Supreme Court of the United States Commons^™

The Pioneers, Waves, And Random Walks Of Securities Law In The Supreme Court, Elizabeth Pollman

Seattle University Law Review

After the pioneers, waves, and random walks that have animated the history of securities laws in the U.S. Supreme Court, we might now be on the precipice of a new chapter. Pritchard and Thompson’s superb book, A History of Securities Law in the Supreme Court, illuminates with rich archival detail how the Court’s view of the securities laws and the SEC have changed over time and how individuals have influenced this history. The book provides an invaluable resource for understanding nearly a century’s worth of Supreme Court jurisprudence in the area of securities law and much needed context for …

Three Stories: A Comment On Pritchard & Thompson’S A History Of Securities Laws In The Supreme Court, Harwell Wells

Seattle University Law Review

Adam Pritchard and Robert Thompson’s A History of Securities Laws in the Supreme Court should stand for decades as the definitive work on the Federal securities laws’ career in the Supreme Court across the twentieth century.1 Like all good histories, it both tells a story and makes an argument. The story recounts how the Court dealt with the major securities laws, as well the agency charged with enforcing them, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the rules it promulgated, from the 1930s into the twenty-first century. But the book does not just string together a series of events, “one …

Students For Fair Admissions: Affirming Affirmative Action And Shapeshifting Towards Cognitive Diversity?, Steven A. Ramirez

Seattle University Law Review

The Roberts Court holds a well-earned reputation for overturning Supreme Court precedent regardless of the long-standing nature of the case. The Roberts Court knows how to overrule precedent. In Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard (SFFA), the Court’s majority opinion never intimates that it overrules Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court’s leading opinion permitting race-based affirmative action in college admissions. Instead, the Roberts Court applied Grutter as authoritative to hold certain affirmative action programs entailing racial preferences violative of the Constitution. These programs did not provide an end point, nor did they require assessment, review, periodic expiration, or revision for greater …

For Freedom Or Full Of It? State Attempts To Silence Social Media, Grace Slicklen

University of Miami Law Review

Freedom of speech is, unsurprisingly, foundational to the “land of the free.” However, the “land of the free” has undergone some changes since the First Amendment’s ratification. Unprecedented technological evolution has ushered in a digital forum in which the volume, speed, and reach of words transcend the Framers’ visions of the First Amendment’s aims. Social media platforms have become central spaces for public discourse, where opportunities to create—and repress—speech are endless. From enabling individuals to freely express their views, to allowing state actors to limit open exchanges, it is about time that the Supreme Court tackles this complex issue of …

What’S Your Damage?! The Supreme Court Has Wrecked Temporary Takings Jurisprudence, Timothy M. Harris

University of Miami Law Review

In Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, the U.S. Supreme Court unnecessarily expanded the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. In doing so, the Court veered away from established precedent and overturned prior case law—without expressly admitting to doing so.

In 2021, the Court held that a California law allowing union organizers to access private property under certain conditions took away a landowner’s right to exclude others and was (apparently) immediately compensable under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. Prior law had subjected temporary takings to an uncertain, unpopular, and ambiguous balancing test—but the Cedar Point holding turned temporary takings jurisprudence on its head …

The News Media Engagement Principle: Why Social Media Has Not Actually Overrun The Limited Purpose Public Figure Category, Zachary R. Cormier

University of Miami Law Review

Has the rise of social media ruined the limited purpose public figure category of the First Amendment’s actual malice privilege? Justice Gorsuch believes so—and he has recently invited courts to get rid of it. He argues that the category now includes vast numbers of otherwise private citizens that have “become ‘public figures’ on social media overnight.” With so many people qualifying as limited purpose public figures (and having to overcome the actual malice standard to prevail on a defamation claim), he claims that the category has evolved to provide an unjustified shield for the masses of misinformation-peddlers on social media. …

You Can’T Teach Old Katz New Tricks: It’S Time To Revitalize The Fourth Amendment, Jeremy Connell

University of Miami Law Review

For over half a century, the Court’s decision in Katz v. United States has been the lodestar for applying the Fourth Amendment. The Katz test has produced a litany of confusing and irreconcilable decisions in which the Court has carved exceptions into the doctrine and then carved exceptions into the exceptions. These decisions often leave lower courts with minimal guidance on how to apply the framework to new sets of facts and leave legal scholars and commenters befuddled and frustrated with the Court’s explanations for the rulings. The Court’s decision in Carpenter v. United States represents the apex of Katz’s …

Inconsistencies In State Court Decisions Regarding Public School Financing Are Violating The Constitutional Rights Of Citizens: Why The Nevada Court In Shea V. State Should Have Intervened, Corinne Milnamow

