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Banning Abortions Based On A Prenatal Diagnosis Of Down Syndrome: The Future Of Abortion Regulation, Alexandra Russo
Banning Abortions Based On A Prenatal Diagnosis Of Down Syndrome: The Future Of Abortion Regulation, Alexandra Russo
Touro Law Review
Since the infamous Supreme Court decision, Roe v. Wade, the United States has remained divided, each side unyielding to the other regarding the legal and moral issues surrounding abortion. The issues surrounding abortion have become progressively more politicized, thus threatening a woman’s right to a safe and healthy termination of her pregnancy. Restrictions on a woman’s ability to terminate a child with a genetic disorder, such as Down syndrome, highlight this concern. State restrictions on abortion that prohibit abortions based on a diagnosis of Down syndrome seek to prevent the stigmatization of the Down syndrome community. Regulations, such as …
A Proper Burial, Robert L. Tsai
A Proper Burial, Robert L. Tsai
Arkansas Law Review
In his article, Professor Mark Killenbeck defends both Korematsu v. United States and Trump v. Hawaii on their own terms, albeit on narrow grounds. He goes on to conclude that comparisons of the two decisions don’t hold up. Killenbeck has authored a thoughtful and contrarian paper, but I’m not sold. In my view, Korematsu simply isn’t worth saving; in fact, a more complete repudiation of the internment decisions is overdue. Trump v. Hawaii, too, must also be revisited at the earliest opportunity and its more alarming features that abet presidential discrimination against non-citizens rejected. Moreover, I believe that comparisons between …
The Quixotic Search For Race-Neutral Alternatives, Michael E. Rosman
The Quixotic Search For Race-Neutral Alternatives, Michael E. Rosman
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
The Supreme Court has stated that the narrow-tailoring inquiry of the Equal Protection Clause’s strict scrutiny analysis of racially disparate treatment by state actors requires courts to consider whether the defendant seriously considered race-neutral alternatives before adopting the race-conscious program at issue. This article briefly examines what that means in the context of race-conscious admissions programs at colleges and universities. Part I sets forth the basic concepts that the Supreme Court uses to analyze race-conscious decision-making by governmental actors and describes the role of “race-neutral alternatives” in that scheme. Part II examines the nature of “race-neutral alternatives” and identifies its …
Fisher V. Texas: The Limits Of Exhaustion And The Future Of Race-Conscious University Admissions, John A. Powell, Stephen Menendian
Fisher V. Texas: The Limits Of Exhaustion And The Future Of Race-Conscious University Admissions, John A. Powell, Stephen Menendian
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
This Article investigates the potential ramifications of Fisher v. Texas and the future of race-conscious university admissions. Although one cannot predict the ultimate significance of the Fisher decision, its brief and pregnant statements of law portends an increasingly perilous course for traditional affirmative action programs. Part I explores the opinions filed in Fisher, with a particular emphasis on Justice Kennedy’s opinion on behalf of the Court. We focus on the ways in which the Fisher decision departs from precedent, proscribes new limits on the use of race in university admissions, and tightens requirements for narrow tailoring. Part II investigates the …
Foreword: Loving Lawrence, Pamela S. Karlan
Foreword: Loving Lawrence, Pamela S. Karlan
Michigan Law Review
Two interracial couples. Two cases. Two clauses. In Loving v. Virginia, the Supreme Court struck down a Virginia statute outlawing interracial marriage. In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court struck down a Texas statute outlawing sexual activity between same-sex individuals. Each case raised challenges under both the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Attainder And Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, Akhil Reed Amar
Attainder And Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, Akhil Reed Amar
Michigan Law Review
Call me silly. In fact, call me terminally silly. For despite Justice Scalia's remarkably confident claim, I believe, and shall try to prove below, that the Romer Court majority opinion invalidating Colorado's Amendment 2 was right both in form and in substance, both logically and sociologically. I stress "form" and "logic" at the outset because I share Justice Scalia's belief in the importance of these things in constitutional adjudication. I also share his commitment to constitutional text, history, and structure, and his suspicion of "free-form" constitutionalism. And so I shall highlight the text, history, and spirit of a constitutional clause …
Is Amendment 2 Really A Bill Of Attainder? Some Questions About Professor Amar's Analysis Of Romer, Roderick M. Hills Jr.
Is Amendment 2 Really A Bill Of Attainder? Some Questions About Professor Amar's Analysis Of Romer, Roderick M. Hills Jr.
Michigan Law Review
As I first discovered as a law student in Professor Amar's classes on legal history and federal courts, it is generally an intellectual treat to listen to Professor Amar's legal analysis, even when he is attacking one's own arguments. So my pleasure at reading Professor Amar's analysis of the Court's decision in Romer v. Evans was only partly dampened by his disapproval of the respondents' brief that I and other plaintiffs' counsel filed with the Court. According to Amar, this respondents' brief provided the Court with "so little help" that it had to rely on an entirely different and much …
Reconsidering Strict Scrutiny Of Affirmative Action, Brent E. Simmons
Reconsidering Strict Scrutiny Of Affirmative Action, Brent E. Simmons
Michigan Journal of Race and Law
Under the artificial constraints of strict scrutiny, however, the courts are free to veto the government's choice of more effective, race-conscious means. The Supreme Court's unfortunate and ill-conceived adoption of strict scrutiny as the constitutional standard for reviewing race-conscious affirmative action should be reconsidered for several reasons. This Article examines those reasons.
Abortion Rights, Eileen Kaufman
Affirmative Action, Douglas Scherer, John Dunne
Affirmative Action, Douglas Scherer, John Dunne
Touro Law Review
No abstract provided.