Supreme Court of the United States Commons^™

Sovereign Immunity And Interstate Government Tort, Louise Weinberg

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This paper argues that the Supreme Court made a serious mistake last term, when, in a case of interstate government tort, it tore up useful options that should be available to each state for the rare cases in which they would be of service. In seeking to insulate a state from liability when its employee intrudes on a sister state’s territory and causes injury there, the Court stripped every state of power, in cases of interstate government tort, to try injuries occurring on its own territory to its own residents—an unprecedented disregard of a state’s acknowledged traditional interests. Indeed, the …

Waiving Federal Sovereign Immunity In Original Actions Between States, Sandra B. Zellmer

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

There are tremendous disparities between high stakes original actions between states before the U.S. Supreme Court, where there is no waiver of federal sovereign immunity, and other types of cases in the lower courts, where a plethora of immunity waivers allow states and other parties to seek relief from the federal government for Fifth Amendment takings, unlawful agency action, and tort claims. Federal actions or omissions are often at the heart of the dispute, and federal involvement may be crucial for purposes of providing an equitable remedy to the state parties, but there is no reliable mechanism for bringing the …

Hernandez, Bivens, And The Supreme Court’S Expanding Theory Of Judicial Abdication, William J. Aceves

Michigan Law Review Online

This Essay examines the Hernandez decision and critiques the Court’s expanding theory of judicial abdication, an approach with profound implications for civil rights and the future of the judiciary. While Hernandezinvolved a cross-border shooting, the Court’s reasoning extends to all facets of civil litigation. Accordingly, this Essay proposes a new theory of judicial engagement that would empower federal courts to grant relief for constitutional claims against federal officials. It is a theory founded in extant constitutional jurisprudence that the Court has used for over a century to apply the Bill of Rights to state and local governments—an approach that …

The Making Of The Supreme Court Bar: How Business Created A Solicitor General For The Private Sector, Jeremy Pilaar

Michigan Law Review Online

This Essay tells a simple but important story about power and the law: that of the rise of the modern Supreme Court bar. Since 1985, a small cadre of private attorneys has come to dominate Court advocacy. While the share of lawyers making their first arguments before the justices fell from 76% to 43% between 1980 and 2007, the fraction with ten or more arguments under their belt rose from 2% to 28%. Similarly, while litigators with five or more previous arguments were responsible for 5.8% of the case petitions granted in October Term 1980, that quotient soared to 55.5% …

Public Consensus As Constitutional Authority, Richard A. Primus

Articles

Barry Friedman's new book The Will of the People attempts to dissolve constitutional law's countermajoritariand ifficulty by showing that, in practice,t he Supreme Court does only what the public will tolerate. His account succeeds if "the countermajoritarian difficulty" refers to the threat that courts will run the country in ways that contravene majority preference, but not if the "the countermajoritarian difficulty" refers to the need to explain the legitimate sources of judicial authority in cases where decisions do contravene majority preference. Friedman's book does not pursue the second possibility, and may suggest that doing so is unimportant, in part because …

When Should Original Meanings Matter?, Richard A. Primus

Articles

Constitutional theory lacks an account of when each of the familiar sources of authority-text, original meaning, precedent, and so on-should be given weight. The dominant tendency is to regard all sources as potentially applicable in every case. In contrast, this Article proposes that each source of authority is pertinent in some categories of cases but not in others, much as a physical tool is appropriate for some but not all kinds of household tasks. The Article then applies this approach to identify the categories of cases in which original meaning is, or is not, a valid factor in constitutional decisionmaking.