University of Miami Law Review

In 1973, the Supreme Court decided the landmark case, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, which held there was no fundamental right to education under the United States Constitution. In the years that have followed Rodriguez, state courts across the country have been left to decide issues related to public school financing. Many plaintiffs in these cases will argue that education is a fundamental right under their state’s constitution and that their respective state’s public school financing structure—one that heavily relies on local property taxes—is unconstitutional because of the discrepancies in the quality of education one will receive in …

The Five Internet Rights, Nicholas J. Nugent

Washington Law Review

Since the dawn of the commercial internet, content moderation has operated under an implicit social contract that website operators could accept or reject users and content as they saw fit, but users in turn could self-publish their views on their own websites if no one else would have them. However, as online service providers and activists have become ever more innovative and aggressive in their efforts to deplatform controversial speakers, content moderation has progressively moved down into the core infrastructure of the internet, targeting critical resources, such as networks, domain names, and IP addresses, on which all websites depend. These …

The Aoc In The Age Of Covid—Pandemic Preparedness Planning In The Federal Courts, Zoe Niesel

St. Mary's Law Journal

The 2020 COVID-19 pandemic created a crisis for American society—and the federal courts were not exempt. Court facilities came to a grinding halt, cases were postponed, and judiciary employees adopted work-from-home practices. Having court operations impacted by a pandemic was not a new phenomenon, but the size, scope, and technological lift of the COVID-19 pandemic was certainly unique.

Against this background, this Article examines the history and future of pandemic preparedness planning in the federal court system and seeks to capture some of the lessons learned from initial federal court transitions to pandemic operations in 2020. The Article begins by …

A Government Of Laws That Is A Government Of Men And Women, Mark Tushnet

Arkansas Law Review

I take Mark Killenbeck’s “provocative” article as an occasion for some informal comments about what Korematsu and Trump v. Hawaii tell us about the saying, “a government of laws, not a government of men and women.” My basic thought is that the “not” in the saying has to be replaced “but also.” And, in some sense we have always had to have known that the saying was wrong as stated. Whatever the laws are, they don’t make themselves. Nor do they administer themselves, nor interpret themselves. Men and women appear at the stages of enactment, application, and adjudication. So, for …

A Proper Burial, Robert L. Tsai

Arkansas Law Review

In his article, Professor Mark Killenbeck defends both Korematsu v. United States and Trump v. Hawaii on their own terms, albeit on narrow grounds. He goes on to conclude that comparisons of the two decisions don’t hold up. Killenbeck has authored a thoughtful and contrarian paper, but I’m not sold. In my view, Korematsu simply isn’t worth saving; in fact, a more complete repudiation of the internment decisions is overdue. Trump v. Hawaii, too, must also be revisited at the earliest opportunity and its more alarming features that abet presidential discrimination against non-citizens rejected. Moreover, I believe that comparisons between …

Tainted Precedent, Darrell A.H. Miller

Arkansas Law Review

We have a common law system of constitutional adjudication, at least in the sense that constitutional practice in the United States relies on prior rulings rather than reasoning from first principles in each case. If there’s controlling precedent on point, it’s binding. Neither “inferior courts” in the federal system, nor state courts adjudicating federal law, are permitted to start anew with the “original public meaning” of the First Amendment or pronounce a fresh Dworkinian “moral reading” of the Fourth. Even the highest court in the land, the Supreme Court of the United States, for reasons of reputation, stability, and rule …

There Was Nothing "Neutral" About Executive Order 9066, Eric L. Muller

Arkansas Law Review

There is no more appropriate place to discuss the Japanese American cases of World War II than in the pages of the Arkansas Law Review. This is not only because Arkansas was the only state outside the Western Defense Command to host not one but two of the War Relocation Authority’s (WRA) concentration camps for Japanese Americans. It is because one of the most important lawyers to oversee the development and administration of all the WRA camps was the dean under whose leadership this law review was founded: Robert A. Leflar. Leflar’s is not a name that constitutional lawyers are …

Korematsu, Hawaii, And Pedagogy, Sanford Levinson

Arkansas Law Review

I begin with some reflections on my own career in teaching—or, perhaps, attempting to teach—American constitutional law to generations of students from 1975 to the present. Or, more accurately, until about three years ago, when I taught introductory constitutional law for the last time. I am quite happy to no longer be teaching that course, whatever joys it did provide me in the past, for a very simple reason: I became more and more frustrated by the demands of coverage, i.e., the duty to take up a variety of topics—including attendant cases and collateral materials—and the unfortunate certainty that what …

