Supreme Court of the United States Commons^™

Transforming Constitutional Doctrine Through Mandatory Appeals From Three-Judge District Courts: The Warren And Burger Courts And Their Contemporary Lessons, Michael E. Solimine

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

Judicial interpretations of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment underwent significant change, both expanding and retrenching in various ways, in Supreme Court doctrine during the Warren and Burger Courts. An underappreciated influence on the change is the method by which those cases reached the Court’s docket. A significant number of the cases reached the Court’s docket not by discretionary grants of writs of certiorari, as occurred in most other cases, but by mandatory appeals directly from three-judge district courts. This article makes several contributions regarding the important changes in these doctrines during the Warren Court …

A Toothless Tcpa: An Analysis Of Article Iii Standing, Personal Jurisdiction, And The Disjuncture Problem’S Impact On The Efficacy Of The Telephone Consumer Protection Act, Sebastian W. Johnson

University of Cincinnati Law Review

No abstract provided.

Three-Judge District Courts, Direct Appeals, And Reforming The Supreme Court’S Shadow Docket, Michael E. Solimine

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

The “shadow docket” is the term recently given to a long-standing practice of the United States Supreme Court, in granting or denying requests for stays of lower court decisions, often on a hurried basis with rudimentary briefing and no oral argument, and with little if any explanation by the Court or individual Justices. Recently the practice has received unusual attention inside and outside the legal community, because of its seemingly greater use by the Court in high-profile cases, with the emergency orders sought by the federal government or state officials. Scholars have advanced various reforms to ameliorate the perceived problems …

The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: The Case For Putting It To Work, Not To Rest, Bradford Higdon

University of Cincinnati Law Review

No abstract provided.

Institutional Loyalty And The Design Of Partisan Gerrymandering Adjudication In The Federal Courts, Michael E. Solimine

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

In 2019 the Supreme Court held in Rucho v. Common Cause that challenges in federal court to partisan gerrymandering were nonjusticiable political questions. Writing for the 5-4 majority, Chief Justice John Roberts expressed concern that frequently deciding such cases would politicize the Court itself. Such expressions seem to fit well within the characterization of the Chief Justice as an institutionalist concerned with the legitimacy and reputation of the federal courts. This article addresses how the unique design and procedures of gerrymandering litigation in federal courts ought to inform such institutional loyalty arguments. Those features include that such cases are litigated …

Disbelief Doctrines, Sandra F. Sperino

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

Employment discrimination law is riddled with doctrines that tell courts to believe employers and not workers. Judges often use these disbelief doctrines to dismiss cases at the summary judgment stage. At times, judges even use them after a jury trial to justify nullifying jury verdicts in favor of workers.

This article brings together many disparate discrimination doctrines and shows how they function as disbelief doctrines, causing courts to believe employers and not workers. The strongest disbelief doctrines include the stray comments doctrine, the same decisionmaker inference, and the same protected class inference. However, these are not the only ones. Even …

Attorney-Client Privilege When The Client Is A Public Official: Litigating The Opening Act Of The Impeachment Drama, Timothy K. Armstrong

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

The divided panel decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in /n re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998), represented a dramatic shift in that court's thinking on the question whether the attorney-client privilege protects what a government official says to his agency's counsel in confidence. Although the court of appeals in at least four previous decisions had held that a government agency client holds the same privilege any other client would under like circumstances to communicate with counsel in private, the Lindsey court took a quite different view.