Rebus Sic Stantibus: Notification Of Consular Rights After Medellin, Aaron A. Ostrovsky, Brandon E. Reavis

Michigan Journal of International Law

This Comment examines, through principles of public international law and U.S. jurisprudence, the relationship between U.S. courts and the ICJ to determine if the former are indeed bound by the latter's decisions, proprio motu, or if instead some Executive action is required to make the decisions binding on the judiciary. Part of this examination will entail a discussion of the potential for dialogue between the ICJ and U.S. courts to "pierce the veil of sovereignty" that traditionally conceals the inner workings of sovereign states from the scrutiny of international tribunals. Based on this assessment, the Comment then addresses how …

Comparative Constitutionalism In A New Key, Paul W. Kahn

Michigan Law Review

Law is a symbolic system that structures the political imagination. The "rule of law" is a shorthand expression for a cultural practice that constructs a particular understanding of time and space, of subjects and groups, as well as of authority and legitimacy. It is a way of projecting, maintaining, and discovering meaning in the world of historical events and political possibilities. The rule of law - as opposed to the techniques of lawyering - is not the possession of lawyers. It is a characterization of the polity, which operates both descriptively and normatively in public perception. Ours, we believe, is …

What Is And Is Not Pathological In Criminal Law, Kyron Huigens

Michigan Law Review

In a recent article in this law review, William J. Stuntz argues that criminal law in the United States suffers from a political pathology. The incentives of legislators are such that the notorious overcriminalization of American society is deep as well as broad. That is, not only are remote corners of life subject to criminal penalties - such things as tearing tags off mattresses and overworking animals - but now crimes are defined with the express design of easing the way to conviction. Is proof of a tangible harm an obstacle to using wire and mail fraud statutes to prosecute …

Reply: Criminal Law's Pathology, William J. Stuntz

Michigan Law Review

I thank Kyron Huigens for devoting his time and his considerable talent to responding to my article, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law. I also thank editors of the Michigan Law Review for giving me the opportunity to reply. It is best to begin by defining the contested territory. Huigens and I agree (I think) on three propositions. First, American criminal law, both federal and state, is very broad; it covers a great deal more conduct than most people would expect. Second, American criminal law is very deep: that which it criminalizes, it criminalizes repeatedly, so that a single …

Making The Law Safe For Democracy: A Review Of "The Law Of Democracy Etc.", Burt Neuborne

Michigan Law Review

Henry Hart began his 1964 Holmes Lectures by asking what a "single" would be without baseball. We rolled our eyes at that one, reveling in the maestro's penchant for the occult. As usual, though, Professor Hart was trying to tell us groundlings something precious. He was warning us that conventional legal thinking, by stressing rigorous deconstructive analysis, can obscure an important unity in favor of components that should be analyzed, not solely as freestanding phenomena, but as part of the unity. Without recognition of the unity, analysis of the components risks being carried on in a normative vacuum that will …

Back To The Briarpatch: An Argument In Favor Of Constitutional Meta-Analysis In State Action Determinations, Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr.

Michigan Law Review

Brer Rabbit, after claiming repeatedly that he would prefer almost anything to being thrown into the briarpatch, expressed glee once tossed there. In fact, Brer Rabbit wanted to be in the briarpatch because, like most rabbits, he could navigate the briarpatch with relative ease: the briarpatch was home.

Over the course of a century, the Supreme Court has developed a great degree of familiarity with the state action doctrine, a doctrinal briar patch. Like Brer Rabbit, the Court has disclaimed repeatedly any interest in being there.

In this article, I argue that the existing tests for establishing the presence of …

The Judiciary's Use Of Supervisory Power To Control Federal Law Enforcement Activity, Department Of Justice Office Of Legal Policy

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

In McNabb v. United States, the Supreme Court claimed- for the first time in its history-the prerogative of "establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evidence" in the exercise of "supervisory authority over the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts." Since then, the Court has used this self-declared oversight power on numerous occasions and for a wide variety of purposes, but it has never adequately explained either the provenance or the scope of this type of judicial authority. Lower federal courts have followed suit, on the largely unexamined assumption that they too are endowed with supervisory …

