Torts Commons^™

Holding Supporters Of Terrorism Accountable: The Exercise Of General Jurisdiction Over The Pa And Plo In A Post-Daimler Framework, Mark D. Christopher

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

"Local Data" In European Choice Of Law: A Trojan Horse From Across The Atlantic?, T.W. Dornis

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Aviation Law-Personal Injury-The Warsaw Convention, As Modified By The Montreal Agreement, Does Comprehend, And Thus Supplies The Exclusive Relief For, Mental And Psychosomatic Injuries., Lee C. Mundell

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Publicly Funded Private Security: A Critical Examination Of Georgia Law Pertaining To The Private Employment Of Off-Duty Police Officers, Ryan L. Giles

Georgia Law Review

Generally, employers of private security guards are
vicariously liable for the actions of their employees. This
incentivizes employers to protect against unnecessary risks
to the public and to internalize the social costs of their
business activities. In Georgia, however, this centuries-old

doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply when a
private business hires an off-duty police officer.
Several consequences arise from the current state of the
law: inconsistency in application, unfairness to victims
and imprudent taxpayer subsidization of private
businesses. This Note illustrates that the current law is
both unjust and unwise by contrasting business liability
for police torts with …

Repeat Players In Multidistrict Litigation: The Social Network, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Margaret S. Williams

Scholarly Works

As class certification wanes, plaintiffs’ lawyers resolve hundreds of thousands of individual lawsuits through aggregate settlements in multidistrict litigation. But without class actions, formal rules are scarce and judges rarely scrutinize the private agreements that result. Meanwhile, the same principal-agent concerns that plagued class-action attorneys linger. These circumstances are ripe for exploitation: few rules, little oversight, multi-million dollar common-benefit fees, and a push for settlement can tempt a cadre of repeat players to fill in the gaps in ways that further their own self-interest.

Although multidistrict litigation now comprises 36 percent of the entire federal civil caseload, legal scholars have …

Monopolies In Multidistrict Litigation, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch

Scholarly Works

When transferee judges receive a multidistrict proceeding, they select a few lead plaintiffs’ lawyers to efficiently manage litigation and settlement negotiations. That decision gives those attorneys total control over all consolidated plaintiffs’ claims and rewards them richly in common-benefit fees. It’s no surprise then that these are coveted positions, yet empirical evidence confirms that the same attorneys occupy them time and again.

Anytime repeat players exist and exercise both oligopolistic leadership control across multidistrict proceedings and monopolistic power within a single proceeding, there is concern that they will use their dominance to enshrine practices and norms that benefit themselves at …