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Full-Text Articles in Supreme Court of the United States
Sexual Orientation Discrimination Under Title Vii: The Promising Road Ahead, Sydney Wright
Sexual Orientation Discrimination Under Title Vii: The Promising Road Ahead, Sydney Wright
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
No abstract provided.
Rwu First Amendment Blog: Jared Goldstein's Blog: Masterpiece Cakeshop Ruling: No Constitutional Right To Discriminate (For Now) 06-05-2018, Jared A. Goldstein
Rwu First Amendment Blog: Jared Goldstein's Blog: Masterpiece Cakeshop Ruling: No Constitutional Right To Discriminate (For Now) 06-05-2018, Jared A. Goldstein
Law School Blogs
No abstract provided.
Buck V. Davis: Anti-Discriminatory Principles In Habeas Corpus Cases, Daniella Rubin
Buck V. Davis: Anti-Discriminatory Principles In Habeas Corpus Cases, Daniella Rubin
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
No abstract provided.
Disbelief Doctrines, Sandra F. Sperino
Disbelief Doctrines, Sandra F. Sperino
Faculty Articles and Other Publications
Employment discrimination law is riddled with doctrines that tell courts to believe employers and not workers. Judges often use these disbelief doctrines to dismiss cases at the summary judgment stage. At times, judges even use them after a jury trial to justify nullifying jury verdicts in favor of workers.
This article brings together many disparate discrimination doctrines and shows how they function as disbelief doctrines, causing courts to believe employers and not workers. The strongest disbelief doctrines include the stray comments doctrine, the same decisionmaker inference, and the same protected class inference. However, these are not the only ones. Even …
Equal Protection Under The Carceral State, Aya Gruber
Equal Protection Under The Carceral State, Aya Gruber
Publications
McCleskey v. Kemp, the case that upheld the death penalty despite undeniable evidence of its racially disparate impact, is indelibly marked by Justice William Brennan’s phrase, “a fear of too much justice.” The popular interpretation of this phrase is that the Supreme Court harbored what I call a “disparity-claim fear,” dreading a future docket of racial discrimination claims and erecting an impossibly high bar for proving an equal protection violation. A related interpretation is that the majority had a “color-consciousness fear” of remedying discrimination through race-remedial policies. In contrast to these conventional views, I argue that the primary anxiety …