Supreme Court of the United States Commons^™

Suspect Spheres, Not Enumerated Powers: A Guide For Leaving The Lamppost, Richard Primus, Roderick M. Hills Jr.

Michigan Law Review

Despite longstanding orthodoxy, the Constitution’s enumeration of congressional powers does virtually nothing to limit federal lawmaking. That’s not because of some bizarrely persistent judicial failure to read the Constitution correctly. It’s because the enumeration of congressional powers is not a well-designed technology for limiting federal legislation. Rather than trying to make the enumeration do work that it will not do, decisionmakers should find better ways of thinking about what lawmaking should be done locally rather than nationally. This Article suggests such a rubric, one that asks not whether Congress has permission to do a certain thing but whether a certain …

Qualified Immunity And Constitutional Structure, Katherine Mims Crocker

Michigan Law Review

A range of scholars has subjected qualified immunity to a wave of criticism— and for good reasons. But the Supreme Court continues to apply the doctrine in ever more aggressive ways. By advancing two claims, this Article seeks to make some sense of this conflict and to suggest some thoughts toward a resolution.

First, while the Court has offered and scholars have rejected several rationales for the doctrine, layering in an account grounded in structural constitutional concerns provides a historically richer and analytically thicker understanding of the current qualified-immunity regime. For suits against federal officials, qualified immunity acts as a …

State Action And The Constitution's Middle Band, Louis Michael Seidman

Michigan Law Review

On conventional accounts, the state action doctrine is dichotomous. When the government acts, constitutional limits take hold and the government action is invalid if those limits are exceeded. When the government fails to act, the state action doctrine leaves decisions to individuals, who are permitted to violate what would otherwise be constitutional constraints.

It turns out though that the modern state action doctrine creates three rather than two domains. There is indeed a private, inner band where there is thought to be insufficient government action to trigger constitutional constraints, but often there is also a public, outer band where there …

Standing Uncertainty: An Expected-Value Standard For Fear-Based Injury In Clapper V. Amnesty International Usa, Andrew C. Sand

Michigan Law Review

The Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff can have Article III standing based on a fear of future harm, or fear-based injury. The Court’s approach to fear-based injury, however, has been unclear and inconsistent. This Note seeks to clarify the Court’s doctrine using principles from probability theory. It contends that fear-based injury should be governed by a substantial-risk standard that encapsulates the probability concept of expected value. This standard appears in footnote 5 of Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, a recent case in which the Court held that a group of plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of …

On Strict Liability Crimes: Preserving A Moral Framework For Criminal Intent In An Intent-Free Moral World, W. Robert Thomas

Michigan Law Review

The law has long recognized a presumption against criminal strict liability. This Note situates that presumption in terms of moral intuitions about the role of intention and the unique nature of criminal punishment. Two sources-recent laws from state legislatures and recent advances in moral philosophy-pose distinct challenges to the presumption against strict liability crimes. This Note offers a solution to the philosophical problem that informs how courts could address the legislative problem. First, it argues that the purported problem from philosophy stems from a mistaken relationship drawn between criminal law and morality. Second, it outlines a slightly more nuanced moral …

Cost-Benefit Default Principles, Cass R. Sunstein

Michigan Law Review

Courts should be reluctant to apply the literal terms of a statute to mandate pointless expenditures of effort. . .. Unless Congress has been extraordinarily rigid, there is likely a basis for an implication of de minimis authority to provide exemption when the burdens of regulation yield a gain of trivial or no value. It seems bizarre that a statute intended to improve human health would .. . lock the agency into looking at only one half of a substance's health effects in determining the maximum level for that substance. [I]t is only where there is "clear congressional intent to …

What Is A Postmodern Constitutionalism?, J. M. Balkin

Michigan Law Review

I begin with a puzzle. It must certainly strike one as odd that the subject of postmodern constitutional law arises at a time when the actual arbiters of the Constitution - the federal judiciary and in particular the Supreme Court of the United States - appear to be more conservative than they have been for many years, and indeed, are likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. Postmodernism is often associated with what is new, innovative, and on the cutting edge of cultural development. Yet if we were to define the elements of a postmodern constitutional culture, it would …

The Interpreters, Kenneth L. Karst

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Justice as Translation: An Essay in Cultural and Legal Criticism by James Boyd White

The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charter For An Expanded Law Of Privacy?, Robert G. Dixon Jr.

