Supreme Court of the United States Commons^™

Shedding Tiers: A New Framework For Equal Protection Jurisprudence, Danielle Stefanucci

St. John's Law Review

(Excerpt)

This Note argues that the Supreme Court of the United States should reconsider the tiers of scrutiny framework that courts use to evaluate equal protection claims. The Supreme Court has recognized government classifications on the bases of race and gender to be suspect and to merit heightened judicial scrutiny. However, any governmental classification among people is subject to review under the Equal Protection Clause. The class itself is not suspect; the basis for the classification, like race or gender, is treated by courts as more or less suspect.

However, employing the tiers of scrutiny no longer makes sense in …

Guess Who? Reducing The Role Of Juries In Determining Libel Plaintiffs' Identities, Nat Stern

St. John's Law Review

(Excerpt)

During the nomination hearings for now-Justice Brett Kavanaugh, considerable attention was drawn to a high school friend’s memoir featuring a fellow student named “Bart O’Kavanaugh.” By the memoir’s account, “O’Kavanaugh” in one episode blacked out—apparently from alcohol—on his return from a party. For any number of possible reasons, Justice Kavanaugh did not bring a libel suit against the book’s author. If he had, however, a crucial threshold issue—preceding questions of falsity and intent—would have been whether the memoir’s portrayal of “O’Kavanaugh” amounted to a false depiction of Kavanaugh himself. In the parlance of defamation doctrine, Justice Kavanaugh would have …

Government Speech Doctrine—Legislator-Led Prayer's Saving Grace, Daniel M. Vitagliano

St. John's Law Review

(Excerpt)

This Note argues that Lund was decided incorrectly in part because the Fourth Circuit failed to analyze the type of speech at issue before assessing the constitutionality of the prayer practice. This Note is composed of four parts. Part I surveys the Supreme Court’s legislative prayer jurisprudence—Marsh and Town of Greece. Part II outlines Lund and Bormuth, and the Fourth and Sixth Circuits’ dissimilar applications of the Supreme Court’s precedent. Part III argues that courts must first classify legislative prayers as either government or private speech before assessing whether a prayer practice violates the Establishment Clause. It further argues …

Free Exercise Standing: Extra-Centrality As Injury In Fact, Brendan T. Beery

St. John's Law Review

(Excerpt)

Part I of this Article surveys standing doctrine generally and tackles the problem of psychic insult—what might fairly, in some cases, be characterized as hurt feelings—as an injury. Part II addresses the special problems of finding concrete and palpable injuries in religion cases, noting that it is more difficult to identify such injuries in Establishment Clause cases than in free exercise cases. When free exercise is viewed as dynamic and kinetic, free exercise injuries are discernible and concrete: they occur when a person is forced to participate in religious undertakings or express beliefs against his or her will, or …

First Amendment Traditionalism, Marc O. Degirolami

Faculty Publications

Traditionalist constitutional interpretation takes political and cultural practices of long age and duration as constituting the presumptive meaning of the text. This Essay probes traditionalism's conceptual and normative foundations. It focuses on the Supreme Court's traditionalist interpretation of the First Amendment to understand the distinctive justifications for traditionalism and the relationship between traditionalism and originalism. The first part of the Essay identifies and describes traditionalism in some of the Court's Speech and Religion Clause jurisprudence, highlighting its salience in the Court's recent Establishment Clause doctrine.

Part II develops two justfications for traditionalism: "interpretive" and "democratic-populist." The interpretive justification is that …

Backdoor Purposivism, Anita S. Krishnakumar

Faculty Publications

It has become standard among statutory interpretation commentators to declare that, “We are all textualists now.” The comment stems from the observation that in the modern, post-Scalia era, all of the Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court pay significant attention to statutory text when construing statutes and, relatedly, that legislative history use by the Court as a whole has declined since its heyday in the 1970s. The account of textualism’s triumph is so prevalent that some scholars have declared purposivism—or at least traditional purposivism—essentially defunct. Two prominent textualist scholars in particular have suggested that there is a “new purposivism” at …

The Right Family, Noa Ben-Asher, Margot J. Pollans

Faculty Publications

The family plays a starring role in American law. Families, the law tells us, are special. They merit many state and federal benefits, including tax deductions, testimonial privileges, untaxed inheritance, and parental presumptions. Over the course of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court expanded individual rights stemming from familial relationships. In this Article, we argue that the concept of family in American law matters just as much when it is ignored as when it is featured. We contrast policies in which the family is the key unit of analysis with others in which it is not. Looking at four seemingly …

The Traditions Of American Constitutional Law, Marc O. Degirolami

Faculty Publications

This Article identifies a new method of constitutional interpretation: the use of tradition as constitutive of constitutional meaning. It studies what the Supreme Court means by invoking tradition and whether what it means remains constant across the document and over time. Traditionalist interpretation is pervasive, consistent, and recurrent across the Court’s constitutional doctrine. So, too, are criticisms of traditionalist interpretation. There are also more immediate reasons to study the role of tradition in constitutional interpretation. The Court’s two newest members, Justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh, have indicated that tradition informs their understanding of constitutional meaning. The study of traditionalist …