Other Law Commons^™

The Judge As Umpire: Ten Principles, Brett M. Kavanaugh

Catholic University Law Review

In his speech, Judge Kavanaugh discusses the notion of Judges as umpires and sets forth ten principles that are vital for an impartial judiciary dedicated to the rule of law in our separation of powers system. According to Judge Kavanaugh, Judges cannot act as partisans, must follow establish rules and principles, and must strive for consistency, not only in terms of respecting precedent, but from day to day, in how they decide cases, confront issues, interpret statutes and interpret the Constitution.

Judges must also understand that their role is to apply the rules rather than remake the rules according to …

Judicial Diversity On State Supreme Courts, John D. Castiglione, Gregory L. Acquiaviva

John D. Castiglione

State courts of last resort are, in many ways, the primary expositors of law in the United States. Criminal law, contracts, family law, wills, trusts, and estates -- just to name a few -- fall within their purview. And yet, we know surprisingly little about just who sits on these courts -- state supreme court judges have been described as “perhaps the most important and least written about group within the judicial system” of the United States. Indeed, the last study on the characteristics and experiences of the state supreme court justices is almost fifteen years old. This Article presents …

Only Skin Deep: The Cost Of Partisan Politics On Minority Diversity Of The Federal Bench: Why Care Whether Judges Look “Like America” If, Because Of Politics, A “Voice Of Color” Has Become A “Whisper Of Color”?, Sylvia R. Lazos

Scholarly Works

This article explores the difficulties encountered in diversifying the federal bench and why the partisanship of the confirmation process decreases the diversity of viewpoints on the bench. Presidents value diversity in nominating judges. While Bill Clinton and George W. Bush had very contrasting political styles and judicial philosophies, the judges appointed by these two presidents now account for almost 80% of the current active federal minority judges. There has been progress in the area of descriptive diversity; currently 18% of the active federal bench is made up of minority judges according to data compiled from the Judicial Center. However, there …

Jewish Law: Deciphering The Code By Global Process And Analogy, Donna Litman

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Does A Diverse Judiciary Attain A Rule Of Law That Is Inclusive? What Grutter V. Bollinger Has To Say About Diversity On The Bench, Sylvia R. Lazos

Scholarly Works

Race matters, but judges and courts have failed to fashion a rule of law that is inclusive of all racial perspectives and realities in the United States. The reason for this dismal performance lies in how predominantly White judges, and therefore courts, conceptualize race. This article illustrates this proposition by analyzing the Rehnquist Court's race relations jurisprudence in three Supreme Court decisions handed down in 2003: Grutter v. Bollinger,Gratz v. Bollinger,and Georgia v. Ashcroft.Even as the United States Supreme Court entered increasingly complex areas of race relations, the Court continued to apply a simplistic concept of how race functions. The …

The William S. Boyd School Of Law Juvenile Justice Clinic, Mary E. Berkheiser

Scholarly Works

This article reviews the work of the Juvenile Justice Clinic at the William S. Boyd School of Law.

Comment On Frederick Schauer's Prediction And Particularity Comment, Gerald F. Leonard

Faculty Scholarship

Ignorance of the law is generally no excuse. I say generally because the century since the publication of The Path of the Law has brought a small but increasing number of exceptions to the rule. In Oliver Wendell Holmes's day, however, exceptions to the rule were nearly nonexistent, much to Holmes's satisfaction.1 In The Common Law, Holmes said that the law requires persons "at their peril to know the teachings of common experience, just as it requires them to know the law." 2 He did not, of course, actually think that common experience was perfectly knowable or judicial interpretation perfectly …