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Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Torts
Job Security: Protecting At-Will Employees With Good Cause Legislation, Mayumi Yokoyama
Job Security: Protecting At-Will Employees With Good Cause Legislation, Mayumi Yokoyama
LLM Theses and Essays
Recent decades have witnessed significant developments in employment termination law in the United States. In particular, the long-standing “at-will” doctrine, under which employers can fire employees for good, bad, or no reason at all, has experienced great erosion and wide variations in law from state to state. There has been a movement of statutory and common law restrictions limiting an employer’s freedom to terminate at will, which reflects the increasing consciousness of job security by society and workers. This paper analyzes the problem of job security by tracing the origin of the at-will doctrine to 19th century principles favoring economic …
Rock-A-Bye Lawsuit: Can A Baby Sue The Hand That Rocked The Cradle, 28 J. Marshall L. Rev. 429 (1995), Geoffrey A. Vance
Rock-A-Bye Lawsuit: Can A Baby Sue The Hand That Rocked The Cradle, 28 J. Marshall L. Rev. 429 (1995), Geoffrey A. Vance
UIC Law Review
No abstract provided.
Aesthetic Nuisance: Re-Educating The Judiciary, George P. Smith Ii
Aesthetic Nuisance: Re-Educating The Judiciary, George P. Smith Ii
Scholarly Articles
This article discusses how the traditional common-law refusal to grant relief for an aesthetic nuisance has been eroded by various case decisions. The author suggests an “average person” standard for the judiciary to follow for recognizing an aesthetic nuisance.