Federal Court Review Of Arbitrary State Court Decisions, David T. Azrin

Michigan Law Review

Part I of this Note argues that the Thompson, Logan, and Hicks cases can be read narrowly to deal primarily with concern about protecting specific constitutional guarantees such as criminal procedural protections, equal protection guarantees, and first amendment freedoms. Arguably, in order to avoid dealing explicitly with the broader constitutional questions raised by the state decisions, the Court reversed the state decisions as arbitrary interpretations of state law. Part II argues that the rule against arbitrary state decisions suggested by Thompson, Logan, and Hicks is incompatible with federalism because it interferes with states' ability to develop law over state …

Legality And Empathy, Lynne N. Henderson

Michigan Law Review

This article rejects the assumption that legality - by which I mean the dominant belief system about the Rule and role of Law - and empathy are mutually exclusive concepts. Failure to recognize the phenomenon of empathy explicitly in legal decisions more generally may result from a fear of the emotional realm as irrational, rather than a rational. It may stem from a belief that the divide between "subject" and "object" is uncrossable. The resistance to empathy may be attributable to the adversarial ideology acquired during law school understanding the adversary is not important unless it serves one's instrumental …

The Public's Right To Know: The Supreme Court As Pandora?, Loren P. Beth

Michigan Law Review

A Review of The Public's Right to Know: The Supreme Court and the First Amendment by David M. O'Brien

Justice And The Bureaucratization Of Appellate Courts, Joseph Vining

Articles

The author notes the growing bureaucratization of appellate justice in the United States and, in particular, the drafting of opinions by law clerks rather than by judges. Taking the Supreme Court of the United States as an example, and comparing its internal procedure with that of large administrative agencies, he questions whether the method of analysis familiarly used by lawyers to arrive at an authoritative statement of law is applicable to legal texts bureaucratically produced. He suggests that legal method and its presuppositions are ultimately associated with the authority of law, and concludes that there may be critical losses not …

Constitutional Interpretation, Terrance Sandalow

Articles

"[We] must never forget," Chief Justice Marshall admonished us in a statement pregnant with more than one meaning, "that it is a constitution we are expounding."' Marshall meant that the Constitution should be read as a document "intended to endure for ages.to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs."'2 But he meant also that the construction placed upon the document must have regard for its "great outlines" and "important objects."'3 Limits are implied by the very nature of the task. There is not the same freedom in construing the Constitution as in constructing a …

Immunity Under The Speech Or Debate Clause For Republican And From Questioning About Sources, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

Gravel v. United States, which arose out of Senator Mike Gravel's attempt to publicize the Pentagon Papers, concerned the scope of the immunity conferred upon a legislator and his aide under article I, section 6, of the United States Constitution. This provision, commonly called the "speech or debate clause," provides that "for any Speech or Debate in either House, [United States Senators or Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place." Gravel is one of the few Supreme Court interpretations of this clause.

Judicial Supremacy Re-Examined: A Proposed Alternative, G. Sidney Buchanan

Michigan Law Review

A citizen critic recently expressed to me his bitter opposition to the Warren Court's decisions on school prayer and school desegregation. If this critic were elected governor of a state or placed in some other position of governmental authority, he would almost certainly use his power to block public school desegregation and to encourage prayer reading in the public schools. Conceding that our critic would be acting controversially in so using his power, would he be acting unconstitutionally? This is the question which this Article will attempt to answer. More generally, this Article will consider the extent to which a …

Reapportionment--Nine Years Into The "Revolution" And Still Struggling, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

Malapportioned legislative districts traditionally have inhibited the effective working of government at the federal, state, and local levels. By 1960, the population disparities among legislative districts had attained such great magnitude "that the integrity of representative government was in many instances endangered." The underrepresented victims of malapportionment sought relief through the courts. Initially the Supreme Court, ever hesitant to enter the "political thicket," declined to address itself to reapportionment controversies. This era of judicial inaction ended in 1962 with the Court's ruling in Baker v. Carr, in which the plaintiffs overcame the formidable barrier posed by the political-question doctrine. …

