Supreme Court of the United States Commons^™

Ordinary Causation: A Study In Experimental Statutory Interpretation, James Macleod

Indiana Law Journal

In a series of recent split decisions interpreting criminal and tort-like legislation, the Supreme Court has purported to give statutory causation requirements their ordinary, plain meaning. Armed with dictionaries, examples from everyday speech, and commonsense intuitions, the Court’s majority has explained that statutory phrases like “because of” and “results from” entail but-for causation as a matter of ordinary usage. There’s just one problem: The Court’s majority (and the many state and federal courts following its lead) is wrong on the facts—specifically, the facts about how people ordinarily interpret, understand, and use causal language.

This Article considers a novel approach to …

Public Financing Of Elections In The States, Nicholas Meixsell

Honors Theses

In the US, there is a history of the courts striking down campaign finance reform measures as unconstitutional. As such, there are few avenues remaining for someone who is interested in 'clean government' reforms. One such avenue is publicly financed elections, where the state actually provides funding for campaigns. These systems can be quite varied in the restrictions and contingencies they attach to the money, and for examples one has to look no further than the states There are many states that have some form of public financing for elections, and by looking at the different states' systems we are …

Strategic Institutional Positioning: How We Have Come To Generate Environmental Law Without Congress, Donald J. Kochan

Texas A&M Law Review

The administrative state has emerged as a pervasive machine that has become the dominate generator of legal rules—despite the fact that the U.S. Constitution commits the legislative power to Congress alone. When examining legislation authorizing administrative agencies to promulgate rules, we are often left asking whether Congress “dele- gates” away its lawmaking authority by giving agencies too much power and discretion to decide what rules should be promulgated and to determine how rich to make their content. If the agencies get broad authority, it is not too hard to understand why they would fulsomely embrace the grant to its fullest. …