Michigan Law Review

The comments that follow are divided into a brief review, for purposes of perspective, of the elusive nature of "privacy" as developed in American law to date, and an attempted rigorous analysis of the privacy aspects of Griswold. A final section suggests that effectuation of the new constitutional right of marital privacy necessarily or derivatively implies a corollary right of access to birth control information and devices-a right which should have been more clearly articulated by the Court.

Nine Justices In Search Of A Doctrine, Thomas I. Emerson

Michigan Law Review

To the ordinary layman, Griswold v. Connecticut seemed easy. But to the lawyer it was somewhat more difficult. The lawyer's problem with the case was that the issues did not readily fit into any existing legal pigeonhole. Actually, there were five possibilities. The case could have been dealt with under the equal protection clause, the first amendment, substantive due process, the right of privacy, or, in extremis, the ninth amendment. In order to strike down the statute under any of these doctrines, however, the Court would be forced to enter uncharted waters. Whatever course the Court took, its action …

Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental And Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, Paul G. Kauper

Michigan Law Review

The varying theories followed in the several opinions in the Griswold case can be fully understood and appreciated only in the context of the tortuous but fascinating history of the judicial interpretation of the fourteenth amendment.

The Right Of Privacy: Emanations And Intimations, Robert B. Mckay

Michigan Law Review

When Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren wrote in 1890 of "The Right to Privacy," they sought a means of protecting against unwelcome newspaper attention to social activities in the Warren household. Addressing their argument to the private law of torts, they presumably did not anticipate constitutional protection for other rights under the claim of privacy. Nevertheless, seventy· five years later that concept, now called the "right of privacy," was used by the Supreme Court of the United States in Griswold v. Connecticut to describe a constitutional right. Some members of the Court said the new right was within the "penumbra" …

Privacy In Connecticut, Arthur E. Sutherland

Michigan Law Review

Occasionally a judgment of our Supreme Court, delivered in a superficially petty case, suddenly before our startled eyes displays fundamentals of our constitutional theory. Thus, in Griswold v. Connecticut, holding unconstitutional an 1879 Connecticut statute forbidding all persons to use contraceptive devices, the Court found it necessary to discover a "right of privacy" latent in the Bill of Rights and incorporated into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The outcome of the case is satisfying; all nine Justices joined in saying, in one way or another, that Connecticut's statute was nonsense. I am happy to see this …

Church And State: Cooperative Separatism, Paul G. Kauper

Michigan Law Review

Nothing is better calculated to stimulate argument, arouse controversy, excite the emotions and even produce intense visceral reactions than a discussion of church-state relations. Always a subject of lively interest, it has received added attention and emphasis in recent months. Perhaps at no time in at least the modem era of American history have the questions of the proper relationship between religion and government been more thoroughly publicized and explored, and the issues more widely debated, than during the period beginning with the presidential campaign of 1960.

The Supreme Court-October 1959 Term, Bernard Schwartz

Michigan Law Review

A country's constitutional law is but a reflection of its political, economic, and social life. Not unnaturally, the external conditions of any particular period are bound to have their effects in the legal sphere as well-especially in the field of public law. This is as true of the United States as it is of other countries. From this point of view, the constitutional jurisprudence of the American Supreme Court is only the juristic mirror of the different stages through which American history has passed. 'Our jurisprudence is distinctive,' said Justice Jackson on the 150th anniversary of the Supreme Court, 'in …

Full Faith And Credit To Judgments And Public Acts, Kurt H. Nadelmann

Michigan Law Review

Interest here is concentrated on full faith and credit for public acts. But what led to insertion of the command respecting public acts cannot be divorced historically from the study of the command of full faith for judgments. The whole field, therefore, has been included in the reexamination. Clarifications obtainable on the "judgments" side, it will be seen, help also on the "public acts" side. On both sides there are historical facts which deserve greater attention than has been hitherto given, and if, as a result, some of the myths surrounding the' Lawyers Clause are exploded, the rethinking may have …

Federal Supremacy And State Anti-Subversive Legislation, Alan Reeve Hunt

Michigan Law Review

State legislatures have been prompted by international tensions of recent years to enact new and stringent anti-subversive laws, thus adding to an already large body of statutes directed against various forms of subversion. Many of these statutes are open to serious objection on constitutional ·grounds. The purpose of this article is to examine those objections which are based upon the notion either that federal power in the area is exclusive or that Congress, expressly or by necessary inference, has pre-empted the field.