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Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Law and Psychology
Remedies And The Psychology Of Ownership, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Forest Jourden
Remedies And The Psychology Of Ownership, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Forest Jourden
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski
No abstract provided.
The "New" Law And Psychology: A Reply To Critics, Skeptics, And Cautious Supporters, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski
The "New" Law And Psychology: A Reply To Critics, Skeptics, And Cautious Supporters, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski
No abstract provided.
Inside The Bankruptcy Judge's Mind, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie, Andrew J. Wistrich
Inside The Bankruptcy Judge's Mind, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie, Andrew J. Wistrich
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski
In this paper, we extend our prior work on generalist judges to explore whether specialization leads to superior judicial decision making. To do so, we report the results of a study of federal bankruptcy judges. In one prior study of bankruptcy judges, Ted Eisenberg reported evidence suggesting that bankruptcy judges, like generalist judges, are susceptible to the "self-serving" or "egocentric" bias when making judgments. Here, we report evidence showing that bankruptcy judges are vulnerable to anchoring and framing effects, but appear largely unaffected by the omission bias, a debtor's race, a debtor's apology, and "terror management" or "mortality salience."' Because …
Product-Related Risk And Cognitive Biases: The Shortcomings Of Enterprise Liability, James A. Henderson Jr., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski
Product-Related Risk And Cognitive Biases: The Shortcomings Of Enterprise Liability, James A. Henderson Jr., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski
Products liability law has witnessed a long debate over whether manufacturers should be held strictly liable for the injuries that products cause. Recently, some have argued that psychological research on human judgment supports adopting a regime of strict enterprise liability for injuries caused by product design. These new proponents of enterprise liability argue that the current system, in which manufacturer liability for product design turns on the manufacturer's negligence, allows manufacturers to induce consumers into undertaking inefficiently dangerous levels or types of consumption. In this paper we argue that the new proponents of enterprise liability have: (1) not provided any …
Heuristics And Biases In Bankruptcy Judges, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie, Andrew J. Wistrich
Heuristics And Biases In Bankruptcy Judges, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie, Andrew J. Wistrich
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski
Do specialized judges make better decisions than judges who are generalists? Specialized judges surely come to know their area of law well, but specialization might also allow judges to develop better, more reliable ways of assessing cases. We assessed this question by presenting a group of specialized judges with a set of hypothetical cases designed to elicit a reliance on common heuristics that can lead judges to make poor decisions. Although the judges resisted the influence of some of these heuristics, they also expressed a clear vulnerability to others. These results suggest that specialization does not produce better judgment.
Fraud By Hindsight, G. Mitu Gulati, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Donald C. Langevoort
Fraud By Hindsight, G. Mitu Gulati, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Donald C. Langevoort
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski
In securities-fraud cases, courts routinely admonish plaintiffs that they are not permitted to rely on allegations of "fraud by hindsight." In effect, courts disfavor plaintiffs' use of evidence of bad outcomes to support claims of securities fraud. Disfavoring hindsight evidence appears to tap into a well known, well-understood, and intuitively accessible problem of human judgment of "20/20 hindsight." Events come to seem predictable after unfolding, and hence, bad outcomes must have been predicted by people in a position to make forecasts. Psychologists call this phenomenon the hindsight bias. The popularity of this doctrine among judges deciding securities cases suggests that …