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Supreme Court of the United States Commons™
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Articles 1 - 10 of 10
Full-Text Articles in Supreme Court of the United States
Computers, Urinals, And The Fourth Amendment: Confessions Of A Patron Saint, Wayne R. Lafave
Computers, Urinals, And The Fourth Amendment: Confessions Of A Patron Saint, Wayne R. Lafave
Michigan Law Review
At least the title indicates that the article is somehow concerned with "the Fourth Amendment," though for anyone who knows me or is at all familiar with my work, that piece of information hardly would come as a revelation. The fact of the matter is that I almost always write about the Fourth Amendment; I am in an academic rut so deep as to deserve recognition in the Guinness Book World of Records. Search and seizure has been my cheval de bataille during my entire time as a law professor and even when I was a mere law student. …
Counter-Revolution In Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, Carol S. Steiker
Counter-Revolution In Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, Carol S. Steiker
Michigan Law Review
For the purposes of my argument, I adapt Professor Meir Dan-Cohen's distinction (which he in turn borrowed from Jeremy Bentham) between "conduct" rules and "decision" rules. Bentham and Dan-Cohen make this distinction in the context of substantive criminal law; for their purposes, "conduct" rules are addressed to the general public in order to guide its behavior (for example, "Let no person steal") and "decision" rules are addressed to public officials in order to guide their decisionmaking about the consequences of violating conduct rules (for example, "Let the judge cause whoever is convicted of stealing to be hanged"). But as any …
Loss Of Protection As Injury In Fact: An Approach To Establishing Standing To Challenge Environmental Planning Decisions, Miles A. Yanick
Loss Of Protection As Injury In Fact: An Approach To Establishing Standing To Challenge Environmental Planning Decisions, Miles A. Yanick
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
As currently interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, Article III of the Constitution creates a significant hurdle for plaintiff citizen groups seeking standing to challenge environmental planning or management decisions. In particular, plaintiffs have had difficulty in making the required showing of an 'injury in fact" where an agency has not yet approved a site-specific action but has approved only a general plan for an area to govern future site-specific actions. The Supreme Court has not articulated a clear rule for standing to challenge the latter type of agency decision making, and the courts of appeals for the various …
Reconsidering Strict Scrutiny Of Affirmative Action, Brent E. Simmons
Reconsidering Strict Scrutiny Of Affirmative Action, Brent E. Simmons
Michigan Journal of Race and Law
Under the artificial constraints of strict scrutiny, however, the courts are free to veto the government's choice of more effective, race-conscious means. The Supreme Court's unfortunate and ill-conceived adoption of strict scrutiny as the constitutional standard for reviewing race-conscious affirmative action should be reconsidered for several reasons. This Article examines those reasons.
Legislative History And Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court And The Tenth Circuit, Fritz Snyder
Legislative History And Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court And The Tenth Circuit, Fritz Snyder
Oklahoma Law Review
No abstract provided.
Judicial Restraint And Constitutional Federalism: The Supreme Court's Lopez And Seminole Tribe Decisions, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Judicial Restraint And Constitutional Federalism: The Supreme Court's Lopez And Seminole Tribe Decisions, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
The Senate hearings considering Elena Kagan’s Supreme Court nomination called new attention to the Constitution's Commerce Clause. That concern might seem odd, given the typical lack of strong grassroots concern over the commerce power. But the 2010 election year is different. One characteristic of the largely conservative "Tea Party" movement is a wish to roll back Constitutional time to the regime envisioned by its founders. As the New York Times reported in early July, 2010, members of the movement believe that the “commerce clause in particular has been pushed beyond recognition.” Members of the movement imagine that Congressional power over …
Conquering The Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism Of The Supreme Court In Indian Law, David H. Getches
Conquering The Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism Of The Supreme Court In Indian Law, David H. Getches
Publications
For a century and a half, the Supreme Court was faithful to a set of foundation principles respecting Indian tribal sovereignty. Though the United States can abrogate tribal powers and rights, it can only do so by legislation. Accordingly, the Court has protected reservations as enclaves for Indian self-government, preventing states from enforcing their laws and taxes, and holding that even federal laws could not be applied to Indians without congressional permission. Recently, however, the Court has assumed the job it formerly conceded to Congress, considering and weighing cases to reach results comporting with the Justices' subjective notions of what …
Progress And Constitutionalism, Robert F. Nagel
Hiding The Ball, Pierre Schlag
The Most Dangerous Justice: The Supreme Court At The Bar Of Mathematics, Paul H. Edelman, Jim Chen
The Most Dangerous Justice: The Supreme Court At The Bar Of Mathematics, Paul H. Edelman, Jim Chen
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
We analyze the relative voting power of the Justices based upon Supreme Court decisions during October Term 1994 and October Term 1995. We take two approaches, both based on ideas derived from cooperative game theory. One of the measures we use has been used in connection with voting rights cases. After naming the Most Dangerous Justice, we conclude by identifying and explaining the inverse relationship between seniority and voting power.