Korematsu As The Tribute That Vice Pays To Virtue, Jack M. Balkin

Arkansas Law Review

Mark Killenbeck wants to (partially) rehabilitate the reputation of one of the Supreme Court’s most despised legal decisions, Korematsu v. United States. He argues that “[w]e should accept and teach Korematsu as an exemplar of what thelaw regarding invidious discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, and national origin should be.” In both Korematsu (and Hirabayashi v. United States) the Court asserted that classifications based on race were subject to strict scrutiny. But “[t]he majority,” Killenbeck explains, “refused to heed their own mandate. In Hirabayashi they held that the government policy was ‘reasonable.’ In Korematsu, . . . they failed …

Sober Second Thought? Korematsu Reconsidered, Mark R. Killenbeck

Arkansas Law Review

How to best describe and treat Korematsu v. United States? A self-inflicted wound? It is certainly an exemplar of a case that in key respects tracks Justice Stephen Breyer’s caution about decisions that have “harm[ed] not just the Court, but the Nation.” Part of an “Anticanon,” resting on “little more than naked racism and associated hokum” and “embod[ying] a set of propositions that all legitimate constitutional decisions must be prepared to refute”? Perhaps. Or is it simply an opinion and result that “has long stood out as a stain that is almost universally recognized as a shameful mistake”?

“Lawyers’ Work”: Does The Court Have A Legitimacy Crisis?, Lackland Bloom

St. Mary's Law Journal

Talk of the Supreme Court’s legitimacy is pervasive. It can’t be avoided by anyone paying attention. The question this article addresses is does the Supreme Court have a legitimacy crisis. The title “Lawyers’ Work” is taken from Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey in which he declared that as long as the Court decides cases by engaging in “Lawyers’ Work” the public will leave it alone. This article concludes that Justice Scalia was partially though not entirely correct.

The article begins by considering the concept of judicial legitimacy as developed and studied by political scientists. Next it …

The Militia: A Definition And Litmus Test, Marcus Armstrong

St. Mary's Law Journal

The United States Supreme Court, in its decision in Perpich v. Department of Defense, ruled that members of the National Guard are “troops” as that word is used in the Constitution. In doing so, the Court negated a long-standing, but obsolete, definition of the militia. However, this move away from an obsolete definition of the militia posed considerable difficulties that the Court was unable to rectify in its Perpich decision. In this Article, the author hopes to help rectify these difficulties by proposing four necessary characteristics that define the militia: first, the militia is a military force; second, the …

Why Do The Poor Not Have A Constitutional Right To File Civil Claims In Court Under Their First Amendment Right To Petition The Government For A Redress Of Grievances?, Henry Rose

Seattle University Law Review

Since 1963, the United States Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional right for American groups, organizations, and persons to pursue civil litigation under the First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances. However, in three cases involving poor plaintiffs decided by the Supreme Court in the early 1970s—Boddie v. Connecticut,2 United States v. Kras,3 and Ortwein v. Schwab4—the Supreme Court rejected arguments that all persons have a constitutional right to access courts to pursue their civil legal claims.5 In the latter two cases, Kras and Ortwein, the Supreme Court concluded that poor persons were properly barred from …

Neither Safe, Nor Legal, Nor Rare: The D.C. Circuit’S Use Of The Doctrine Of Ratification To Shield Agency Action From Appointments Clause Challenges, Damien M. Schiff

Seattle University Law Review

Key to the constitutional design of the federal government is the separation of powers. An important support for that separation is the Appointments Clause, which governs how officers of the United States are installed in their positions. Although the separation of powers generally, and the Appointments Clause specifically, support democratically accountable government, they also protect individual citizens against abusive government power. But without a judicial remedy, such protection is ineffectual—a mere parchment barrier.

Such has become the fate of the Appointments Clause in the D.C. Circuit, thanks to that court’s adoption—and zealous employment—of the rule that agency action, otherwise unconstitutional …

Fmc Corp. V. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, Seth T. Bonilla

Public Land & Resources Law Review

In 1998, FMC Corporation agreed to submit to the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes’ permitting processes, including the payment of fees, for clean-up work required as part of consent decree negotiations with the Environmental Protection Agency. Then, in 2002, FMC refused to pay the Tribes under a permitting agreement entered into by both parties, even though the company continued to store hazardous waste on land within the Shoshone-Bannock Fort Hall Reservation in Idaho. FMC challenged the Tribes’ authority to enforce the $1.5 million permitting fees first in tribal court and later challenged the Tribes’ authority to exercise civil regulatory and adjudicatory jurisdiction over …

