neural mechanisms underlying conscious pain reports in humans can be identified in fish. This strategy fails in three ways. First, non-mammalian consciousness — if it exists — may depend on different mechanisms. Second, accumulating neurophysiological and behavioural evidence, evolutionary considerations, and emerging Bayesian brain theories suggest that if fish can feel at all, they can feel pain. Finally, the qualitative nature of pain and suffering obliges us, via the precautionary principle, to accommodate the possibility of its existence where doubt remains.
Animal Welfare And Animal Rights, M.E. Rolle
Animal Welfare And Animal Rights, M.E. Rolle
Animal Sentience
This overview of Broom’s book, Sentience and Animal Welfare (2014), considers the role the book could play in the animal rights debate. In a thoroughly researched and objectively presented text, Broom lays out information that could place doubt in the minds of decision-makers. By highlighting not just the ways animals resemble humans, but also the ways humans resemble animals, Broom shines a light on a solidly grey area in the animal rights debate.
From Sentience To Science: Limits Of Anthropocentric Cognition, Charukeshi Chandrasekera
From Sentience To Science: Limits Of Anthropocentric Cognition, Charukeshi Chandrasekera
Animal Sentience
Donald Broom’s Sentience and Animal Welfare (2014) is an intellectually and morally engaging book written with radical new concepts in mind. It deals with many issues that are central to the animal welfare debate such as brain complexity, cognitive ability, when in life sentience begins, and how it all affects the way we endorse welfare. It addresses how our insatiable quest to define the uniqueness of our own species has led us to ignore logic and scientific evidence. It also brings greater clarity to these precarious positions and outlines pragmatic approaches to tackling this complex topic of sentience and welfare.