Law Commons^™

Rethinking Disclosure In A World Of Risk-Based Pricing, Patricia Mccoy

Patricia A. McCoy

In response to subprime loan abuses, it is common for policymakers to exhort consumers to comparison-shop for residential mortgages. This policy prescription ignores the fact that price revelation works differently in the prime and subprime markets, impeding search in subprime. In the prime market, lenders reveal firm prices for free, without requiring consumers to first submit loan applications. This dynamic, combined with Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA) disclosures that standardize prices, make it easy to comparison-shop for prime mortgages. In contrast, in the subprime market featuring risk-based pricing, consumers must reveal their creditworthiness before lenders can determine loan prices, which allows lenders …

Turning A Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance Of Predatory Lending, Kathleen Engel, Patricia Mccoy

Patricia A. McCoy

Today, Wall Street finances up to eighty percent of subprime home loans through securitization. The subprime sector, which is designed for borrowers with blemished credit, has been dogged by predatory lending charges, many of which have been substantiated. As subprime securitization has grown, so have charges that securitization turns a blind eye to financing abusive loans. In this paper, we examine why secondary market discipline has failed to halt the securitization of predatory loans.

When investors buy securities backed by predatory loans, they face a classic lemons problem in the form of credit risk, prepayment risk, and litigation risk. Securitization …

The Financial Reform Act: Will It Succeed In Reversing The Causes Of The Subprime Crisis And Prevent Future Crises?, Charles W. Murdock

Charles W. Murdock

Summary: The Financial Reform Act: Will It Succeed in Reversing the Causes of the Subprime Crisis and Prevent Future Crises? By: Professor Charles W. Murdock

The current financial crisis, which could have plunged the world into a financial abyss similar to the Great Depression, is far from resolved. The financial institutions, which this article asserts caused the crisis, have returned to profitability and have paid billions of dollars in bonuses, while ordinary Americans have borne the brunt of the meltdown, with formal unemployment hanging around the 10% mark. This has caused some to comment that profits have been privatized and …

How Incentives Drove The Subprime Crisis, Charles W. Murdock

Charles W. Murdock

In order to address any systemic problem, whether the goal is to change the system, o regulate the system, or change the incentives driving a system, it is necessary to appreciate all the drivers operating within the system. In the case of the subprime crisis, one of the drivers was the changing nature of the subprime loans, which was not factored into the models used by the investment bankers, the credit rating agencies, and the issuers of credit default swaps.

This paper is an attempt to look dispassionately at the subprime crisis from a particular perspective, namely, the incentives that …

2003 Testimony On Securitization And Predatory Lending In A Hearing On 'Protecting Homeowners: Preventing Abusive Lending While Preserving Access To Credit', Kurt Eggert

Kurt Eggert

This 2003 Congressional Testimony warns of the dangers of securitizing subprime loans. After defining "predatory lending" and describing the process of securitization, it argues that securitizing subprime loans has many dangers. While some have claimed that securitizing loans lowers loan costs to borrowers, the reverse might be true and securitization may actually increase the costs of loans to borrowers. This testimony states that securitization undermines loan underwriting. As originators immediately sell their loans and so face less risk of loss even if a borrower defaults, the originators naturally will spend less time and effort screening potential loans for default, thus …