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Fourteenth Amendment

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1996

Articles 1 - 11 of 11

Full-Text Articles in Supreme Court of the United States

The Constitution And Racial Preference In Law School Admissions, Robert A. Sedler Nov 1996

The Constitution And Racial Preference In Law School Admissions, Robert A. Sedler

Law Faculty Research Publications

No abstract provided.

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Determining Ripeness Of Substantive Due Process Claims Brought By Landowners Against Local Governments, David S. Mendel Nov 1996

Determining Ripeness Of Substantive Due Process Claims Brought By Landowners Against Local Governments, David S. Mendel

Michigan Law Review

Landowners who sustain economic harm from arbitrary and capricious applications of land use regulations may sue the local government entities responsible for applying those regulations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the local government entities deprived them of substantive due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. A landowner who brings this claim - an "as-applied arbitrary and capricious substantive due process" claim - may in appropriate cases seek declaratory and injunctive relief, damages, and attorney's fees. Despite controversy among courts and commentators over both the definition of property interests protected by the Due Process Clause and the standard …

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Attainder And Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, Akhil Reed Amar Oct 1996

Attainder And Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, Akhil Reed Amar

Michigan Law Review

Call me silly. In fact, call me terminally silly. For despite Justice Scalia's remarkably confident claim, I believe, and shall try to prove below, that the Romer Court majority opinion invalidating Colorado's Amendment 2 was right both in form and in substance, both logically and sociologically. I stress "form" and "logic" at the outset because I share Justice Scalia's belief in the importance of these things in constitutional adjudication. I also share his commitment to constitutional text, history, and structure, and his suspicion of "free-form" constitutionalism. And so I shall highlight the text, history, and spirit of a constitutional clause …

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Is Amendment 2 Really A Bill Of Attainder? Some Questions About Professor Amar's Analysis Of Romer, Roderick M. Hills Jr. Oct 1996

Is Amendment 2 Really A Bill Of Attainder? Some Questions About Professor Amar's Analysis Of Romer, Roderick M. Hills Jr.

Michigan Law Review

As I first discovered as a law student in Professor Amar's classes on legal history and federal courts, it is generally an intellectual treat to listen to Professor Amar's legal analysis, even when he is attacking one's own arguments. So my pleasure at reading Professor Amar's analysis of the Court's decision in Romer v. Evans was only partly dampened by his disapproval of the respondents' brief that I and other plaintiffs' counsel filed with the Court. According to Amar, this respondents' brief provided the Court with "so little help" that it had to rely on an entirely different and much …

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Affirmative Duties, Systemic Harms, And The Due Process Clause, Barbara E. Armacost Feb 1996

Affirmative Duties, Systemic Harms, And The Due Process Clause, Barbara E. Armacost

Michigan Law Review

Part I of the article lays out the major academic criticisms of DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services. Part II describes the contours of liability for failure to protect in tort. Part III offers a positive explanation for the strong presumption against governmental liability in failure-to-protect cases: permitting broad liability for failure to protect would involve the courts in second-guessing political decisions about the use of limited community resources. This explanation has two parts. First, as a matter of institutional competence, budgetary decisions about the appropriate level and distribution of public services are better suited to political rather …

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United States V. Virginia: Does Intermediate Scrutiny Still Exist?, Eric J. Stockel Jan 1996

United States V. Virginia: Does Intermediate Scrutiny Still Exist?, Eric J. Stockel

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

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California’S Proposition 187--Does It Mean What It Says? Does It Say What It Means? A Textual And Constitutional Analysis, Lolita K. Buckner Inniss Jan 1996

California’S Proposition 187--Does It Mean What It Says? Does It Say What It Means? A Textual And Constitutional Analysis, Lolita K. Buckner Inniss

Publications

No abstract provided.

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Physician Assisted Suicide: A Bad Idea, Yale Kamisar Jan 1996

Physician Assisted Suicide: A Bad Idea, Yale Kamisar

Articles

It would be hard to deny that there is a great deal of support in this country - and ever-growing support - for legalizing physician-assisted suicide (PAS). Why is this so? I believe there are a considerable number of reasons. I shall discuss five common reasons - and explain why I do not find any of them convincing.

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The 'Right To Die': On Drawing (And Erasing) Lines, Yale Kamisar Jan 1996

The 'Right To Die': On Drawing (And Erasing) Lines, Yale Kamisar

Articles

Until this year, no state or federal appellate court had ever held that there was a right to assisted suicide no matter how narrow the circumstances or stringent the conditions. In 1996, however, within the span of a single month, two federal courts of appeals so held; in an 8-3 majority of the Ninth Circuit (sitting en banc) in Compassion in Dying v. Washington and a three-judge panel of the Second Circuit in Quill v. Vacco. What heartened proponents of a right to physician-assisted suicide even more, and pleased those resistant to the idea even less, was that the two …

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Reconsidering Strict Scrutiny Of Affirmative Action, Brent E. Simmons Jan 1996

Reconsidering Strict Scrutiny Of Affirmative Action, Brent E. Simmons

Michigan Journal of Race and Law

Under the artificial constraints of strict scrutiny, however, the courts are free to veto the government's choice of more effective, race-conscious means. The Supreme Court's unfortunate and ill-conceived adoption of strict scrutiny as the constitutional standard for reviewing race-conscious affirmative action should be reconsidered for several reasons. This Article examines those reasons.

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Progress And Constitutionalism, Robert F. Nagel Jan 1996

Progress And Constitutionalism, Robert F. Nagel

Publications

No abstract provided.

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