Justice Scalia Got It Right, But For The Wrong Reasons: Scalia’S Recognition Of The Supreme Court’S “Southern Exception” In U.S. Constitutional Jurisprudence And The Connection Of “Southern Exceptionalism” To “American Exceptionalism", James D. Wilets

University of Miami Law Review

The late Justice Scalia has repeatedly and sardonically noted that the Supreme Court has discounted the views of Southern states in determining whether there is a consensus among the states with regards to a Constitutional norm. This Article has termed that Supreme Court position as “Southern Exception” and can be viewed as an effort by some Justices to address the unique social, economic, religious and cultural traditions in the South engendered by its unique" and “exceptional” history. This Article will also explore how this "Southern Exception" affected American jurisprudence to the point of rendering it "exceptional" from much of the …

Fire, Aim, Ready! Militarizing Animus: “Unit Cohesion” And The Transgender Ban, Eric Merriam

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

President Trump’s currently litigated “transgender ban,” which excludes transgender persons from military service, is premised in part upon a claim that transgender persons’ presence in the military adversely affects “unit cohesion.” This use of identity- based “unit cohesion” as a justification for excluding a group from military service is the latest episode in a long history of the government asserting “unit cohesion” to justify excluding people from military service based on their identities. This Article contends that unit cohesion, when premised on identity, is always an impermissible justification for exclusion from military service because it is unconstitutional animus. Though …

Justice Blackmun And Individual Rights, Diane P. Wood

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

Of the many contributions Justice Blackmun has made to American jurisprudence, surely his record in the area of individual rights stands out for its importance. Throughout his career on the Supreme Court, he has displayed concern for a wide variety of individual and civil rights. He has rendered decisions on matters ranging from the most personal interests in autonomy and freedom from interference from government in life’s private realms, to the increasingly complex problems posed by discrimination based upon race, sex, national origin, alienage, illegitimacy, sexual orientation, and other characteristics. As his views have become well known to the public, …

Indecency Four Years After Fox Television Stations: From Big Papi To A Porn Star, An Egregious Mess At The Fcc Continues, Clay Calvert, Minch Minchin, Keran Billaud, Kevin Bruckenstein, Tershone Phillips

University of Richmond Law Review

Using the WDBJ case as an analytical springboard, this article examines the tumultuous state of the FCC's indecency enforcement regime more than three years after the Supreme Court's June 2012 opinion in Fox Television Stations. Part I of this article briefly explores the missed First Amendment opportunities in Fox Television Stations, as well as some possible reasons why the Supreme Court chose to avoid the free-speech questions in that case." Part II addresses the FCC's decision in September 2012 to target only egregious instances of broadcast indecency and, in the process, to jettison hundreds of thousands of complaints that had …

Navigating The Post-Shelby Landscape: Using Universalism To Augment The Remaining Power Of The Voting Rights Act, Jesús N. Joslin

The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social Justice

Abstract forthcoming.

The Texas Supreme Court Retreats From Protecting Texas Students, Albert Kauffman

The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social Justice

This Article criticizes the 2016 Texas Supreme Court school finance decision, the latest of seven decisions starting in 1989, for its disregard of both the record in the case and the realities of the Texas Constitution and Texas politics. The Article also focuses on how standards for reviewing legislation have changed and the Texas Supreme Court's irrational and unfounded retreat to the "money doesn't make a difference" theory of school finance. Finally, the Article recommends a return to an objective, comprehensible, enforceable and constitutional system of review, and concludes with a prayer for holdings that recognize the inequities of the …

Politics At Work After Citizens United, Ruben J. Garcia

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

There are seismic changes going on in the political system. The United States Supreme Court has constitutionalized the concentration of political power in the “one percent” in several recent decisions, including Citizens United v. FEC. At the same time, unions are representing a shrinking share of the workforce, and their political power is also being diminished. In order for unions to recalibrate the balance of political power at all, they must collaborate with grassroots community groups, as they have done in several recent campaigns. There are, however, various legal structures that make coordination between unions and nonunion groups difficult, …

Half-Baked: The Demand By For-Profit Businesses For Religious Exemptions From Selling To Same-Sex Couples, James M. Donovan

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

Should bakers be required to make cakes for same-sex weddings? This Article unravels the eclectic arguments that are offered in support of a religious exemption from serving gay customers in the wake of Obergefell.

Preliminary issues first consider invocations of a libertarian right to exclude. Rather than being part of our concept of liberty, this right to exclude from commercial premises is a new rule devised to prevent African Americans from participating in free society. Instead of expanding this racist rule to likewise bar gays from the marketplace, it should be reset to the antebellum standard of free access …