The Warren Court And The Press, John P. Mackenzie

Michigan Law Review

The conventional wisdom about the relationship between the ·warren Court and the news media runs something like this: With a few exceptions, the press corps is populated by persons with only a superficial understanding of the Court, its processes, and the values with which it deals. The Court has poured out pages of legal learning, but its reasoning has been largely ignored by a result-oriented news industry interested only in the superficial aspects of the Court's work. The Court can trace much of its "bad press," its "poor image," to the often sloppy and inaccurate work of news gatherers operating …

Murphy: Congress And The Court, Robert B. Mckay

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Congress and the Court. By Walter F. Murphy

The Supreme Court And The Rule Of Law, Paul G. Kauper

Michigan Law Review

I should like to approach this afternoon's subject along two lines. On the one hand, I propose to develop the subject in terms of the Supreme Court's contribution to our understanding of the Rule of Law, and, on the other hand, I propose to look at the Supreme Court as a governmental institution subject to the Rule of Law. In short, I propose to discuss the Supreme Court both as an instrumentality for the development of the American concept of the Rule of Law and as an institution governed by the Rule of Law. Needless to say, these two approaches …

"Congress Shall Make No Law…":Ii, O. John Rogge

Michigan Law Review

The framers of the federal bill of rights by the First and Tenth Amendments sought to deny Congress power over utterances unless they were connected with criminal conduct other than advocacy. Any power over such utterances was to reside in the states. However, the Supreme Court departed from the framers' intent.

One of the factors in this development was the emergence of an undefined federal police power. This occurred largely under the commerce and postal clauses. It began over a century ago. As early as 1838 Congress passed a law requiring the installation of safety devices upon steam vessels. Beginning …

"Congress Shall Make No Law..."*, O. John Rogge

Michigan Law Review

It is the position of the writer that, at least so far as Congress is concerned, speech is as free as thought, and that unless and until speech becomes a part of a course of conduct which Congress can restrain or regulate no federal legislative power over it exists. State power, despite the Fourteenth Amendment, may be somewhat more extensive. Certainly the framers of the First Amendment intended that it should be. This article will deal with federal power over speech.

Constitutional Law - Due Process -Watkins V. United States As A Limitation On Power Of Congressional Investigating Committees, Allan F. Bioff S. Ed.

Michigan Law Review

It is the purpose of this comment to examine the nature and extent of the restraints imposed by the Watkins case as well as the potential problems raised by the decision.

Estoppel And Crown Privilege In English Administrative Law, Bernard Schwartz

Michigan Law Review

Perhaps the most anachronistic doctrine in Anglo-American public law is that of sovereign immunity. Under it, the State is placed in a privileged position of immunity from the principles of law which are binding upon the ordinary citizen, unless it expressly consents to be bound by such principles. In Anglo-American law the infallibility attributed to the King in the days when he was personally sovereign has been more recently recognized in the State, which the Crown now merely personifies. Thus, even today, and even in the American democracy, the basic principle of public law is that the King can do …

Constitutional Decisions By A Bare Majority Of The Court, Robert Eugene Cushman

Michigan Law Review

In December, 1823, the legislature of Kentucky, in a blaze of resentment against a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States invalidating a Kentucky statute,' petitioned Congress "so to organize the Supreme Court of the United States that no constitutional question * * * involving the validity of State laws, shall be decided by said Court unless two-thirds of all the members belonging to said court shall concur in such decision." 2 At the same time a United States senator from Kentucky was demanding that Congress- require for such decisions the concurrence of seven judges out of a …

Limits To State Control Of Private Business, Thomas M. Cooley

Articles

The present purpose is to inquire whether, in the matter of the regulation of property rights and of business, legislation has not of late been occupying doubtful, possibly unconstitutional grounds. The discussion in the main must be limited to fundamental.-principles, aided by such light as legal and constitutional history may throw upon them, since the express provisions of the constitutions can give little assistance. They always contain the general guaranty of due process of law to life, liberty, and property, but in other particulars they for the most part leave protection to principles which have come from the common law. …