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Full-Text Articles in Supreme Court of the United States
Can Speech Act Theory Save Notice Pleading?, Susan E. Provenzano
Can Speech Act Theory Save Notice Pleading?, Susan E. Provenzano
Indiana Law Journal
Countless scholars have debated—and lower courts have attempted to apply—the plausibility pleading regime that the Supreme Court introduced in Twombly and Iqbal. Iqbal took Twombly’s requirement that a complaint plead plausibly and turned it into a two-step test. Under that test, the life or death of a lawsuit rests on the distinction between “well-pleaded” and “conclusory” allegations. Only the former are assumed true on a motion to dismiss. Seven decades of pleading precedent had taken a sensible, if unstable, approach to the truth assumption, making a single cut between factual contentions (assumed true) and legal conclusions (ignored). But Iqbal redrew …
Pleading Conditions Of The Mind Under Rule 9(B): Repairing The Damage Wrought By Iqbal, A. Benjamin Spencer
Pleading Conditions Of The Mind Under Rule 9(B): Repairing The Damage Wrought By Iqbal, A. Benjamin Spencer
Faculty Publications
In 2009, the Supreme Court decided Ashcroft v. Iqbal, in which it pronounced-among other things- that the second sentence of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-which permits allegations of malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of the mind to be alleged "generally" -requires adherence to the plausibility pleading· standard it had devised for Rule 8(a)(2) in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. That is, to plead such allegations sufficiently, one must offer sufficient facts to render the condition-of-the-mind allegation plausible. This rewriting of the standard imposed by Rule 9(b)'s second sentence-which came only veritable moments after the Court …
Pleading And Access To Civil Justice: A Response To Twiqbal Apologists, A. Benjamin Spencer
Pleading And Access To Civil Justice: A Response To Twiqbal Apologists, A. Benjamin Spencer
Faculty Publications
Professor Stephen Yeazell once wrote, ''A society based on the rule of law fails in one of its central premises if substantial parts of the population lack access to law enforcement institutions."" One apparent threat to access to justice in recent years has been the erosion of notice pleading in the federal courts in favor of a plausibility-pleading system that screens out potentially meritorious claims that fail to offer sufficient specificity and support at the pleading stage. But some have questioned whether this purported threat is more perceived than real. Indeed, this doctrinal shift has been defended in several ways …
Beyond Common Sense: A Social Psychological Study Of Iqbal's Effect On Claims Of Race Discrimination, Victor D. Quintanilla
Beyond Common Sense: A Social Psychological Study Of Iqbal's Effect On Claims Of Race Discrimination, Victor D. Quintanilla
Michigan Journal of Race and Law
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) once operated as a notice pleading rule, requiring plaintiffs to set forth only a "short and plain" statement of their claim. In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, and then Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the United States Supreme Court recast Rule 8(a) into a plausibility pleading standard. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Iqbal requires federal courts, when deciding whether a complaint is plausible, to draw on their "judicial experience and common sense." Courts apply this standard …
Iqbal And The Slide Toward Restrictive Procedure, A. Benjamin Spencer
Iqbal And The Slide Toward Restrictive Procedure, A. Benjamin Spencer
Faculty Publications
Last term, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court affirmed its commitment to more stringent pleading standards in the ordinary federal civil case. Although the decision is not a watershed, since it merely underscores the substantial changes to pleading doctrine wrought in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, Iqbal is disconcerting for at least two reasons. First, the Court treated Iqbal 's factual allegations in a manner that further erodes the assumption-of-truth rule that has been the cornerstone of modern federal civil pleading practice. The result is an approach to pleading that is governed by a subjective, malleable standard that permits …
Law, Facts, And Power, Elizabeth G. Thornburg
Law, Facts, And Power, Elizabeth G. Thornburg
Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Ashcroft v. Iqbal is wrong in many ways. This essay is about only one of them: the Court’s single-handed return to a pleading system that requires lawyers and judges to distinguish between pleading facts and pleading law. This move not only resuscitates a distinction purposely abandoned by the generation that drafted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but also serves as an example of the very difficulties created by the distinction. The chinks in the law-fact divide are evident in Iqbal itself - both in the already notorious pleading section of the opinion, and in …
New Pleading, New Discovery, Scott Dodson
New Pleading, New Discovery, Scott Dodson
Michigan Law Review
Pleading in federal court has a new narrative. The old narrative was one of notice, with the goal of broad access to the civil justice system. New Pleading, after the landmark Supreme Court cases of Twombly and Iqbal, is focused on factual sufficiency, with the purpose of screening out meritless cases that otherwise might impose discovery costs on defendants. The problem with New Pleading is that factual insufficiency often is a poor proxy for meritlessness. Some plaintifs lack sufficient factual knowledge of the elements of their claims not because the claims lack merit but because the information they need is …
Pleading With Congress To Resist The Urge To Overrule Twombly And Iqbal, Michael R. Huston
Pleading With Congress To Resist The Urge To Overrule Twombly And Iqbal, Michael R. Huston
Michigan Law Review
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court changed the rhetoric of the federal pleading system. Those decisions have been decried by members of the bar, scholars, and legislators as judicial activism and a rewriting of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Such criticism has led members of both houses of Congress to introduce legislation to overrule the decisions and return to some variation of the "notice pleading" regime that existed before Twombly. This Note argues that both of the current proposals to overrule Twombly and Iqbal should be rejected. Although the bills take different …
Understanding Pleading Doctrine, A. Benjamin Spencer
Understanding Pleading Doctrine, A. Benjamin Spencer
Faculty Publications
Where does pleading doctrine, at the federal level, stand today? The Supreme Court's revision of general pleading standards in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly has not left courts and litigants with a clear or precise understanding of what it takes to state a claim that can survive a motion to dismiss. Claimants are required to show "plausible entitlement to relief" by offering enough facts "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Translating those admonitions into predictable and consistent guidelines has proven illusory. This Article proposes a descriptive theory that explains the fundaments of contemporary pleading doctrine in …
Organizational Standing In Environmental Litigation, Jeanne A. Compitello
Organizational Standing In Environmental Litigation, Jeanne A. Compitello
Touro Law Review
No abstract provided.
Is A Judgment Open To Collateral Attack If Rendered Without Written Pleadings As Required By Statute, Or If The Writings Do Not Comply With The Statutory Requirements?, John R. Rood
Articles
It is believed that no good reason can be assigned for answering the above question in the affirmative. Certainly none has yet been discovered in a careful search of the cases involving the point. And yet the assurance and unanimity with which lawyers and judges give the affirmative answer to it on first thought is indeed remarkable. For instance, Mr. Justice FIELD in speaking for the Supreme Court of the United States, on the question as to whether a judgment is subject to collateral attack if one served with process is not permitted to make any defense when he appears …