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Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons™
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Full-Text Articles in Dispute Resolution and Arbitration
Shleifer's Failure, Jonathan Klick
The Effect Of Judicial Expedience On Attorney Fees In Class Actions, Eric Helland, Jonathan Klick
The Effect Of Judicial Expedience On Attorney Fees In Class Actions, Eric Helland, Jonathan Klick
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Judges facing exogenous constraints on their pecuniary income have an incentive to reduce their workload to increase their private welfare. In the face of an increase in caseload, this incentive will induce judges to attempt to terminate some cases more rapidly. In class action cases, failing to grant an attorney fee request will delay termination. This conflict is likely to lead judges to authorize higher fees as court congestion increases. Using two data sets of class action settlements, we show that attorney fees are significantly and positively related to the congestion level of the court hearing the case.
The Tuna Court: Law And Norms In The World's Premier Fish Market, Eric Feldman
The Tuna Court: Law And Norms In The World's Premier Fish Market, Eric Feldman
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Legal scholars have long emphasized the corrosive impact of conflict on long-term commercial and interpersonal relationships. To minimize the negative consequences of such conflict, members of close-knit groups who anticipate future interactions create ways of resolving their disputes with reference to internal group norms rather than relying on state-mandated legal rules. From farmers in California’s Shasta County to jewelers in midtown Manhattan and neighbors in Sanders County, the literature describes people who create norms of conflict management that are faster and less expensive than relying on formal law, and lessen the harm that conflict causes to their relationships. This article …