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Full-Text Articles in Law

The Risky Interplay Of Tort And Criminal Law: Punitive Damages, Daniel M. Braun Jan 2013

The Risky Interplay Of Tort And Criminal Law: Punitive Damages, Daniel M. Braun

Daniel M Braun

The rise of modern mass tort litigation in the U.S. has transformed punitive damages into something of a “hot button” issue. Since the size of punitive damage awards grew so dramatically in the past half century, this private law remedy has begun to involve issues of constitutional rights that traditionally pertained to criminal proceedings. This has created a risky interplay between tort and criminal law, and courts have thus been trying to find ways to properly manage punitive damage awards. The once rapidly expanding universe of punitive damages is therefore beginning to contract. There remain, however, very serious difficulties. Despite …


Crop Insurance Bad Faith: Protection For America's Farmers, Chad G. Marzen Jan 2013

Crop Insurance Bad Faith: Protection For America's Farmers, Chad G. Marzen

Chad G. Marzen

This article examines issues concerning the potential liability of crop insurers for insurance bad faith, and discusses cases to date on the issue of federal preemption of insurance bad faith claims under the Federal Crop Insurance Act (FCIA) and the development of a general rule that bad faith claims under state law are not preempted by the FCIA. The article argues that the crop insurance bad faith remedy is designed as a check against egregious, intentional and reckless misconduct of a crop insurer in the handling of a claim and should be preserved by the courts.


The Merrill Doctrine And Federally Reinsured Crop Insurers, Chad G. Marzen Jan 2013

The Merrill Doctrine And Federally Reinsured Crop Insurers, Chad G. Marzen

Chad G. Marzen

Since 1947, the Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill decision has operated to bar claims of equitable estoppel against agents of the federal government. However, the applicability of the Merrill doctrine to insurers is unclear. There is a split of authority on this significant issue and it remains largely unresolved in numerous jurisdictions. An early trend developed where the courts applied the Merrill doctrine to alleged misrepresentations of agents of the FCIC as well as the agents of private insurers. In the early to mid 2000s, the decisions of three state courts (in Kentucky, Georgia and Tennessee) declined toe extend …


Segmented Settlements Are Not The Answer: A Response To Professor Squire’S Article, How Collective Settlements Camouflage The Costs Of Shareholder Lawsuits, Christopher C. French Jan 2013

Segmented Settlements Are Not The Answer: A Response To Professor Squire’S Article, How Collective Settlements Camouflage The Costs Of Shareholder Lawsuits, Christopher C. French

Journal Articles

In his recent article, Professor Richard Squire offers a provocative theory in which he claims the underlying claimants in shareholder litigation against corporate policyholders are overcompensated due to what he describes as “cramdown” settlements, under which insurers are forced to settle due to the “duty to contribute” that arises under multi-layered directors and officers (“D&O”) insurance programs. He also offers a novel idea regarding how this problem could be fixed by what he refers to as “segmented” settlements in which each insurer and the policyholder would be allowed to settle separately and consider only its own interests in doing so. …


Segmented Settlements Are Not The Answer: A Response To Professor Squire’S Article, How Collective Settlements Camouflage The Costs Of Shareholder Lawsuits, Christopher C. French Dec 2012

Segmented Settlements Are Not The Answer: A Response To Professor Squire’S Article, How Collective Settlements Camouflage The Costs Of Shareholder Lawsuits, Christopher C. French

Christopher C. French

In his recent article, Professor Richard Squire offers a provocative theory in which he claims the underlying claimants in shareholder litigation against corporate policyholders are overcompensated due to what he describes as “cramdown” settlements, under which insurers are forced to settle due to the “duty to contribute” that arises under multi-layered directors and officers (“D&O”) insurance programs. He also offers a novel idea regarding how this problem could be fixed by what he refers to as “segmented” settlements in which each insurer and the policyholder would be allowed to settle separately and consider only its own interests in doing so. …