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Full-Text Articles in Natural Law

The Temptation Of Cosmic Private Law Theory, Nathan B. Oman Dec 2021

The Temptation Of Cosmic Private Law Theory, Nathan B. Oman

Faculty Publications

It’s a heady time to be a theorist of private law. After decades of vague post-Realist functionalism or reductive economic theories, the latest generation of private law theorists have provided a proliferation of new philosophies of tort, contract, and property. The result has been a tremendous burst of intellectual creativity. While Kant and Hegel have been dragooned into debates over torts and contracts and even such supposedly wooly headed thinkers as Coke and Blackstone have been rehabilitated, there have been fewer efforts to generate natural law accounts of private law than one might expect, particularly in light of the revival …


The Path Less Traveled: A Natural Law Critique Of Justice Holmes’ Path Of The Law, Alexander Hamilton Mar 2021

The Path Less Traveled: A Natural Law Critique Of Justice Holmes’ Path Of The Law, Alexander Hamilton

Catholic University Law Review

American law and jurisprudence fail to solve fundamental problems in our country. Every lawyer and judge practices, knowingly or unknowingly, from a particular philosophy of law. Much of the practice of law in the United States is rooted in the thought of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. Holmes taught that law was not grounded in morality and logic, but rather the pragmatic rulings of judges. Our law schools and courts today follow Holmes in defining law as merely what a judge says it is. This Comment argues that Justice Holmes’ definition of law was fundamentally flawed and his jurisprudence should …


Reevaluating Legal Theory, Jeffrey Pojanowski Jan 2021

Reevaluating Legal Theory, Jeffrey Pojanowski

Journal Articles

Must a good general theory of law incorporate what is good for persons in general? This question has been at the center of methodological debates in general jurisprudence for decades. Answering “no,” Julie Dickson’s book Evaluation and Legal Theory offered both a clear and concise conspectus of positivist methodology, as well as a response to the longstanding objection that such an approach has to evaluate the data it studies rather than simply describe facts about legal systems. She agreed that legal positivism must evaluate. At the same time, she argued, it is possible to offer an evaluative theory of the …